A neoliberalizing Chinese cinema: political economy of the Chinese film industry in post-WTO China by Zhu, Xiaoxi
   
 
 1 





A neoliberalizing Chinese cinema: political economy of the Chinese 







A thesis submitted to the Department of Media and Communications of 
the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
London, March 2019 
  






I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I 
have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried 
out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that 
full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written 
consent. 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any 
third party. 
I declare that my thesis consists of 71012 words. 
  




This thesis aims to investigate the industry restructuration of the Chinese film industry in the 
context of China integrating into the global neoliberal capitalist system since its WTO entry in 
2002. By interrogating the power dynamics between the Party-state, domestic capital and 
transnational media capital, this thesis explores respective roles each of the three stakeholders 
have played in shaping the commercialization and marketization of the Chinese film industry.  
Methodically, this thesis primarily relies on elite interviews with industry professionals, 
together with critical discourse analysis of one key policy document, and secondary data 
collected from news outlets, trade publications, industry reports, etc. Drawing on the empirical 
data, I present four main arguments.  
 
First, in light of China’s culture system reform and the evolution of film policies since 2002, 
the Party-state continues to utilize film as an ideological instrument for consolidating the 
Party’s hegemonic rule and sustaining its legitimacy. The Party-state proves ingenious in 
governing the Chinese film industry at the discursive level as China experiencing the 
integration into global neoliberalism.  Second, despite the installation of the market mechanism 
in the film sector, the Party-state manages to retain control over the Chinese film industry, not 
only on the ideological front, but also in the economic sense by partaking in the competition 
with private capital, domestic and foreign. Third, the Chinese film industry has been 
profoundly transformed by the trend of conglomeration driven by other capital-intensive 
industry sectors in China, in particular the internet sector. Riding on their explosive success in 
the new century, several key tech giants seek to build Chinese media conglomerates that are 
competitive on the global scale. This process is further complicated by the keen participation 
of transnational media capital, mainly Hollywood players. Co-production film projects best 
epitomize the transnational collaboration which however, haven’t achieved much success. 
Fourth, the Chinese film workers have developed professional skills that enable them to 
navigate between political imperatives, commercial demands, and personal fulfilment. The 
mental struggle of balancing individual artistic vision with political and commercial constraints 
is palpable for film practitioners on a daily basis, though to varying degree. One way of coping 
with the challenge is exercise agency in a highly depoliticized manner, channelling creative 
energy into filmmaking activities that are either considered politically safe, or in accordance 
with the official ideologies, in some cases pandering to the Party-state. The fact that Chinese 
film workers actively transform themselves into depoliticized subjects in their professional 
work, indicating neoliberalism as a national hegemonic project at its core.     
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and justification 
 
Now as I look back at my research journey, several things—industry news as well as fieldwork 
observations—come straight to mind. They are noteworthy at the beginning of a critical 
narrative about the commercialization and marketization of the Chinese film industry since 
2002 for three reasons. Firstly, these brief anecdotes make different stakeholders explicit as 
participants in the narratives surrounding the Chinese film industry, highlighting their role in 
shaping the dynamics of the Chinese film industry. Secondly, they encapsulate the complicities 
and ambiguities embedded in the power relations between those stakeholders. And most 
importantly, they help shed light on the intricate connections between the Chinese film industry 
and the broader sociocultural and political conditions of post-WTO China. 
 
When Feng Xiaogang was approached by e-commerce tycoon Jack Ma, the Chairman of 
Alibaba Group, with the offer of a job, he hesitated at first. As an established film director with 
a reputation within Chinese and international circles, he considered it beneath his dignity to 
direct a gala to promote an online shopping event for Singles’ Day on November 11, 2015 
(Zhang, 2015). However, Jack Ma successfully persuaded Feng to take the job by telling him 
to “catch up with the trend” (Ibid). Indeed, the interaction between renowned film directors 
and commercial events was to become a trend—one engineered and propelled by Alibaba and 
other Chinese Internet companies—and it would go on to transform the Chinese film industry 
dramatically (Ibid). The news that Feng Xiaogang had agreed to Ma’s proposal resonated 
instantly with a bold statement Ma had made one year earlier in a keynote speech he delivered 
at the WSJ.D Live conference in Laguna Beach on October 27, 2014, when he had proclaimed 
Alibaba “the biggest entertainment company in the world” (Bond, 2014). 
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Starting from July 1, 2017, the Chinese audience found themselves bombarded by a three-
minute-long promotion video entitled “The Glory and the Dream—Our Chinese Dream” (光
荣与梦想—我们的中国梦系列公益片) before every picture in theatres.1 Followed by the 
distinguished Dragon Logo (龙标 long biao)2, the film release license without which rejection 
of theatrical release is guaranteed, these propaganda videos introduce themes including the 
“Chinese Dream” (中国梦), core socialist values, the four comprehensives, and the five-in-one 
overall arrangement. The parallel between this promotional video and historian William 
Manchester’s book The Glory and the Dream: A Narrative History of America, 1932-1972 
(1974) is blatant (Kwok, 2017). As if the term Chinese Dream itself is not suggestive enough, 
the video puts forward a message that makes party doctrines ever more the centre of attention.  
 
I share these stories in an attempt to draw attention to three major aspects of the transformations 
encompassing the Chinese film industry within the timeframe of 2002-2017, which comprise 
the theme of this thesis. First, I aim to revisit the state-cinema relationship and the way in which 
the Party-state utilizes the Chinese film industry as an ideological instrument to consolidate its 
ruling hegemony and legitimacy amongst domestic audiences and to boost its soft power 
abroad. Second, I try to examine the involvement of transnational capital and domestic capital 
from outside the film sector, specifically the Chinese Internet corporations, in pushing and 
shaping the commercialization and marketization of the Chinese film industry as China 
integrates into global neoliberal capitalism. And third, I draw on original interviews with film 
professionals to explicate their coping strategies in terms of navigating between political 
imperatives, commercial demands, and personal, artistic and aesthetic fulfilments. 
 
1 http://ent.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0626/c1012-29363474.html  
2 In Mainland China, film release license is commonly referred to as the “dragon logo”, because it has a yellow 
dragon-shaped logo on the red background. The remarks followed the logo changed from “the Film Bureau, 
State Administration of Radio, Film & Television” to “the China Film Administration” in December 2018, in 
accordance with administrative reshuffle undertook in early 2018. See more in Chapter 4 on film policy.  
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The 21st century has witnessed the mounting visibility of the Chinese film industry as a globally 
recognizable power player. In terms of typologies of cinema, it is experiencing what might be 
termed a transition from a postsocialist third world cinema to a regional powerhouse imaging 
and claiming the global as its scale of operation. No sign is more explicit of the meteoric rise 
of the Chinese film industry than the annual growth in the number of feature films, box office 
sales, and cinema screens (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2 below). On average, China’s box-office 
takings grew by an annual rate of more than 40% from 2003 to 2010. And in 2012, China’s 
domestic film revenues surpassed those of Japan, making the Chinese film market the second 
largest in the world, second only to the United States.3 With fewer than 4,000 screens in 2007, 
the number of movie screens increased to 54,165 by March 2018, which means it has been 
increasing at an average of 19 screens a day since 2012.4 The nation-wide infrastructural 
renovation and adaptation in part and by degrees enabled and accelerated by the real estate 




3 https://www.economist.com/business/2015/10/15/lost-in-shangywood  
4 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/china-overtakes-us-for-having-the-most-cinema-screens-w9z7cvnn3  




Table 1.1: Number of feature films from 2002 to 2017 




Table 1.2: Annual domestic box office revenue from 2002 to 2017 
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Table 1.3: Number of cinema screens from 2003 to 2017 
Source: SAPRRFT, Film Industry Research Report 
 
The film screening infrastructural improvements and transformations have to be seen in tandem 
with changes in the production of filmic content. The once historical wuxia epics popularized 
by Director Zhang Yimou have experienced a rapid decline, turning the dapian (大片 ) 
phenomenon overnight into a seemingly obsolete object of research. In place of the so-called 
Chinese blockbusters are now hundreds of commercial genre films. Chinese filmmakers are 
taking a page from Hollywood scripts and focusing on producing genre films, including 
romantic comedies, thrillers, crime, horror, and more. This increased diversification in content 
can also be seen as a timely response to demographic changes in the audiences for films in 
China, with an increment in the proportion of young viewers. Along with the proliferation of 
genre films is the growing appeal of local films, although Hollywood blockbusters still generate 
huge chunk of annual box office revenue. The opening up of the Chinese film market makes it 
one of the most desired overseas markets and collaborative partners for more mature film 
industries such as Hollywood, or those closer in terms of geographical and cultural proximity, 
such as the Korean film industry. The dazzling rise of the Chinese film industry is astutely 
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captured by western media where the dominant power of the global film industry lies. For 
example, in a December 2013 edition, The Economist devoted a cover to “China’s Hollywood”, 
proclaiming the emergence of a promising film market in the East.5 
 
Considering that Chinese cinema only began to be incorporated into China’s economic reform 
programme in the early 1990s, this is without doubt a major achievement. Historically, films 
and the cinematic apparatus came to China from the “West”, along with the warships that 
forced “free trade” on China in the mid-19th-century Opium Wars (Zhang, 2004). As a new 
form of art and entertainment originating in the West, films arrived in Shanghai in 1896, only 
one year after their initial “invention” and screening. From the late nineteenth century until 
1949, foreign films accounted for 90 percent of the Chinese screening market, among which 
Hollywood films were the predominant presence from the 1920s to the 1940s (Lu, 1997; Xia, 
2002). At the end of the civil war and soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereafter PRC), an indigenous cinema was developed and nationalized under the leadership 
of the Communist Party of China (hereafter CCP), turning into a state-owned enterprise that 
was stripped of its previous industrial elements, and made to serve merely as a crucial part of 
the various mediated “ideological state apparatuses” (hereafter ISA) (Althusser, 1971).6  
 
If the foregoing discussion suggests a crude turning of cinema to an ideological tool, it reflects 
the historical realities. Production was subsidized and ideologically motivated with the purpose 
of propagating communist ideology and ensuring the Party’s political control. The profit 
 
5 https://www.economist.com/christmas-specials/2013/12/21/the-red-carpet  
6 The term “ideological state apparatus” (ISA) was developed by the Marxist theorist Louis Althusser (1971) to 
denote institutions such as education, the churches, family, media, trade unions and the law, which are formally 
outside state control but which serve to transmit the values of the state, to interpellate those individuals affected 
by these, and to maintain order in a society, and above all to reproduce relations of production. Ideology refers 
to a system of meaning that helps to define, explain and produce the social “reality” that “serves to establish and 
sustain relations of domination” (Thompson, 1984: 56). 
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motive for cinema production which was burgeoning in other more capitalistic states was 
brought to a halt or completely eliminated by the endless political turmoil of the Maoist era, 
and was not reinstated for half a century. The Party guidelines were driven to even further 
extremes during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and, subject to the 
unrelenting political demands of the Maoist leadership, Chinese cinema was reduced almost to 
the role of a transparent vehicle for political propaganda and ideological indoctrination (Yin & 
Ling, 2002). Foreign films that were allowed to enter China were selected predominantly from 
socialist-bloc countries.7 As a result, exchange between Chinese cinema and the outside world 
was extremely limited thought not entirely eliminated (Ma, 2016).  
 
Apart from that, Chinese cinema has maintained its connection with world cinemas to varying 
degrees. In the 1980s when China started to open its door to the outside world, US films that 
passed strict censorship began to reappear in China on a very small scale. For example, in 1986 
China established cooperative ties with America’s Music Corporation of America (hereafter 
MCA) and agreed to import films from MCA for several years. Similar treatment went to 
Columbia Pictures Industries Inc, 20th Century Fox and The Walt Disney Company. Even 
then, the imported films were either played on Chinese TV channels or exhibited in limited 
theatres for very circumscribed audiences.  
 
In 1989 the Tiananmen Square Incident temporarily interrupted the thaw in cultural exchange 
which then resumed about three years later, signifying the second return of Hollywood film 
importation. In 1994 when the US and China signed an agreement regarding intellectual 
property rights, a quota system of 10 movies per year on the basis of revenue-sharing was 
 
7 During the thirty years from 1951 to 1981, only one American movie was allowed to be shown in China, Salt 
of the Earth (1954). 
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imposed on the import of Hollywood movies for the first time. The year 2002 when China 
entered the World Trade Organization (hereafter WTO) marked a turning point for China’s 
integration into global capitalism, which also sets the backdrop against which the new Chinese 
film industry began to embark on its path towards globalization. The original 10 slots restricted 
by the quota system increased to 20 in 2002, and in 2012 an extra 14 slots were added for 3D 
and IMAX films, bringing the total revenue-sharing slots to 34 (Coonan, 2014). 
 
The market-driven shift in cultural production did not emerge until the 1990s when the official 
label of “socialist market economy” justified the extension of market reforms to new areas of 
the national economy. For the first time in history, the Chinese film industry was put on the 
front line of economic restructuring. In the early 2000s, many documents issued by the State 
Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (hereafter SARFT) began to refer to cinema as 
an “industry” or chanye, rather than by the previously used term “cause” or shiye, which had 
implied an understanding and acknowledgment of cinema’s political and pedagogical functions 
in China.8 Thereafter, a process of marketization and commercialization took off at full speed 
with China becoming a member of WTO. 2002 is therefore a landmark for the modernization 
of Chinese cinema in the sense that for the first time, the film industry became a part of China’s 
overall integration into transnational capitalism and was pushed into direct economic and 
ideological competition with external forces, particularly referring to Hollywood. In early 2003 
the film industry was claimed to be the most promising pillar-industry among cultural 
industries by the Chinese authority with remit for strengthening the marketization agenda.  
 
Since then a series of policy reforms have paved the way for a painful process of wrenching 
industrial restructuring. The formerly state-subsidized and Party-controlled propaganda 
 
8 The regulatory institution later changed its name to State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television 
of the People's Republic of China (SAPPRFT) in 2013. 
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machinery of cinematic production was put to the test of the market economy and has gradually 
turned into a system regulated by state supervision but also compatible with commercial 
imperatives. In anticipation of Hollywood’s aggressive expansion in the Chinese film market 
upon China’s accession to the WTO, filmmakers and industry observers agonized about “the 
wolves at the door” (Zhao & Schiller, 2001). This anxiety-laden discourse gradually withered 
away in public discussion when the government showed a strong determination to push for 
economic reforms in the cultural sector and to work with transnational capital. However, the 
Chinese film industry soon faced challenges shared by other national cinemas which have also 
been plagued by marketization. Therefore, the initiative to rebuild the link between Chinese 
cinema and the outside world was mostly considered as a remedy for China’s ailing national 
cinema as it went through the growing pains of commercialization and marketization (Zhu, 
2003).  
 
One thing I want to clarify here concerns my use of terminology. Much scholarly attention has 
been paid to the formation of Chinese art cinema that came into being in the late 1970s as a 
counterpart to mainstream cinema (Lei, 2003; Yang, 2018). 9  Following its own path of 
development in the Reform Era (1978-present), Chinese art cinema has already been 
comprehensively studied not only for its aesthetic properties, but also as an integral part of the 
entire Chinese film system, as it contributes to a broader investigation of the social dynamics 
of postsocialist Chinese society. In a way, mainstream cinema and art cinema are two sides of 
the same coin. Confined by scope and scale, my research concentrates on mainstream cinema, 
as opposed to art cinema, which operates according to different sets of logics, both 
institutionally and aesthetically. Hence, the terms I will use in the rest of this thesis such as 
 
9 Please read Yang (2018) for a concise yet comprehensive explanation of the categorization from a historical 
perspective. 
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“Chinese cinema in the post-WTO era” and “a neoliberalizing Chinese cinema” only refer to 
Chinese mainstream cinema within the timeframe of 2002-2017 (the justification for this 
timeframe can be found in the next section), while leaving out other significant components of 
Chinese cinema of the same time period, normally known as Chinese independent cinema or 
cinema of the urban generation (Zhen, 2007). Additionally, this categorization should be 
differentiated from another widely accepted classification method which sorts all Chinese films 
into three all-encompassing categories: leitmotif (propaganda) film, entertainment 
(commercial) film, and art film by the start of the 1990s (Zhang, 2007; Zhen, 1994). My usages 
of those descriptive terms for films in the following chapters comply with this classification 
method. 
 
In summary, a brief retrospective account of the Chinese film industry in the contemporary 
arena seems to suggest a prosperous and growing indigenous film market that has greatly 
benefited from the government’s de-regulatory policies towards the cultural and media sectors 
since 2002. The cultural system reforms initiated at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
appear to have provided fertile ground for the development of the Chinese film industry, as a 
constituent of the other Chinese cultural industries, which has been zealously pushed by the 
Chinese authorities to the forefront of market reforms.10 Nevertheless, there is no shortage of 
evidence showing that the Chinese film industry is continuing to experience a turbulent period 
of transformation that is characterized by uncertainties, conflicts and chaos. 
 
At the forefront, the entry of Internet companies awash with capital is turning the film industry 
into an integral part of a much bigger picture. Waves of mergers and acquisitions across the 
IT, media and entertainment sectors are setting a tone of consolidation and conglomeration that 
 
10 The genealogy of China’s cultural system reform will be elaborated in Chapter 4. 
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is by and large driven and led by tech giants. Great threats are imposed upon film forerunners 
who have been spending about a decade trying to establish leading positions in the film 
industry. Established film companies, in turn, are feeling the pain of industrial and 
technological upgrading due to the penetration of Internet companies into the entertainment 
domain. These Internet-companies-turned-film-producers in turn have taken on a significant 
role in shaping the contours of the development of the Chinese film industry in recent years, 
and will most certainly be implicated in changes in narrative, form and content in years to 
come.  
 
These new conditions are wearing away the advantages that established Chinese cinema 
producers have built through time, experience and great effort, while appearing to give Internet 
companies the upper hand in the Chinese cinema industry within just a few years. Now, both 
parties are improvising in the face of a film market changing at an unprecedented pace. To 
make sense of the transformations taking place in the Chinese film industry, it is of vital 
importance to look at the way it fits into the economic transition that is to large extent defined 
by the advancement in digital technologies. During this contemporary period of industrial 
transformation, newcomers are looking for ways to rebuild the entire industry order, while old 
players are striving to adjust their business models to adapt to this new environment.  
 
The dynamics in the Chinese film industry are further complicated by the continuing pressure 
to open up its film market as part of the WTO membership package. Enjoying the benefits of 
state protectionism, domestic films outplayed foreign films in the local market in terms of box 
office performance in 2013. However, that’s the exception to a long history of foreign films 
taking up more than half of the box office share in China. With the full-scale opening up of the 
Chinese film market in 2017, people cannot help but brood over the question as how to cope 
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with the Hollywood attack. My research captures the proactive strategies of local companies 
to expand globally. Thorny questions, however, remain: under a global neoliberal framework 
to what extent can and will the Chinese state intervene in the imbalanced flows of transnational 
capital and culture, and in which ways can the Chinese film industry unsettle the existing power 
relations embedded in the global film market?  
 
With capital flooding in, filmmaking is increasingly subject to the logic of commerce. Under 
radical financialization and market-driven calculations, films become highly replicable 
products with similar ingredients and little imagination or creativity so as to reduce risk and 
ostensibly to guarantee returns. Creative and critical potential appears to be stifled when the 
big screen is rife with stories about urban youth and historical legends, most of the time to say 
the least, made worse by the elusive censorship system and by knowing self-censorship. Box 
office fraud has become a common practice in the Chinese film industry. Without sophisticated 
and effective regulatory mechanisms in place, misbehaviours such as “buying/stealing box 
office” are rampant under the table.11 Theatres adopt all sorts of means to manipulate box office 
data and viewership figures to artificially inflate reported ticket sales. Manipulating and 
fabricating online reviews on major online platforms by hiring a so-called “water army” to 
boost marketing or to smear competing products is also commonplace.12 The “Water army” is 
a nickname for web users who are hired to talk up or talk down a given movie. For every post, 
one would be paid 10 to 50 Chinese cents. Usually those who do this dirty work only get around 
40% of what the film companies spend on it. The rest goes to online promotion firms acting as 
middlemen. So, one notorious marketing strategy is to launch a clandestine smear campaign 
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other undercurrents going unreported in mass media such as casting couch scandals, and how 
film businesses are used as the ideal vehicle for money laundering.13 All these irregularities 
add to a tumultuous and problematic reality that is strikingly incomprehensible to an outsider.  
 
In this thesis I examine the 21st Chinese film industry as a social, cultural and political 
formation in the context of China’s official integration into the global capitalist system, 
epitomized by China’s entry into the WTO in 2002. Instead of studying the aesthetic and 
cultural dimensions of cinema, a tendency that has dominated research on Chinese cinema for 
decades long, I apply the approach of critical political economy to analysing the Chinese film 
industry as a socially integrated economic institution imbued with cultural and ideological 
implications. By examining the industrial restructuring of the Chinese film industry in post-
WTO China when cultural production and circulation is increasingly influenced by and 
intertwined with forces of global capitalism and technological advancement, this thesis aims 
to explore the complex dynamics between the Chinese state, domestic capital and transnational 
capital, with an especial focus on the changing role of the Party-state in shaping the cinematic 
scene, both domestically and globally.  
 
1.2 Contextualization and qualification 
 
In light of the massive scale and complexity of Chinese cinema, to make this research 
manageable, I set up specific temporal and spatial boundaries in my thesis. Temporally, I use 
China’s accession into the WTO in 2002 as the starting point for a new formative period of 
 
13 The producer interviewee who revealed to me those shadowy sides of the film industry asked to remain 
anonymous and off the record. According to the producer interviewee, some would actually pay money to be a 
part of big productions, usually playing supporting roles. And a select few can have their sugar daddies 
underwrite big-budget projects and surround themselves with big names. 
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Chinese cinema. Although except during the Maoist era Chinese cinema has never really been 
completely isolated from the outside world, it was not until China became an official member 
of the WTO that the idea of “globalization” can be said to have applied in defining Chinese 
cinema at a discursive level.14 For the sake of analytical clarity and consistency, I delimit the 
timeframe of the post-WTO era from 2002 to 2017. Accordingly, all the movies I mention in 
this thesis, either briefly as examples or extensively for textual analysis, are ones that were 
produced and exhibited during this specific timeframe.   
 
Spatially, the focus of my research is on cinema of Mainland China or PRC, which I am fully 
aware is an organic component of a much larger cinematic constellation (Lim & Ward, 2011; 
Rojas & Chow, 2013; Zhang, 2004; Zhang, 2012). I acknowledge the fact that Mainland 
Chinese cinema has, to varying degrees, always maintained connections with cinemas from 
other areas of Greater China such as Hong Kong cinema and Taiwan cinema. However, given 
its enormity as an object of study, I narrow my research object down to Mainland Chinese 
cinema, which I believe deserves in-depth examination in its own right.  
 
This research project is concerned about the production of cultural commodities, which in this 
case refers to a process and a range of activities concerning film production, circulation, 
distribution and exhibition. As such, I acknowledge the importance of both textuality and 
consumption, and therefore in coming chapters, textual analysis of film (summary of themes, 
plots and characters) will be conducted to examine how nationalism and its relation to the state 
is reflected and performed in the Chinese film industry; nevertheless, this is essentially, a piece 
of research into cultural production within a capitalist system stamped with Chinese 
 
14 I use globalization in a narrow sense, as interchangeable with the “going global” scheme. I would also like to 
clarify that the CCP’s comprehensive “going out” strategy came before the logic applied to the film sector. 
Devised at the turn of the century, the policy encouraged Chinese enterprises, backed by the country’s foreign-
exchange reserves, to acquire assets and expand business overseas.  
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characteristics. Yet, contrary to belief that political economic research is solely concerned with 
the social materialist condition in which cultural products are made into formation, it also relies 
on other theoretical resources and methodologies which integrate non-materialist elements into 
understanding and explaining production processes. A critical approach to policy analysis 
premised on the recognition of the power of language will be appropriated in this research to 
investigate the ways in which the CCP leadership naturalizes and legitimizes particular official 
ideologies through political documents.  
 
This is also a research project conducted from an institutional perspective. It proposes that 
national cinema strives for viability and survival in a market economy conditioned by the logic 
of neoliberal globalization, subject to international regulatory laws, and in competition with 
other national cinemas and other media formats. It locates the development of the Chinese film 
industry at the intersection of commerce (both domestic and global market economy), cultural 
production, and the Chinese Party-state against the background of neoliberal globalization. 
More importantly, it foregrounds the role of the Chinese Party-state in mediating other forces, 
including domestic capital, transnational capital and international institutions. However, using 
the state as point of entry to analyze the Chinese film industry is by no means giving the state 
supreme status in relation to other factors. Instead, it acknowledges the fact that with regard to 
the Chinese cinema industry the state is in a continuously and mutually constitutive relationship 
with other forces in various forms.  
 
Ultimately, my research utilizes the Chinese film industry as a vantage point to examine 
China’s changing state-society relationship and its interaction with transnational capital. In 
Chinese cinema studies today, it is rare to find thorough studies of how decades of economic 
restructuring have been fabricated and embodied in Chinese cinema. The film industry, the 
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most political and commercial of modern industries, serves as a crucial space to observe how 
reality of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” unfolds and what challenges facing China 
as it emerges as a major world economy and cultural force. In no other sectors are the powerful 
forces of ideological politics and commerce so dramatically and visibly joined together and 
presented to the people as a single product. Thus, the Chinese film industry offers a purview 
into both the political economy of China’s neoliberal project and its far-reaching implications 
on culture, thus contributing to the discussion of variations of neoliberalism across the globe. 
 
I do not intend to take on the task of providing a comprehensive account of this transformative 
and decisive period of the Chinese film industry, which would require thorough analysis of 
every aspect of cinema from ideology, to aesthetics, economics, technology and audience. 
Instead, I focus on political, economic and cultural factors conducive to the changes in the 
Chinese film industry, manifested in state policies, institutional restructuring, and filmic 
content.  
 
1.3 Critical political economy approach to the analysis of film industry 
 
Research on Chinese cinema has been undertaken by scholars from a wide range of disciplines 
and perspectives.15 Researchers with a political economic background have criticized the heavy 
inclination towards textual analysis and film theory in Chinese film studies (Zhu, 2003). This 
 
15 Chinese film studies has been a bourgeoning field in academic circles since the mid-1980s. Influential works 
of Chinese film studies include Perspectives on Chinese cinema (1991) edited by Chris Berry, Paul Clark’s 
(1987) Chinese cinema: Culture and politics since 1949, New Chinese cinema: Forms, identities, politics (1994) 
edited by Nick Browne, et al., and Jerome Silbergeld’s (1999) China into film: Frames of reference in 
contemporary Chinese cinema. Rey Chow’s Primitive passions: Visuality, sexuality, ethnography, and 
contemporary Chinese cinema (1995) is framed by postcolonial theories. Jinhua Dai and Shuqin Cui approached 
the Chinese cinema through the lenses of feminism theories. See also Cui Shuqin’s (2003) Women through the 
lens: Gender and nation in a century of Chinese cinema and Cinema and desire: Feminist Marxism and cultural 
politics in the works of Dai Jinhua (Dai et al., 2002). 
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text and theory centred approach should come as no surprise. Given its functionalist role in the 
history of China’s modernization throughout the 20th century, Chinese cinema has always 
foregrounded its ideological, pedagogical and artistic values over economic ones. Research is 
predominately focused on the relation between Chinese cinema and the formation of Chinese 
modernity. Moreover, the marketization and commercialization of Chinese cinema only began 
in 1984. Cinema in China has more often been treated as part of state propaganda apparatus 
rather than an independent economic institution operating with an independent economic logic. 
Studies of film history, national identity and national culture, ideological analysis of texts 
informed by Western critical theories are the research orthodox.16 Only a minority of scholarly 
publications focus on how political and economic reforms initiated by the CCP government 
have changed the Chinese film industry. Two clusters of literature contribute to the collection.  
 
First is a series of studies about commercial filmmaking since the 1990s when Hollywood was 
re-introduced to China in 1994 of which most are PhD theses, while others are sporadic 
research, scattered as book chapters and journal articles.17 Wu’s (1992) PhD thesis titled The 
Chinese film industry since the 1977 is arguably the first comprehensive political economic 
and historical analysis of the Chinese film industry after the “reform and opening up” (gaige 
kaifang) policy initiated by the CCP government.18 It delves into the institutional restructuring 
of the film industry against the background of China’s post-Cultural Revolution period until 
the early 1990s. Zhu’s book Chinese cinema during the era of reform (2003) is one rare 
 
16 This is evident from three recent compilations regarding Chinese cinema: Companion to Chinese cinema 
edited by Zhang (2012), The Chinese cinema book edited by Lim and Ward (2011), and The Oxford handbook 
of Chinese cinema edited by Rojas and Chow (2013). Their analytical framework is either based on 
periodization of film history or on cinematic expressions, styles, theories. Notable individual works include 
Cornelius, S. & I. H. Smith (2002) and Leyda (1972). 
17 Particularly worth mentioning is Liu’s The Film industry in Communist China (1965), one of the earliest 
attempts to examine the structure of the Chinese film industry itself. There are also a few book-length studies 
contributing to narrate the history of the Chinese film industry before or around the early 1990s. See Clark 
(1987), Ni (1994), Wu (1992).  
18 “Reform and opening up” policy refers to economic reforms adopted by the CCP government under Deng 
Xiaoping’s power which started in December 1978. 
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example looking at Chinese cinema’s first entertainment wave from the mid 1920s to the early 
1930s in conjunction with the transition from art to popular entertainment cinema from the mid 
1980s to the 1990s.19 Zhang (2008) follows a similar line of argument in his book The cinema 
of Feng Xiaogang: Commercialization and censorship in Chinese cinema after 1989 in which 
he situates Feng’s career in parallel with the trajectory of private Chinese film productions 
since the late 1980s, emphasizing the film officials’ indecisive attitude towards the function of 
cinema and its impact on elite filmmakers. In a similar vein, Zhou (2007) looks into the 
installation of capitalist production in the film sector alongside the television sector. Zhu and 
Nakajima (2010) examine reforms from the mid-1980s to the early-2000s that were attempts 
to resuscitate the declining film industry. Chu (2010) analyzes the relationships between the 
market, the state, society, and transnational capital in light of changing culture policies since 
1978. All of these authors cited above share the view that the state is withdrawing its 
overwhelming ideological influence in the face of ascending market power, as Dai (2006) 
suggests, “the political trajectory has been rewritten by the capitalist logic”. However, the state 
has also effectively incorporated this logic and further consolidated its hold over the film 
industry with the help of domestic and foreign capital. 
 
Another group of political economists have been doing research on the state governance of 
media industries in China in the last decade or so (Lee, 2000, 2003; Lee, He & Huang, 2006; 
Qiu, 2007; Stiglitz, 2002; Wacker, 2003; Zhao, 1998, 2003, 2008a, 2008b; Zheng, 2004). These 
scholars treat media and communications as the prism for analysing state transformation 
against the backdrop of China’s integration into a global neoliberal capitalist system. Their 
studies address the conspicuous contradiction between a socialist legacy and a capitalist agenda 
 
19 Zhu Ying is one of the prolific scholars writing about the Chinese film industry in the 21st century in mass 
media. Relevant publications can be found on ChinaFile, The New York Times, The Atlantic, The Los Angeles 
Times, etc.  
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that has become embedded within the transformation of China’s media system since the early 
1990s. One of the tasks they undertake is to deconstruct the monolithically repressive image of 
the Chinese state circulating in several Western journalistic discussions about China, and 
instead to propose a more nuanced approach to Chinese state power. Notably, Zhao (1998, 
2003, 2008a, 2008b) observes that the restructuring and rationalization of China’s national 
media system under the new market logic has predominately taken the form of bureaucratic 
monopoly capitalism. In this view the government is constantly caught between the Party’s 
insistent ideological leadership and the imperative to create a stronger media industry to 
withstand the influx of foreign content and ownership. Media organizations under the control 
of the Party assume the twin objectives of capital accumulation and ideological legitimization. 
Inevitably, discrepancies exist between official ideologies propagated by the state and the way 
these are acted upon and rearticulated among media elites. 
 
Although the film industry is not at the center of critical political economic research on Chinese 
media, there are still some insightful analysis of Chinese cinema contributed by this approach. 
For example, I find Zhao’s (2010) analysis of Hero (2002) from a transnational and 
transcultural political economic perspective particularly helpful. Through an interpretation of 
Hero as the manifestation of China’s place in the global political and economic order, Zhao 
reveals the inherently contradictory process of China’s global reintegration of the post-WTO 
era. 
 
Moving beyond the Chinese case, it is Hollywood, the most prominent and powerful film 
industry in the world, that initiated scholarly interest in the political economic analysis of 
cinema. Different from media economists, critical political economists take on the task of 
unpacking power relations embedded in economic activities of film industry. They examine 
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market structure and performance of film industry in the larger context of capitalist society, 
aiming to deconstruct the myths of globalization, free market, free competition. Important 
works include Bettig (1996), Guback (1969, 1989), Miller et al. (2005), Wasko (1981, 1985, 
1995, 2003), among which Hollywood domination of international screen market is a recurring 
theme. 
 
Guback’s essay in 1978 entitled “Are we looking at the right things about film?” laid the 
groundwork for this research field. He argued that film studies have traditionally overlooked 
the analysis of cinema as an economic institution and overwhelmingly has emphasized 
criticism and theory. Guback’s work (1969, 1979, 1985) focuses on documenting Hollywood’s 
economic and ideological domination, with the assistance of the US government, over the 
international cinema landscape. Wasko (1981, 1985, 1995, 2003, 2005) raises awareness about 
the need to treat films as commodities produced and distributed within a capitalist entity 
encompassing class and other social relations. This is a perspective that is particularly pertinent 
for my thesis and has informed the ways in which I approach interviews with film producers 
discussed in later chapters.  
 
Toby Miller’s Global Hollywood 2 (2005) demonstrates that the dominant position enjoyed by 
Hollywood in the global entertainment industry would not be achieved and sustained without 
protection and assistance from the US government. The concern of all these scholars is not just 
with the ways in which the US film industry is successful, its takings and investments, and the 
mergers that are occurring around it. In the spirit of critical political economy, these scholars 
not only investigate the market structure of the film industry, the media corporations that 
control the industry, the vertical and horizontal integration in terms of ownership, but also the 
interaction between the industry and the state in both domestic and international markets 
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(Wasko, 2005). On the heels of this body of literature, a cohort of researchers has employed 
the critical political economic approach to examine other national cinemas that provided 
insightful references. Pendakur (1990) looks at market structure and labor issues in the 
Canadian film industry that has long been overshadowed by Hollywood domination, arguing 
that “political economy’s concern with power in class societies and its emphasis on a dialectical 
view of history help explain how the battle to create an indigenous film industry has been 
fought in Canada, in whose interests, and with what outcome” (p.39).  
 
In this same vein, Punathambekar examines the transition of Bombay cinema to Bollywood 
and argues that “transformation … was caught up in a larger process of the state realigning its 
understanding of ‘culture as resource’ away from well-worn developmentalist paradigms 
toward meeting the demands of new circuits of capital” (2013: 49).20 Despite those efforts, one 
problem with some of the research in this area lies in the palpable Hollywood-centric proclivity 
that reflects the hegemony of Hollywood in global film market. More precisely, it is difficult 
for these scholars to come to grips with a cinema industry such as Bollywood which has had 
very little state funding or one such as China where the state has maintained massive budgetary 
and ideological control at the cost of profits, because they are so focused on the Hollywood 
model in which states offer a variety of incentives for cinematic production, but appear to have 
little direct coercive control over the narratives of contemporary films.  
 
In this thesis I primarily rely on critical political economic approach to examine the 
transformative period of the post-WTO Chines cinema. In spite of various strengths, even the 
strongest political economic research needs to seek for analytical and methodological balance 
 
20 A few film historian’s work overlaps with political economy research. See, for example, Allen & Gomery 
(1985), Armes (1987).  
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with the help of other approaches. The following section summarises the importance of media 
economics to the critical political economic approach before concluding with an outline of the 
ways in which I hope to approach my own project.  
 
It needs to be clarified that, incorporating some elements of media economics in my research 
in no way means that critical political economy is short of theoretical or analytical strength, 
neither does it mean media economics has more explanatory capability. I turn to media 
economics only for some analytical tools which help identify continuities and commonalities 
based on fundamental economic rationales behind evident changes and the particularities of 
market structures and practices in the Chinese film industry.  
 
It is easy to assume that China’s neoliberalizing cinema represents some sort of disjuncture 
from previous periods since it is undertaking neoliberalizing economic reforms confined within 
the parameters set by a regulatory regime marked by discursive adherence to ideologically 
socialist doctrines. However, literature on media economics dispel this myth by pointing out 
that the fundamental economic rationales sustaining the development of the film industry 
disregard social, cultural and historical context. 21  Picard defines media economics as 
“concerned with how media operators meet the informational and entertainment wants and 
needs of audiences, advertisers, and society within available resources. It deals with the factors 
influencing production of media goods and services and the allocation of those products for 
consumption” (1989: 7). It addresses a range of issues including “international trade, business 
 
21 For handbooks on media economics, see, for example, Albarran, A. (1996). Media economics: understanding 
markets, industries and concepts; Alexander, A. et al. (2004). Media economics: Theory and practice; Cave, 
R.E. (2000). Creative industries: contracts between art and commerce; Doyle, G. (2002). Understanding media 
economics; Picard, R. et al. (1989). Media economics: Concepts and issues; Vogel, H.L. (2014). Entertainment 
industry economics: A guide for financial analysis. For research focusing on movie business, see, Hoskins, C. et 
al. (1997). Global television and film: A guide to the economics of the business; Vany, A.D. (2004). Hollywood 
economics: How extreme uncertainty shapes the film industry. Also see The Journal of Media Economics, 
which launched in 1988.  
   
 
 29 
strategy, pricing policies, competition and industrial concentration as they affect media firms 
and industries” (Doyle, 2002: 2). From a mainstream neo-classical economic perspective, this 
line of enquiry into the media industries emphasizes micro-economic issues devoid of any 
moral and ideological concern, which attracts criticism from political economists who instead 
share concerns with the expansionary logic of capitalism, issues of labor, class, concentration 
of ownership, and collusion between state and capital.  
 
Media economists identify some principal economic characteristics of film industry that make 
it operates in distinctive ways (Banks, 2007; Caves, 2000; Doyle, 2002; Hesmondhalgh, 2007; 
Howkins, 2001; Sedgwick & Pokorny, 2005). The film industry is characterized by uncertain 
demands and high risk given the massive initial costs of development, production and 
marketing of a film and the extremely low ratio of hits against losses. Caves (2003) recognizes 
this feature as “nobody knows property” in the sense that even under the assistance of market 
research, no one can actually tell which products would be hits no matter how much intimate 
knowledge is possessed. Also, the “public” nature of cultural commodities makes cultural 
industries “defy the premise on which the laws of economics based—scarcity” (Doyle, 
2002:10). “Public” quality is described as non-rival in use by economists. One person’s use of 
or benefit from the product does not affect its use by or benefit to another person. A film which 
is distributed through various channels can be consumed without diminishing other people’s 
opportunities to view it. This means film production companies needs to create scarcity to fulfil 
the value of goods by limiting access to its films. One way to reduce risk, realize scarcity and 
maximize audience is for corporations to achieve “a high level of concentration, 
internationalization and cross-media ownership” (Garnham, 1990: 161). In economic terms, 
these practices refer to economies of scale and economies of scope that are applied under 
circumstances when marginal costs are lower than average costs.  
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There is an identifiable tendency towards concentration in market power across cultural 
industries worldwide (Albarran & Dimmick, 1996; Fitzgerald, 2012; Foley, 1992; Kunz, 2006; 
Murdock & Wasko, 2007; Picard, 1996). In what Hesmondhalgh (2012) calls a complex 
professional era, corporate strategies such as conglomeration and vertical integration in terms 
of ownership and corporate structure in cultural industries are part of a general tendency 
towards more and larger mergers and acquisitions in all industries, which quickened during the 
1980s.22 Conglomeration first hit the cultural industries in the 1960s in the form of industrial 
and financial and business corporations buying up and investing in media industries. Classical 
Hollywood from 1920s to 1950s serves as a perfect example of market concentration in the 
film industry through vertical and horizontal integration, and its more recent history since 
1980s epitomize the process of conglomerates devouring the film industry to diversify their 
business interests (Gomery, 2009; Wayne, 2003).  Institutionalisation of the Chinese film 
industry follows the steps of Hollywood at a much accelerated pace. Changes in the film market 
structure reveal a strong resemblance to what happened to Hollywood in its transformative 
years since conglomeration took off. However, those structural changes haven’t been addressed 
in academia largely because, as object of research, they are too recent to result in fruitful and 
accurate observation and analysis.  
 
The importance of distribution cannot be over-stressed for the movie business. Garnham 
theorizes distribution as “the key locus of power and profit in corporate media” (1990: 162). 
Turner (1988) argues that understanding distribution is the key to understanding the past, 
present and future of cinema as a “social practice”. Lobato (2012) attributes a crucial role to 
distribution for Hollywood to maintain dominance in the global film market. Distribution gains 
 
22 Hesmondhalgh uses the term complex professional as a heuristic device to describe the whole era of cultural 
production from the 1950s onwards. For more detailed analysis, see Hesmondhalgh (2007: 55). 
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more significance in an increasingly technology-saturated business environment in which 
innovative distribution models create strong presence. Many scholars come to address the hype 
around digital film networks based on examination of Internet-enabled distribution channels 
and platforms such as commercial online video-on-demand (VOD) services. Studies reflect on 
the possibility of online distribution disrupting traditional business models of the film industry, 
explore potential impact on social stratification, and reconceptualize notions such as piracy 
based on examination of unofficial or informal terrains of film distribution exemplified by 
Nollywood (Cunningham, et al., 2010; Currah, 2004; Garon, 2007; Koch et al., 2012; 
Iordanova & Cunningham, 2012; Lobato, 2009a; Silver & Alpert, 2003; Sparrow, 2007; Zhu, 
2002).23  
 
In the context of contemporary China, distribution becomes essential for examining 
neoliberalizing cinema for two reasons. First, one way for the Chinese state to mediate power 
relation with capital, be it domestic or transnational, is through firm control over distribution 
rights to imported movies. Second, the trend of market concentration and industrial 
conglomeration is partly driven by the urge to secure distribution networks connecting content 
providers with the ever enlarging and diversifying audience base. Thus, it is unsurprising to 
see the scene of the Chinese film industry been overhauled by IT corporations such as BAT 
(comprised of Baidu Inc, Alibaba, and Tencent and real estate giant Wanda Group)24. The 
tendency towards conglomeration is also fuelled by Chinese corporations’ ambition of setting 
up the global market as their playground. Yet this discussion falls short of analysing the ways 
 
23 These researches exist alongside a more general scholarly interest in the topic of digital distribution across 
disciplines including media studies, economies, information systems, geography and legal studies. Prominent 
works include Anderson (2006), Jenkins (2006), Hartley (2009), etc. Concerns rest on whether digital 
distribution increases audiovisual diversity, empowers consumers, and enables new forms of literacy and access, 
etc.   
24 BAT is an acronym for Baidu Inc. (BIDU), Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. (BABA) and Tencent Holdings Ltd. 
(0700.Hong Kong, TCEHY) 
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in which changing models of conglomeration and distribution are connected to changing 
consumption and discursive understanding of cinema as a whole and films as units of meaning 
by audiences. 
 
It can be seen, then from the overview in this section and the previous one that a critical political 
economy approach is strong on the economic basis for and context of production and 
distribution, but weaker when dealing with questions concerning the relationship between the 
ideological aspects of film texts and the discursive and social contexts which they inhabit. 
What’s more, it falls short of analytical force when confronting the issue of how ideas are 
ingrained into the social fabric and their interaction with institutions and individuals. With this 
gap in mind, scholars such as Havens, Lotz & Tinic (2009), Hesmondhalgh (2007), Miller 
(2005), Peterson & Anand (2004) and Zhu (2003) have look for inspiration to research 
traditions such as cultural studies, introducing a “production of culture” perspective, and 
pushing the boundaries of organizational studies. For example, Nakajima (2007) traces 
structural changes in the Chinese film industry in the Reform era between 1978 and 2005. 
Viewing the film industry as embedded in distinctive social structures, he questions the validity 
of a clear-cut state-versus-market framework and argues for the establishment of integrated 
logics of filmmaking based on three aspects: “political legitimacy”, “economic viability” and 
“artistic autonomy”.  
 
Drawing from theories developed in economic sociology, the sociology of culture, and Pierre 
Bourdieu’s “field” theory, Nakajima provides a thorough analysis of the institutional 
restructuring of the Chinese film industry in that time period. He sheds light on the co-evolving 
relationship between market and state, and how this relationship is socially and historically 
configured. Zhu (2003) adopts the “cultural industries approach” which developed out of the 
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political economy approach rooted in the Frankfurt School and in its assumptions about the 
social impact of the mass media on the circulation of ideas and values amongst audiences. This 
revised approach retains the force of the critical political economic tradition which is attentive 
to issues of production, circulation, policy, institution and market, but also looks at film culture 
expressed through changing cultural discourses amongst audiences. Clarification of film 
culture is needed. I recognize that film culture is an all-encompassing term covering a board 
range of representations, discourses, and practices produced or performed by film professionals, 
film critics, and audiences. That is beyond the scope of my research. Rather, I only use film 
culture as a vocabulary shortcut to refer to the ways in which film professionals navigate 
through the changing Chinese film industry. Bringing this latter more integrated critical 
political economic/cultural industries approach into conversation with Foucauldian notions of 
discourse, the conditions of the Chinese film industry in the contemporary era will be subjected 
to multiple analysis in my thesis, the outline of which can be found below. 
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework which emerges from a reading of the critical 
literature on Chinese cinema production in the contemporary and historical arena. In Chapter 
3, I discuss the methodological decisions made during the conduct of this research and provide 
my reflections on the process and results. I primarily rely on elite interviews with industry 
professionals, together with critical policy analysis of one key political document. The 
secondary data is drawn from news outlets, trade publications, industry reports conducted by 
the government, etc. Chapter 4 focuses on film policy, cultural governance and censorship 
mechanisms within mainstream cinema. In Chapter 5, I turn my attention to the power interplay 
between the party-state, domestic private capital and transnational media capital, epitomized 
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in the conglomeration and convergence of the Chinese film industry, in large part facilitated 
by IT corporations. Chapter 6 and 7 are two sides of the same coin. Chapter 6 investigates the 
process of Chinese cinema’s integration into a global neoliberal capitalist order, with specific 
focus on the dynamics between the Chinese film industry and Hollywood. While Chapter 7 
examines how that process is manifested in cinematic content. Chapter 8 offers the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CINEMA BETWEEN IDEOLOGY 
AND ECONOMICS 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I draw on three bodies of literature to form a theoretical framework. The first 
section is dedicated to scholarship on contemporary mainstream Chinese cinema with a 
particular focus on how it is theorized in relation to globalization. This leads to the second 
section which interrogates the notion of neoliberalism and expounds its essential role in 
theorizing Chinese cinema during the years 2002 to 2017. Finally, this chapter concludes with 
a discussion of the politics of depoliticization, featuring aspects of China’s politics and political 
communication during these years, and the implications for Chinese cinema.   
 
2.2 Theorizing and contextualizing the research of Chinese cinema  
 
Globalization is a constituent element in the formation of any national film industries across 
the world, to varying degrees. It is only possible to understand the Chinese film industry in the 
21st century by situating it in an integrated global film market in conjunction with China’s 
sociocultural and political specificities. Empirically, the Chinese film industry is increasingly 
imagined by state elites and industrial professionals on the global scale. Theoretically, the 
“Chineseness” of China’s emerging film industry has been called into question in an 
increasingly transnational context (Chow, 1998; Lu, et al., 2014; Marchetti, et al., 2009; Pang, 
2006a). Particularly pertinent to the discussion of globalization is how to reposition the Chinese 
film industry in relation to Hollywood.  
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In general, the theme of globalization threads through two fields of scholarship that are relevant 
to the study of the film industry. First is the paradigmatic transition from national cinema to 
transnational cinema. National cinema, as a significant taxonomic organizing principle of 
cinema studies, serves as a starting reference point for many analysis claiming “Chinese 
cinema” as their objects of research.25 The concept of national cinema is epistemologically 
built upon three interrelated premises: cultural-territorial model, established and self-sustaining 
national identity, and Hollywood-versus-national cinemas dichotomic framework. The 
national cinema paradigm approaches the cinema as a form of art that is primarily filtered 
through a political lens, which renders it intrinsically defined by national boundaries 
(Barrowclough, 1981).  
 
In this approach films are believed to be the product of particular cultures and territories. By 
suggesting that cinema mediates shared cultural codes and social norms bearing national 
marks, a national cinema model can easily betray nationalist essentialism. It posits that cinema 
as an institution exists and at its core relies on the imagination of a unified and fixed national 
identity, articulated through cinema as at once a signifying system and social practices. For 
example, Higson once claims that, in essence, to identify a national cinema is “to specify a 
coherence and a unity; it is to proclaim a unique identity and a stable set of meanings” (1989: 
37). This statement was challenged by himself later in the essay “The limiting imagination of 
national cinema” written in 2000 when he revisits the concept. As Yoshimoto once pointedly 
argued, writing about national cinema used to be an easy task for film critics because all they 
needed to do was to “construct a linear historical narrative describing a development of a 
cinema within a particular national boundary whose unity and coherence seemed to be beyond 
 
25 Important publications on Chinese national cinema in recent years include Yingjin Zhang’s Chinese national 
cinema (2004) and Berry & Farquhar’s China on Screen: Cinema and nation (2006). Zhang approaches it in 
more traditional geographical terms, while Berry and Farquhar put the problem of how China is simultaneously 
affirmed and interrogated through the national at the centre. 
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all doubt” (1993: 338). Underneath this statement is a critique of the problematic assumption 
of a separate, expressive, monolithic and unified entity – “the nation” – inscribed in theorizing 
about national cinema.  
 
Another problem with some national cinema models is that they usually start by acknowledging 
the dominant position of Hollywood in the world cinema landscape (Williams, 2002). In 
“Reconceptualizing National Cinema/s”, Stephen Crofts begins expectedly with the 
recognition that “national cinema production is usually defined against Hollywood” to the 
extent that “Hollywood is hardly ever spoken of as a national cinema” (1993:44). He provides 
a typology that divides national cinemas into seven categories among which Hollywood is not 
even included.26 This raises one troubling question about national cinema: should Hollywood 
with its studio system and generic films be viewed as the standard against which all national 
cinemas around the world must be addressed? If that is the case, it is hard to prevent all national 
cinemas from becoming the “other” to Hollywood, in the sense that Hollywood serves as the 
yardstick against which others are measured. The predominant position of Hollywood is taken 
as a given, not a historical and socio-cultural product.27 To remedy this slant, Higson (1989) 
mobilizes the concept of national cinema from what he terms an inward-looking perspective. 
Higson does not consider Hollywood as an external force imposing its standards on the rest of 
the world, but as “an integral and naturalized part of the national culture, or the popular 
 
26 According to Crofts (1993: 44), the seven categories include: a) European-model art cinemas that do not 
directly compete with Hollywood; b) third cinema that opposes the USA and Europe in its insistence on 
distinctive national cinema; c) third world and European commercial cinemas that compete with Hollywood in 
domestic markets; d) cinemas ignoring Hollywood, exemplified by Indian and Hong Kong cinema; e) cinemas 
imitating Hollywood, including British, Canadian, and Australian cinema; f) totalitarian cinemas, including 
Chinese cinema in the Maoist era between 1949 and the mid-1980s, the cinema of Fascist Germany and Italy, 
and of the Stalinist regimes of the Soviet bloc; g) regional/ethnic cinemas. 
27 As Harry Magdoff (2003) argued, the domination of the United States of world film distribution from World 
War I onward is best characterized as “imperialism without colonies”, established by the US government after 
1914 and enhanced after 1945. However, it is also worth noting that the “studio system” was born in France and 
that, before World War I, French cinema occupied the same position as Hollywood does today in the world 
market. 
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imagination” (1989:39). Higson’s view, however, risks downplaying the power dynamics 
between Hollywood and other national cinemas, without resolving the issue of dichotomization.  
 
While some scholars propose to accept the limitations inherent to a national cinema paradigm 
and more constructively to get to grips with what the term can describe and illuminate, others 
see the national as an anachronism and reconsider film historiography from a transnational 
perspective (Bergfelder, 2005; Ezra & Rowden, 2006; Gates & Funnell, 2012; Hunt & Wing-
Fai, 2008; Krings & Okome, 2013; Lu, 1997; Wang, 2011). The launch of journal 
Transnational Cinemas marks the beginning of institutionalising transnational film studies in 
academia. It sets out to be the primary forum for discussions and debates surrounding the 
concept of transnational cinema, which has been used as a theoretical concept and descriptive 
term from various approaches before the journal’s inauguration. Higbee and Lim’s (2010) 
paper in the first volume maps out three approaches to the theorization and deployment of 
transnational cinema, including: a) transnational emerging as a response to the limiting national 
cinema model, which exemplified by Higson (2000); b) transnational cinema as regional 
phenomenon comprised of cinemas with shared cultural heritage and/or geo-political boundary; 
c) transnational cinema privileges analysis of diasporic, exilic and postcolonial cinemas 
inspired by cultural studies, postcolonial theories and globalization research. All three 
approaches have their respective limitations and drawbacks. Generally, transnational cinema 
risks losing sight at the level of state policy, particularly as a means of promoting cultural 
diversity and attending to national specificity (Hill, 1992, 1996). Moreover, its celebratory 
undertone about the hybridity of glocalised cultural product glosses over the unequal power 
relationship underpinning global cultural production and circulation. To avoid this term turning 
into a potentially empty floating signifier due to its multifarious usage, Higbee and Lim (2010) 
argue for a critical form of transnationalism in film studies that negates the national-
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transnational binary thinking, situates cross-border filmmaking activities in the web of social 
relations fraught with issues of postcoloniality, politics and power, and interrogate negotiation 
between those activities and the national on all levels. Only through engaging with 
transnational cinema in the form of theorizing it in conceptual-abstract and exploring its 
deployment in concrete-specific can it become an established academic field with critical 
purchase.  
 
Scholarship on Chinese cinema(s) has been at the forefront of theorizing the transnational. 
Sheldon Lu’s anthology Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nationhood, Gender (1997) 
is one of the earliest attempts at a paradigmatic shift from a national cinema to a transnational 
cinema model within the discipline of Chinese cinema studies. Recognising the fractured 
nature of the very idea of Chinese cinema, which serves as a convenient rubric and analytical 
shortcut for complex processes and practices that often exceed China’s national boundaries, a 
number of scholars have turned to transnational cinema as a replacement, without surrendering 
to it completely (Berry, 2010; Berry & Farquhar, 2006; Pang, 2006b; Zhang, 2007). As part of 
a research project to revitalise the institutionalisation of Chinese cinema as a coherent and 
legitimate academic discipline, with a focus on production instead of textual analysis and 
consumption, Berry and Pang (2010) propose a different understanding of Chinese cinema in 
reference to the advent of global cinema. They argue that “rather than understanding it as a 
single and self-sufficient system, as the idea of a national cinema tends to assume…in the age 
of flexible production, Chinese cinema must also be seen as something more flexible, multiple, 
and open—an internally stratified but interconnected combinatoire with dynamic participation 
in global cinema” (Berry & Pang, 2010: 90). Berry goes further to describe this global cinema 
as transnational in the sense that it is “growing out of the conditions of globalization, shaped 
by neoliberalism, “free trade”, the collapse of socialism, and post-Fordist production…a 
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different order of cinematic cultures and industries from the old national cinema order” (Berry, 
2010: 111).28 Central to the discussion is to understand cinema as a unique transborder form of 
cultural production in late-capitalist society. The Chinese film industry is embedded as much 
in global economic conditions as in a specific cultural environment. In analytical terms, it 
liberates the Chinese film industry from an antagonistic relationship with Hollywood. 
Hollywood is deprived of its centralized position and treated as equal counterpart functioning 
within the encompassing framework of global capitalism, yet imbued with power dynamics 
featured by inequality, complexity and uncertainty.  
 
The central concern arising from a collective attempt to rewrite Chinese film history as 
described above is to revisit and challenge the validity of the terminology “Chinese-language 
cinema”. Debates are shaped by two strands: scholars led by Sheldon Lu share the view that 
the Chinese cinema of current era can be best analyzed within the “Chinese-language cinema” 
or “transnational cinema” framework; scholars represented by Li Daoxin and Lü Xinyu (Lü et 
al., 2015) criticize the “de-China-lization” and “Americantrism” embedded in those 
approaches, pointing out complexity within Chinese cinema, for example, in reference to 
ethnicity films. What the latter alerted to is the danger of losing Chinese subjectivity and 
subverting legitimacy of Chinese culture and Chinese national cinema. 29  
 
Other scholars have also attempted to unsettle the nation-state centred framework and national 
cinema-versus-Hollywood dichotomy in discussions of global media production. Reflecting on 
what they view as an outdated cultural imperialism thesis, some scholars have developed their 
 
28 It is necessary to differentiate global cinema from the term world cinema, which owes its origin to 
orientalism. See Dennison & Lim (2006). Remapping world cinema: Identity, culture and politics in film. 
London: Wallflower Press.  
29 For a more detailed review of the ongoing debate see Sun (2016). 
   
 
 41 
research on media and globalization by deconstructing the centre-peripheral paradigm, by 
identifying multi-directional media flows, and by analysing the relocation of production centres 
across the globe (Curtin, 2007; Fuchs, 2010; Jin, 2007; Meng & Rantanen, 2015; Tunstall, 
2008). For example, Thussu (2007) argues that gradual commercialization of media systems 
around the world has created new private networks that are primarily interested in markets and 
advertising revenues. It could be the case that individual nations scarcely matter in this market-
oriented media ecology, as producers view the audience principally as consumers and not as 
citizens.  
 
This shift from a state-centric and national view of media to one defined by consumer interest 
and transnational markets has been a key factor in the expansion and acceleration of media 
flows; but it is also belied, even in the case of India on which Thussu bases his thesis, by the 
increasing levels of nationalism and jingoism in media from news to film. Also worth 
mentioning in this context is Michael Curtin’s (2003) work which mobilizes the concept of the 
“media capital” as the product of an increasingly interconnected global network of media 
production. Likewise, attempting to move beyond a national media framework, Curtin uses the 
idea of the media capital to represent centres of media activity that have specific logics of their 
own, ones that do not necessarily correspond to the geography, interests or policies of particular 
nation-states. These media capitals such as Shanghai, London, New York and Tokyo also 
represent cities positioned at the intersection of complex patterns of economic, social and 
cultural flows. While this is a view that needs to be kept in mind, it is also one that does not 
preclude a return to the centrality of the nation as an ideological artefact in that it is quite 
possible to imagine global cities and media capitals co-existing with highly nationalist 
frameworks – as in the efforts of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India to woo Bombay 
capital and the Bollywood elites.  
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Apart from tactically renewing official discourses naturalising the CCP’s ideology, the Chinese 
state’s flexibility and resilience in media governance is also demonstrated in other manners. It 
is frequently argued that the Party-state navigates itself in massive economic restructuring for 
the purpose of consolidating its own ruling power. For example, drawing on the case of China 
Film Group (hereafter CFG) which represents marketization as liberalization but is part of a 
scheme to utilize the market to consolidate state power, Yeh and Davis (2008) notice a re-
nationalising trend within the Chinese film industry. Since the late 1990s, encouraged by the 
state, former state-owned studios have started to form film groups which vertically integrate 
film production, distribution, and exhibition, as well as horizontally integrating film production, 
TV production, and video, DVD production. CFG is the perfect embodiment. As the foremost 
state-owned media conglomerate, CFG takes the lead in almost every sector of Chinese cinema, 
covering financing, co-production, joint ventures, cinema circuits, and particularly distribution.  
 
Other ways of sustaining CFG’s domination remain through a tight grip over distribution of 
imported movies and strategically allocating resources in a variety of ways. For example, 
Huaxia is in charge of flat-fee imports which also have a quota limit. In a private conversation 
during my research, an investor disclosed to me that usually producers or investors need to 
bribe their way into the competition for a slot. It is therefore unsurprising those who with 
connections to power holders are more likely to get a piece of the distribution pie, very often 
these fortunate ones being relatives of high-ranking officials. 
 
With specific exclusions, limits on the involvement of private capital in the film industry have 
been lifted. Foreign capital is allowed in the area of production and exhibition, but distribution 
is a forbidden zone. Any form of investment that can boost the development of infrastructure 
or production experience is welcomed, but the door to reaping pure profits through the 
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distribution arm is shut down. This strategy extends to protective measures against foreign 
capital so as to create a more open and accommodating environment for domestic players and 
help to attract foreign capital, which will shore up the domestic film industry locally. Zhao 
(2008a) argues that what differentiates the “socialist market economy” from capitalist 
economies is that marketization, industrialization and privatization are seen as necessary 
measures to ensure that state-owned corporations possess advantageous positions in the market 
when private and global capital floods in. It has developed a market-based means of managing 
market share and entry to create a new mechanism of cultural control. The industry takes a 
gradualist approach to reform by incorporating small policy changes incrementally without 
explicit grand design embodied by Deng Xiaoping’s widely quoted phrase: “groping for stones 
to cross the river” (mozhe shitou guohe) (Lin et al., 2003). In this manner, not only does the 
state rejuvenate its ideological and representational capacity by means of the market, it also 
shows a certain level of adaptiveness in the context of media convergence. Nevertheless, the 
state is under challenge from other forces, be these the (international and national) market, 
technology, intermediaries or critical film professionals. 
 
2.3 Neoliberalism as a lens for viewing the cinema  
 
Another body of literature consists of studies of national film industries through the prism of 
the concept of neoliberalism (Berry, 2012; Jin, 2006, 2011; Kapur & Wagner, 2011; Stratton, 
2009; Yoon, 2009), the invasion of all spheres of society including that of the personal and the 
social and cultural by the values of the neoclassical “free market” and unregulated economic 
profit model. In this view, at the outset, cinema is a product of Western-style capitalism. 
However, throughout the 20th century, cinema as an institution has survived World War I & II, 
fascism and Nazism, decolonisation movements, communist governance across a swathe of the 
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world, competition from other entertainment forms like television from the 1950s onwards, 
state intervention and regulation, and many further political changes. Hollywood is the most 
prolific example of how cinema sustains itself and thrives in a capitalist system, becoming a 
commercially viable institution while maintaining a level of artistic autonomy. What emerges 
from scholarly discussion of global cinema in the 21st century, then, is the changing cinema-
capital relationship in the current capitalist system with its strong neoliberal traits, in all its 
manifestations, specified by sociocultural and political contexts.  
 
Any serious engagement with neoliberalism as a conceptual tool needs to define it, both 
theoretically and methodologically. Defining neoliberalism is never a straightforward task due 
to its self-contradictory nature. It has been used in myriad ways in scholarship across social 
sciences, referring simultaneously to an ideology, a set of practices, a process and the outcomes 
of combinations of ideology, process and practices (Brown, 2003; Flew, 2012; Harvey, 2005; 
Kipnis, 2007; Lemke, 2001; Pollin, 2005; Passavant, 2005; Rose, 1996, 1998; Springer, 2012). 
 
The critical political economic approach described in the previous chapter treats neoliberalism 
as a hegemonic programme engineered and orchestrated by transnational political elites (Dean, 
2008; Harvey, 2005; Kipnis, 2007; Peck, 2008). It is understood in more or less Marxist terms, 
as an ideology imposed on behalf of a transnational capitalist class through their manipulation 
of the state and public policies in order to reassert their class power.30 As Barnett succinctly 
puts it, neoliberalism is “a new variant of a class-driven project of state restructuring in the 
interests of free-markets and expanded accumulation” (2005:7). In this view, neoliberalism in 
 
30 The best known definition of neoliberalism from this tradition is developed by David Harvey (2005): “A 
theory of political economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free market, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices.” (P.2)  
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all its guises is problematic because it promotes a barbaric capitalism that has produced a 
dramatically upward redistribution of wealth, a decline in the economic security of a majority 
of people in the world, and a society that morally supports, maintains, and legitimizes a social 
environment of deepening inequality. Institutional mechanisms are put in place to ensure the 
operation of free market, or the fantasy of free market. The neo-Marxist critique of 
neoliberalism sits alongside Foucauldian accounts of neoliberalism, which draws upon the late 
work of Michel Foucault on governmentality and liberal political rationality (Brown, 2006; 
Foucault, 2000; Miller, 2009, 2010; Rose,1999). Structural and poststructural treatments of 
neoliberalism will always cause ontological and epistemological tension that are difficult to 
reconcile and transcend, not least because of the way in which one totalises the power of the 
market while the other resists an analysis that depends on such totalising power. For this reason, 
although I do deploy some poststructuralist concepts such as discourse, this thesis will not go 
into details of the poststructuralist approach to neoliberalism but focus on the political 
economic institutionalist approach. 
 
The generalised explanatory power and status of neoliberalism as a concept has been 
challenged intensively, especially after the global economic crisis of 2008. The unevenness of 
the intensity of the neoliberal project across territory boarders and promiscuous application of 
neoliberal policies in diverse socio-political environments pose questions to the validity of an 
encompassing theorization of neoliberalism. In using a single, politically and emotionally 
loaded term to refer to diverse phenomena, it is suspected that analyzes of neoliberalism risk a 
reification that occludes more than it reveals. This problem of reification is clearly illustrated 
in the case of contemporary China. Guided by market-oriented policies for the past few decades, 
China has adopted a set of economic practices that bear a strong resemblance to neoliberal 
practices such as liberalization of trade and investment, privatization of state-owned enterprises 
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(SOEs), a reduction in public spending on social welfare like education and health care, etc. 
(Xu, 2011). Wang (2004) traces the emergence of the hegemony of neoliberalism in China 
back to 1989 and gives a comprehensive account that neoliberalism is the root cause of 
dramatic social inequality and the breakdown of the public welfare system. However, the 
oscillations between market-led and state-led development seem repeatedly to frustrate even 
the most sophisticated attempts at conceptual categorization.  
 
China displays little functional coherence, either as a socialist-developmental or as a neoliberal 
state and neither does it display a tidy transition between the two (Breslin, 2006; Liew, 2005). 
The depth of official commitment to private property rights, free markets, and free trade is 
limited, contingent, and potentially reversible, particularly if the enhancement of any of these 
were to challenge the power of the Chinese Communist party-state. As a result, whether China 
is becoming neoliberal in the same way that the US or the European Union is neoliberal 
becomes a debatable question. While some scholars prefer to eschew the trope of neoliberalism 
altogether (Kipnis, 2007; Nonini, 2008), others consider China as being in a neoliberal 
transformative state (Chu & So, 2012; Flew & Cunningham, 2010; Harvey, 2005; Ji, 2006; 
Ren, 2010; Rofel, 2007; Yan, 2003; Zhao, 2008b; Zheng, 2008). They give the Chinese 
situation historical, geographical and cultural specificity.  
 
China does not simply follow a well-established, fully laid out neoliberal plan based on 
normative principles, but rather pursues a mutated form of neoliberalism that couples 
continuity in the political system of governance with discontinuity in the state’s promotion of 
radical marketization and privatization. For example, Harvey (2005) uses “neoliberalism with 
Chinese characteristics” to describe Chinese development since 1980, based on the observation 
that China presents “a particular kind of market economy that increasingly incorporates 
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neoliberal elements interdigitated with authoritarian centralized control” (p.2). The ideological 
signification of neoliberalism is strategically filtered and instrumentalised in alliance with 
doctrines of developmentalism and socialist legacies. At the core of the debate is to trace and 
explain the trajectory of the co-evolving of state forms and endemic, uneven and conflictive 
processes of deepening marketization (Peck & Zhang, 2013). Wang (2004) attributes the 
hegemonic position of neoliberalism in China to a domestic process during which the state’s 
crisis of legitimacy was overcome through economic itself. Similarly, Ren (2010) emphasizes 
the critical role of the state in normalizing neoliberalism which is considered as a constructivist 
project implemented through governmental and social policies. By reinventing a new politics 
of the state to create and improve institutional frameworks appropriate to neoliberalism, the 
government intervenes and orchestrates the normalization of neoliberalism. Therefore, it is of 
vital importance to recognize the Chinese state’s power in engineering economic structures to 
serve its own purposes.  
 
In this thesis I subscribe to a critical theory of neoliberalization, which defines neoliberalism 
with four premises. First, it acknowledges the discrepancy between neoliberalism as ideology 
and as reality (Bourdieu, 1998; Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Cahill (2013) observes that when 
neoliberalism is understood as an ideology, it provides only a partial representation of the 
world. In practice, there can be no “pure-bred” neoliberalism in the idealist form. What exists 
are hybrid and mongrel formations. Lying at the contradictory heart, is the permanent 
“discrepancy between the galvanizing utopian vision of freedom through the market and the 
prosaic realities both of earthly governance and endemic governance failure” (Peck, 2013: 
144). To resolve the incongruity needs to understand hegemony (Gramsci, 1971) not as a state 
of being, but a process that needs to be constantly “worked on”, maintained, renewed and 
revised (Hall, 2011). Therefore, neoliberalism is better redefined as the process of 
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neoliberalization, enacted through the tensions between extra-local generality and local-
embedded particularity.  
 
Second, neoliberalism contradicts itself in the sense that there is no actual free market in the 
strictest neoliberal sense without state intervention. No market operation can be autonomous 
from national policy/regulatory oversight. A critical theory of neoliberalization recognizes the 
essential role of the state in creating, maintaining and shaping markets through 
instrumentalising neoliberal doctrines in specific socio-historical contexts. Third, it contests 
the presumed hegemonic and all-determining mega-cause status of neoliberalism across the 
globe. Whether neoliberalism uniquely defines the principal power relations in the 
contemporary world (as opposed to patriarchy, for instance, or to resistance to these forms) 
remains a contentious question.  
 
Forth, it stresses the necessity of holding on to the concept despite the messiness of reality, for 
neoliberalism serves to unite politically as a “radical-theoretical slogan” (Peck, 2004: 403). 
Hall reflects on the relevance of the concept neoliberalism, arguing that “critical thought often 
begins with a ‘chaotic’ abstraction … naming neoliberalism is politically necessary to give the 
resistance to its onward march content, focus and a cutting edge” (2011: 706-707). This does 
not mean to treat neoliberalism as an analytical shortcut but admits its utility in pursuing 
progressive social scientific research. 
 
The above discussion helps to clear an analytical path towards a deployment of the term 
“neoliberalism” in the analysis of the film industry. With its far-reaching global influence, 
neoliberalism is considered as having brought about poignant anxiety across national cinemas. 
These have reacted in different ways (Falicov, 2000; Kerr & Flynn, 2003; Zhu, 2009). Scholars 
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focus on examining the role of the state in pursuing and promoting neoliberal-oriented cultural 
policies and the ways in which the ideology of neoliberalism shapes, in the meantime 
naturalized and reproduced in market structure, industrial practices, and filmic content. Yoon 
(2009) observes the declining diversity within the Korean film industry in terms of content and 
production when big-budget blockbuster films – particularly crime noir and romcoms – and 
multiplex theatres have come to dominate the market under neoliberal pressure. In the case of 
the Australian film industry, Stratton (2009) perceptively points out the naturalisation of 
neoliberal ideology in story lines, narratives, and characterisations. Drawing upon Ong’s (2006) 
understanding of neoliberalism as a mechanism of exclusion and inclusion, Stratton maintains 
that the act and consequences of unabashed celebration of the transcendental value of the free 
market leads to a state that is founded on exclusion rather than inclusion and where the 
hierarchical order is enforced through violence. And this violent ideological element reveals 
itself in Australian films. Stratton admits that this naturalisation is not without resistance at the 
beginning. This interesting line of argument, however, is not developed via detailed analysis, 
and the choice is justified by simply saying that it is rather the reproduction of neoliberal 
ideology and not resistance to it that he is seeking to tease out. Finally, Kapur & Wagner’s 
(2011) book Neoliberalism and global cinema provides an overview of existing research in the 
area. They use global cinema as a lens through which to view the workings of what they 
determine to be a global neoliberal project and its extensive implications for global cultural 
production, and invention of neoliberal subjectivity.  
 
2.4 From postsocialist cinema to neoliberalizing cinema 
 
Before applying the lens of the concept of neoliberalism to the analysis of the post-WTO 
Chinese film industry, I first revisit the term “postsocialist cinema” put forth by Chris Berry in 
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his book Postsocialist Cinema in Post-Mao China: The Cultural Revolution after the Cultural 
Revolution (2004). Berry places his research focus on eighty-one relatively neglected Chinese 
feature films produced between 1976 and 1981, examining their themes, characters, audience 
address, and narrative structures. He views those films as cinematic discourses that participate 
in the constitution, maintenance, and transformation of a new society and culture condition, the 
post-Mao period which he refers to as postsocialism. Originating from Chinese studies, 
postsocialism is a term coined by Arif Dirlik as his response to Deng Xiaoping’s “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics”, a term by which Dirlik rebutted claims that Deng’s term was just 
a euphemism for capitalism. Since then scholars based in various academic fields including 
Chinese literature, Chinese cinema studies, the political economy of communication, and so 
forth have been using ‘postsocialism’ as a broad general term for the contemporary Chinese 
social condition (Zhang Xudong, Xiaobing Tang and Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, Paul Pickowicz). 
In the same vein, Berry adopts the term postsocialism to imply qualitative changes 
distinguishing Mao’s China and the period it follows, and tries to examine how those changes 
are registered through cinematic discourses.  
 
While acknowledging the complexity in terms of the exact end point of the Cultural Revolution 
which he originally set out as the starting point for choosing his object of research from a 
methodological point of view, Berry justifies his inclusion of all films made in 1976, some of 
which are made before the official repudiation of the entire Cultural Revolution. 31  This 
methodological rationale bears importance in relation to my research and I will return to it in 
chapter 3 when I justify my selection of films to analyze in this thesis.  
 
 
31 Please see chapter 3 of the book where Berry provides a more detailed account of this issue. 
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Inspired in part by Berry’s work, this thesis seeks to provide a critical political economic 
analysis of Chinese cinema of the post-WTO era by putting the conceptualization of the relation 
between cinema as a social institution bearing identifiable and peculiar characteristics and the 
larger sociocultural and political circumstance that conditions it at the very centre of discussion. 
In line with Berry’s approach, I propose the term “neoliberalizing cinema” to designate post-
WTO Chinese cinema. Though it is imperative to clarify that this in no case amounts to a 
reflection theory of media effects, which Berry also clearly points out. The social and cultural 
formation is always in the process of evolution, so is the position of cinema within it, and their 
relationship to each other. Also, it would be naïve to consider that there is a sudden break 
between neoliberalizing cinema and postsocialist cinema. I am fully aware that the renaming 
based on significant historical events inevitably begs one critical question with regard to 
continuity and change. Here I return to the critical theory of neoliberalization discussed in the 
previous section which sees neoliberalism as a process rather than as a state of being, and 
furthermore, as a contested process rather than as a smooth transition. Therefore, instead of 
“neoliberal cinema”, I use “neoliberalizing cinema” to emphasize a process of becoming 
teeming with inconsistencies and contradictions. After all, fundamental shifts in societal and 
cultural formation and the cinema within it do not eclipse the continuities entailed and sustained 
by historical legacies.  
 
This leads to the question of the theoretical resources that I draw on to formulate and enrich 
the analytical framework of my research. Except from the obvious difference in terms of 
historical contexts, my theorization of neoliberalizing cinema departs from Berry’s 
understanding of postsocialist cinema in its theoretical roots. Berry takes inspiration from 
Miriam Hansen’s (1991) work on early American cinema in which Hansen considers cinema 
as a social institution with alternative potential, or what she calls an “alternative public sphere”. 
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Admitting the traditional emphasis on textual properties and meaning making through 
spectatorship and reception in cinematic study, Hansen broadens her analytic focus by 
incorporating into her research factors such as patterns of distribution, modes of exhibition, 
socially differentiated audiences in different venues, ancillary discourses ranging from 
advertising to newspaper criticism, and so forth. Hansen understands cinema as historical 
product and examines how cinema helps create alternative public spaces where changes in 
social relations could take place through the act of movie watching. In summary, Hansen is 
interested in the possibility offered by cinema for opening up public spaces where alternative 
discourses could be created and materialized.  
 
Considering the contested nature of the public sphere as a concept in the Chinese context, Berry 
finds it more appropriate to understand cinema as a rhizome instead of an alternative public 
sphere in postsocialist China.32 Premised on a set of problematic assumptions – that either the 
conditions of liberal capitalist pluralism do not exist at all in postsocialist China, or that they 
are the goal towards which China is headed or a standard against which China should be 
measured – the notion of an alternative public sphere is deemed both inadequate and misleading 
to apply to postsocialist China. Hence, Berry turns to the metaphor of rhizome which allows 
him to analyze postsocialist cinema as a combination of “systems of order and … areas or 
zones that work against the repressive structure of an order to open up difference and 
heterogeneity… a place that can conform and dissent at once” (2004: 17-18) . Put simply, the 
analytical focus is on lines of flight within the formation that could lead to the possibility of 
conceiving of and discursively articulating difference.  
 
 
32 A more detailed discussion on the applicability of public sphere in China could be found on p24-26. 
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Berry’s argument that there exist ambiguities, contradictions, and differences in Chinese 
cinema of post-Mao era paves the way for future research when China’s politics gradually 
veers away from a centralized commanding system within which there was no prospect for 
autonomy to be found. But unlike Berry’s approach of identifying different cinematic 
discourses in film texts framed by a conformist-versus-defiant dichotomy in political terms, I 
pull in the factor of the market against the backdrop of globalization as one of the shaping 
forces of this cinema in technological, aesthetic and ideological/narrative domains. The 
antagonism is no longer structured between a Party-state apparatus just recovered and 
withdrawing from ideological struggle and alternative public spheres such as cinema seeking 
to express different political voices and ideas. Rather, China’s installation of market 
mechanisms and attempted integration into global capitalist system marked by WTO accession 
further complicates the landscape and creates new pressures on the agents within the cinema 
field, which also creates more leeway for compromise, negotiation and cooperation. Again, 
these processes correspond to a critical theory of neoliberalization in the sense that they 
acknowledge the complex relationship between the state and the market in constructing 
neoliberalism of a particular formation with national particularities as well as global 
commonalities. To strip down all the discussion, I examine the contemporary Chinese film 
industry as institutional and cinematic manifestations of critical neoliberalization bound up in 
a web of power relations played out on national, transnational and global scales.   
 
2.5 The depoliticized politics and its implications for the cinema 
 
To further inform and enrich the theoretical framework of neoliberalizing cinema, in this 
section I draw on Wang Hui’s notion of “depoliticized politics” (2009) to look at how the larger 
political economic conditions of post-WTO China shape and being manifested in the Chinese 
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cinema. I break down this section into three parts. First, I explain the depoliticizing tendencies 
which characterize China’s politics and political communication in the 21st century, and how 
it is expressed through depoliticized discourses propagated by the CCP as part of a concerted 
effort to promote China’s soft power globally. In the second part, I start with the explication of 
the logical alliance between nationalism and cinema, and then specifically the CCP’s discursive 
strategies of incorporating the cinema into its nation building. Lastly, I focus on media 
governance and its manifestations in the cinema. 
 
2.5.1 Depoliticized politics   
 
If post-Mao China witnessed a major shift in the Party’s priorities from mass-scale class 
struggle to socialist modernization, post-WTO China embodies what Wang Hui’s calls 
“depoliticized politics”. By this he contends that “the party is no longer an organization with 
specific political values, but a mechanism of power” (2009: 6). The disastrous Cultural 
Revolution brought an end to the “line struggle” (路线斗争), which according to Wang (2006) 
is the only way to maintain party’s internal vitality and ensure that it does not become a 
depoliticized political organization. With “line struggle” painted as “mere power play”, Wang 
observes “a thoroughgoing suppression of the political life of the party… laid the foundation 
for the stratification-i.e. depoliticization—of the party” (Wang, 2006: 33). The single-party 
system and the absence of institutionalised mechanism for inner party democracy makes the 
theoretical debate over ideological issues impossible and obsolete. In other words, the Party 
has changed into “a depoliticized apparatus, a bureaucratic machine, and no longer functioned 
as a stimulant for ideas and practice” (Wang, 2009: 9). The political crisis triggered by the 
1989 Tiananmen incident reaffirmed the Party’s determination to shed its previous skeletal 
communist underpinnings and shut down any possibility of ideological debate. Deng 
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Xiaoping’s “southern tour” (南巡) in 1992 to advocate his line of further marketization  
consolidated the depoliticizing trend. Public space for ideological debates over the fundamental 
direction of China’s social transformation was officially sealed off when Deng proclaimed his 
own truth—“development is the hard truth” (发展是硬道理)—and imposed the famous “no 
debate” decree which claimed that there should no longer be any open debates over the 
ideological nature of policy reform (Zhao, 2012).  
 
To fill the ideological void, the Party turned to an attempt to legitimate ideological doctrines 
via economic development and nationalism. However, along with the rapid economic 
development since the CCP implemented marketization in the early 1990s has come escalating 
social inequality. The primary task of the CCP was to renew official ideologies devoid of real 
political connotations, and to develop a pragmatic and technocratic approach to governance 
that puts the consolidation of the Party’s ruling legitimacy at the top of the agenda. The 
principle of “stability is paramount” (稳定压倒一切) was upheld and carried into the 21st 
century. When Hu Jintao came into power in 2003, he felt the mounting urgency of renewing 
China’s previous Communist ideological doctrines to manage the undermining effects of 
increasing social inequality on not only the political legitimacy of the CCP but also China’s 
economic growth (Yu, 2010). Relying on new political discourses such as that of the 
“harmonious socialist society” (社会主义和谐社会), the CCP began to try to re-channel the 
economist or developmentalist policy that focused solely on the growth of GDP into a more 
balanced reform to address the mounting social disparity, injustice and popular resentment 
(Liu, 2012). “Harmonious socialist society” as a concept was first mentioned in the resolution 
of the 16th Party Congress in November 2002 and defined at the fourth plenary session in 
September 2004 as a society built on “democracy and rule of law, justice and equality, trust 
and truthfulness, amity and vitality, order and stability, and a harmonious relation with 
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nature”.33 It was further explicated by Hu Jintao in February 2005 in a long speech, in which 
he highlighted the concept’s relevance to the legitimacy of CCP by stating that the creation of 
a “harmonious socialist society” was “essential for consolidating the party’s social foundation 
to govern and achieve the party’s historical governing mission”.34  
 
Xi followed suit when he took office and peppered the official ideology with discourses such 
as the“Chinese Dream” (中国梦), a catchphrase that has a particular bearing on the Chinese 
film industry. Popularized after 2013 which describes a set of personal and national ideals in 
line with socialist thinking, “Chinese Dream” is another newly established official discourse 
propagated by the CCP and crystalized in the domain of cultural production.35 It has become 
the trademark slogan for President Xi’s administration since he first publicly uttered the words 
in a November 2012 Speech at the opening of an exhibition in Beijing called “The road toward 
renewal” (复兴之路).36 In what appears to be a rip-off of the “American Dream”, this term 
spells out a vision of a prosperous China’s ascendance to cultural, political and economic 
power under the leadership of the CCP (Carlson, 2015; Wang, 2014).  
 
Another discourse that could be understood in conjunction with depoliticization is “soft power” 
(软实力). Originally developed by Nye in the field of international relations as a depoliticized 
way of imagining the hegemonizing attempts of nations through cultural dissemination, “soft 
power” means “one country gets other countries to want what it wants—might be called co-




35 This term has been popularized in mass culture in the form of film American dreams in China (2013), reality 
shows Chinese Dream Show (simplified Chinese: 中国梦想秀) produced by Zhejiang Television Network, or 
through platform such as Spring Festival Gala produced by CCTV.  
36 http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-12/06/c_113936084.htm 
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it wants” (Nye, 1990: 166). In line with Gramsci’s (1971) work on hegemony and consent this 
potential of indirectly influencing the behavior or interests of other political bodies is built 
upon intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions. Soft power as a 
concept was introduced into China in 1993 when Wang Huning, now a member of CCP Central 
Committee Secretariat, wrote and published the first Chinese article on soft power, discussing 
culture being the main source of a state’s soft power. Only in the early 2000s the term enters 
Chinese mainstream discourse, first in international politics and then domestic policies, inter-
provincial competition and corporate governance (Han & Jiang, 2009). After being debated 
heatedly in intellectual circle for several years, soft power was adopted by the Chinese 
leadership in political speeches and policy documents. In 2007 this term gained strategic 
significance at the highest levels in China’s political discourse when Hu Jintao delivered a 
political report to the 17th CCP National Congress in which he specifically stated that “we must 
enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic 
cultural rights and interests”.37  
 
China’s soft power strategies have attracted scholarly attention in the field of communication 
studies in recent years, in particular the implications for the Chinese media industries (Guo, 
2013; Su, 2010; Sun, 2010; Vlassis, 2015; Zhang, 2010; Zhao, 2013; Zhou, 2015). Sun’s (2010) 
analysis of former CCP propaganda chief Li Changchun’s speech on the importance of 
enhancing Chinese media’s “communication capacity” demonstrates that a soft power 
campaign based on a transmission view of communication neglects the symbolic dimension of 
the communication, and due to the lack of contemporary moral appeal inherent in China’s 
approach to soft power, it is impossible for China to escape global geopolitics, nor can it avoid 
Western ideological resistance. Despite the CCP’s efforts to foreground an ostensibly 
 
37 https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/25/content_6205616_7.htm 
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depoliticized notion of culture and to downplay ideological differences within China, to what 
extent this charm offensive has been effective in terms of exporting the ideological frameworks 
and nationalism behind Chinese cultural products remains open to doubt. Put aside its 
practicality and achievability, Meng (2018) argues that the CCP’s soft power initiative 
resonates with the general depoliticizing trend in China’s political communication by taking 
“a technocratic approach that circumvents ideology with an emphasis on economic 
development, an instrumentalist view of ‘communication capacity’, and an essentialist, 
apolitical understanding of Chinese culture” (p. 38). 
 
In general, I agree with the argument that these new ideological discourses formulated under 
the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations epitomize a crucial shift in China’s politics and 
political communication, which could be explained by Wang Hui’s notion of “depoliticized 
politics”. The discourse of “revolutionary class struggle” of the Maoist China was buried in the 
dust of history. What replaced it were culture-oriented depoliticized discourses, through which 
the direction of societal transformations was rid of any ideological undertones, the issue of 
escalating social inequality was presented as the inevitable by-product of economic 
development, and the shift in the class basis of the regime was made obscure (Ling, 2006; 
Meng, 2018; Wang, 2006; Wuthnow, 2008; Zhao, 2008a; Zhao, 2012).  
 
Before moving to the next part, I want to emphasize one crucial point that, behind a 
depoliticizing regime is a more than ever contentious and stratified Chinese society. The 
politics of depoliticization shouldn’t be interpreted as the disappearance of ideological 
contestation within the Party, and at the grassroots level. Neither does it mean that the socialist 
legacies and revolutionary history from which the CCP used to derive legitimacy have been 
wiped out of the regime’s political discourses, or have lost political currency in articulating 
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China’s future, as Xi’s administration has evidently illustrated. I will return to this point in 
chapter 4 when conducting critical policy analysis of Xi’s talk at the Beijing Forum on 
Literature and Art in 2014 (hereafter Beijing Forum Talk). Lying at the heart of “depoliticized 
politics” is the CCP’s attempt to gloss over fundamental ideological contradictions and 
reconcile the discrepancies between socialist promises and capitalist policies through political 
discourses free from any ideological connotations and thus resistant force.   
 
2.5.2 Nationalism and cinema: a logical alliance    
 
Nationalism is a modern phenomenon that appeared alongside the emergence of the nation-
state system in Europe and came to China as a product of Western imperialism and Japanese 
invasion. Zhao Suisheng (2004) offers an overview of Chinese nationalism in his book A 
Nation-state by Construction. According to Zhao, nationalism penetrated Chinese people’s 
thinking only after China was brought into the modern nation-state system in the 19th century, 
which was facilitated by the national crisis that came after China’s defeat by the British in the 
1840-1842 Opium War and by the Japanese in the 1894-1985 Sino-Japanese War. 
 
Since Maoist China, the discourse of nationalism has remained as one of the vital sources from 
which the CCP derives its political legitimacy. By positioning itself as the defender of China’s 
interests among the nation-states of the world, the CCP relies on nationalism to take on the 
responsibility for speaking in the name of the nation and demands that citizens subordinate 
their individual interests to China’s national ones (Zhao, 2005). The top-down nationalism 
functions premised on the core idea that China’s unique national conditions make China 
unprepared to adopt Western-style liberal democracy and that the current one-party rule is 
necessary to maintaining “political stability and unity” (安定团结) and a prerequisite for rapid 
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economic development (Wei & Liu, 2001; Zheng, 1999). In the meantime, while nationalism 
can be furthered through propaganda, it is more than propaganda propagated by the party elites 
for its own instrumental purpose (Gries, 2004). The CCP has always been wary of and tried to 
rein in rising bottom-up popular nationalist sentiments that it assumes may backfire, turning 
into criticism of the regime. A pragmatic nationalism is therefore endorsed and strategically 
managed to create a favorable international environment for China’s economic development.  
 
Cinema is considered as conducive to nation-building from a social constructivist point of view 
by media scholars with particular research interests in the relationship between nationalism and 
media (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995; Dermody & Jacka, 1987; Hill, 1997; Moran, 1996; 
Turner, 1999). Nationalist ideology can be viewed as being premised upon what Anderson 
(1983) defines as “imagined community” building on the collective imagination of people who 
inhabit in a particular geo-political space. This should not, however, been viewed in a simplistic 
sense as the expression of a single monolithic set of group interests. As Turner (1999: 180-
188) argues, different cultural and symbolic systems which participate in the ideological 
constriction of nations as bounded units are always in contention with each other; most forms 
of nationalism involve at some point or some manner the suppression of identities and voices 
that do not bow to the most powerful nationalist political vision, a pattern that means the 
nationalist community always has its “others”, even where some of these others have found 
themselves in full agreement with the ideology of the nation. In this sense, the Chinese 
nationalist consciousness does not exist naturally, and was not born, but was made possible 
with the construction of a unified nation through concerted discursive efforts, via the medium 
of media representation, official articulation, concrete institutions and immediate, lived 
experiences of people all together (Ong, 2005). In Higson’s words, to build a nationalist 
consciousness is to build “a strong sense of self-identity that imagine themselves as members 
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of a coherent, organic community, rooted in the geographical space, with well-established 
indigenous traditions” (Higson, 2006: 16). In light of the actual fractures within the population 
of most nations along lines of class and caste, religion, race, gender and language, the process 
of imaging a coherent, homogeneous, and unproblematic community is achieved through the 
authoritative telling and retelling of a shared history, elaboration of a shared present, and the 
projection of a shared future (Bishop & Jaworski, 2003). Thus, rather than being the “natural” 
and “immemorial” object of reverence for many nationalists, the nation is socially forged and 
“sutured” together through a variety of discursive processes (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Born to 
be a key site for symbolic creation and circulation, cinema has thus become a significant public 
space in which compelling version of the nation is produced and negotiated.  
 
Turner (1999: 158-159) argues that representations of the nation are particularly important for 
building and maintaining the hegemony of nationalist ideologies. There are, therefore, always 
attempts to “control the proliferation of these representations” in cinema. In China, historically 
there is therefore nothing novel about cinema being incorporated into a nation-building 
enterprise. It runs a long time in the CCP’s history for cinema to be used to consolidate the its 
ruling legitimacy. The function of cinema evolves through conformity to re-invention and re-
articulation of official ideologies distinguishing particular socio-cultural and political periods, 
which require sophisticated governance techniques to materialize.  
 
2.5.3 Media governance and cultural policies    
 
In existing film studies, governance of Chinese cinema is often reduced to state regulation 
embodied by film policies and more straightforwardly, censorship mechanism. The Chinese 
film industry subjects to an opaque and elusive censoring process which is believed to be 
choking up the creative talent of the industry. The overall observation with regard to art 
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censorship in China after Cultural Revolution is that it is gradually relaxing its grip.38 With 
regard to scholarship on film censorship, it largely falls into two categories, either focus on 
censorship over images on the big screen (Johnson, 2012; Zhu, 2003; Zhu & Nakajima, 2010), 
or censorship over independent, underground and alternative filmmaking (Berry & Rofel, 2010; 
Ma, 2014, Nakajima, 2010).39  
 
The fact that there is a long spectrum of views and attitudes towards the changes taking place 
in Chinese film control since the 1980s reflects a rather murky state of affairs. The uplifting 
and optimistic view argues that the CCP’s hands on film control is indeed getting looser and 
more tolerant. For example, Rui Zhang (2008) suggests that a transformation from hard 
censorship to soft censorship of a rating system seems likely to come to Chinese cinema. On 
the middle ground is a view represented by Mary Calkins who analyzes film censorship from 
legal perspectives and argues that the “film censorship in China, like contracts and 
constitutional law in China, is contextual, individualized, and continuously negotiable rather 
than absolute or binding” (1999: 242-243).40 On a similar note, Paul Pickowicz (2013) teeters 
between pessimism and optimism when talking about political constraints on filmmaking. 
Building on his intimate encounters with Chinese film history, Pickowicz concludes that “if 
the political history of Chinese filmmaking in the last hundred years has taught us anything, it 
has shown us how these cycles of crackdown and opening come and go” (2013: 17). However, 
 
38 Jerome Silbergeld (1997) concludes that the relaxation of film censorship is derived from the CCP’s 
conscious adjustment of its art policies during the Reform era (pp.328). Richard Kraus (2004) attributes the 
lightening censorship over art to four reasons: breaking the rules, media expansion, technological change, and 
the professionalization of cultural criticism (pp.122-126).  
39 A majority of the research centres on censorship after the 1980s. Zhiwei Xiao’s doctoral thesis titled Film 
Censorship in China, 1927-1937 (1994) is the only comprehensive research available on the nationalist film 
censorship before 1949. Paul Clark’s book Chinese Cinema: Culture and Politics since 1949 (1987) includes 
essays which provide valuable information about the censorship of the Chinese socialist film industry since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China until the 1980s. 
40 What validates this judgement is the fact that very often film directors simplify their admittedly complex 
relations with the Chinese state. They could have serious conflicts with the state but sometimes they also enjoy 
cooperation and benefits from the state.  
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in Kraus’s view, the sluggish and erratic restructuring of the cultural world is “the product of 
a weakening regime taking aim at a moving target” (2004: 130) because the marketization of 
culture has both complicated the job of the censors and generated new tasks.  
 
However, current understandings and study of censorship is restricting in three aspects. First, 
self-censorship is rarely discussed in the Chinese context, although it has been adopted as a 
coping mechanism by many industry professionals. Detailed analysis of workings of self-
censorship is rare in current research primarily due to the difficulty of collecting empirical 
evidence; this is addressed particularly well by Siao Yuong Fong (2018) in her ethnographic 
work on self-censorship in the television industry in Singapore.41 Obviously, there is a degree 
of bitterness about the bleak situation. The rhetoric about censorship among film professionals 
indicates splitting and vacillation between coming to terms with the realities of the constraints 
and risks, trying to make the best out of what at hand or voluntary alienation and distancing 
from the mainstream so as to retain creative independence and integrity. The intricacies of self-
censorship range from familiarising oneself with subjects off limits and staying away from 
them, internalizing naturalized consensuses within the industry without questioning, 
challenging or even helping to maintain these borders and boundaries in areas from sexuality 
to politics, making compromises when in conflict with official opinions so as to get the 
greenlight for production or distribution, and many more. My point, however, which is 
confirmed by Fong’s work, suggests that these power relations cannot be understood as 
repressive in an absolute and totalising sense. As Fong (2018) points out, the space of 
negotiation is not entirely sealed off.  Sometimes, censorship can even be a productive force.  
 
 
41 The difficulty of collecting data regarding self-censorship will be elaborated in the methodology chapter and 
following empirical chapter.  
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For example, some scholars argue that this particular blend of political censorship cultivates 
the rapid development of diversified distribution channels such as the Internet, and a dual-track 
and double standard censorship system has been mobilized to manage the new condition (Xie, 
2012; Zhou, 2015). Secondly, censorship enforced by market mechanisms has become an 
equally, if not more overshadowing force in an increasingly marketised film industry. The 
impact is most palpable in the domain of independent and underground filmmaking. 
Exemplified by the so-called Fifth Generation directors such as Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige, 
artistic filmmaking in China experienced its heyday in the 1980s when the liberating and 
critical political climate and socio-cultural milieu provided fertile ground for re-narrating 
national history and stories through cinematic expression. However, this burgeoning came to 
an end in the mid-1990s when the socialist cinema apparatus collapsed in the face of deepening 
marketization  in the cultural sector, and when the CCP did not need artists and intellectuals to 
help legitimize its ruling power as in the previous decade when ideological debate was still 
being allowed and encouraged in public cultural spaces.  
 
What followed was the underground or independent filmmaking represented by Sixth 
Generation directors including Wang Xiaoshuai, Zhang Yuan, and Jia Zhangke. This 
generation was not lucky enough to have the privileges enjoyed by their predecessors when 
Chinese cinema was still financially supported and culturally endorsed by the state. Going 
overseas and/or underground became those directors’ survival strategy, which further alienated 
them from the state, establishing a broad pattern of independence and rebellion amongst this 
generation of film makers. The brief trajectory of artistic filmmaking in contemporary China 
again took a drastic turn in the 21st century when the state receded to the secondary position 
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while market dynamics came to the fore in further marginalizing and isolating critical artistic 
voices in Chinese cinema.42  
 
When the Chinese film industry stretches out its influence into the global arena, so does its 
censorship system. As Chinese finance capital has become the hotly pursued new darling at 
international film trade markets, familiarity with Chinese censorship rules has become a 
necessary and a valuable career skill for foreign producers. The logic of Chinese soft power 
(see section 2.5.1) is thus working in unexpected and twisted ways, with the assistance of 
capital, instead of from traditional Chinese cultural production. Therefore, to adequately 
register the nuances embedded in censorship mechanism manifested in power relations among 
the state, market and film professionals in the global context, it is necessary to re-conceptualize 
the role of the state in governing Chinese cinema and more empirically grounded research. 
However, capital and censorship alone cannot account for the state’s complex global cultural 
governance machinery. Censorship enforced by regulation and legislation is only part of a 
colossal governing apparatus. Instead of singling out censorship as the overarching governing 
technique, I situate state regulation of the Chinese film industry in the discursive construction 
of a broader nationalist project under the theoretical framework of critical neoliberalization.  
 
Chapter four will address those competing factors and the interconnections among them. But 
before turning to that analysis, it is worth noting in more detail the methods I have used in this 
thesis to gather and generate data, sample and analyze data, and to reflexively frame the ethics 
of the study.  
  
 
42 For more in-depth research on independent and underground filmmaking in China, see, Pickowicz, P.& Y. 
Zhang (2006). From underground to independent: alternative film culture in contemporary China; Zhang, Z. 
(2007). The urban generation: Chinese cinema and society at the turn of the twenty-first century; Zhang, H. 
(2014). The dissolution and re-organization of the Chinese film industry, The Observer, obtained access at 
http://www.guancha.cn/ZhangHuiZuo/2014_08_04_252862.shtml  
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction: reflexive methodological considerations 
 
In this chapter, I discuss and reflect on the methodological choices of this project—primarily 
critical policy analysis of Party leader’s speech and in-depth elite interviews with industry 
professionals. I situate my research in the broad field of media industries scholarship which 
has grown out of diverse disciplinary contexts and benefited from a wide range of analytical 
methods. In their co-edited volume, Media Industries: History, Theory, and Method, Holt and 
Perren (2009) outline a genealogy of media industries scholarship. From their work I take the 
relevance of “production studies” and/or ethnographic approaches to media studies: in 
particular participant observation, and expert producer interviews, offer a grounded, 
empirically based understanding of media industry practices, including the operations, business 
models, and day-to-day realities of the media industries, past and present. As discussed in 
chapter 1, my approach to the Chinese film industry is mainly informed by the hybrid 
theoretical approaches of culture industry studies, media economics and institutional political 
economy.  
 
I embarked on this foray into the Chinese film industry with no prior connection with the 
Chinese film industry at all, in both professional and intellectual senses, which later on turned 
out to be the primary difficulty in my fieldwork. Thus, this thesis strives to provide situated 
and partial yet grounded observations and explanations of the institutional reconfigurations of 
the Chinese film industry as a budding locale of film production and circulation, of which the 
underpinning rationales and mechanisms are more and more imaged and operated on the global 
scale. My work formulates a coherent narrative of the commercialization and marketization of 
the Chinese film industry during a specific historical period.  
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My position as an outsider inevitably constrained the analytical adequacies of this project due 
to a lack of intimate prior knowledge of the day-to-day realities of the film industry. However, 
in the meantime, the lack of first-hand experience or immediate contacts with the industry 
entails a distance prerequisite for a critical perspective on the Chinese film industry. The 
development of the film industry is highly conditioned by sociocultural and political contexts 
and therefore should be understood as a formation as well as a process profoundly entangled 
with other dimensions and sites of social change. My position affords me the critical eye to 
more easily discern regulatory ideologies deeply rooted in the practices of film workers. 
 
Well aware of the rift between industry and academia, I hope to at least narrow the gap, rather 
than broaden it. The objective of this brief account of my fieldwork experience is partly to draw 
attention to the challenges involved in doing elite interviews with practitioners in a field where 
personal networks and communication skills are of foremost importance, particularly so from 
the perspective of an outsider. To compensate the potential deficiencies of my outsider status, 
I have turned to critical policy study as a complementary method.  
 
3.2 Critical policy analysis 
 
When I set out to conduct an analysis of Chinese film industry policies, I soon realized the 
conventional approach of policy analysis embedded in the empiricist, rationalistic and 
technocratic tradition is limiting in its analytical strength for my thesis. Instead, I turned to 
critical policy analysis, an approach that fits better with my overall theoretical pursuits. In this 
section, I give a brief review of the rationale and principles of critical policy analysis, explain 
why it is more appropriate, and justify the choice of document which I will use as the object of 
critical policy analysis in chapter 4.  
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Instead of one particular or several concrete film policies laid out by the film authorities, I am 
more interested in doing in-depth analysis of political statements associated with significant 
ideological substance. In section 4.2, I will map out the evolving re-arrangements of the 
legislative and managerial structure pertinent to Chinese cinema and review landmark film 
policy documents since 2002 as an integral part of discussion on the transition of Chinese 
cinema from film institution to film industry. These aspects of the Chinese film industry are 
important in chronicling the history of institutional restructuration of the post-WTO Chinese 
cinema from the point of view of the party-state. However, I argue those official policy 
documents only constitute the top layer of the overall media governance mechanism. It is 
imperative to give a critical account of the ideological positions underpinning extant film 
policies, and in this case, I turn to one of Xi Jinping’s political speeches as a vehicle that allows 
me to elucidate the Party’s position in articulating the function of cinema and its relation to 
nation-building.  
 
A critical approach to policy analysis requires the re-evaluation of two fundamental issues. 
First, critical policy analysis indicates an epistemological re-orientation. At the heart of the 
conventional policy analysis approach is an effort to sidestep the normative, ethical, and 
qualitative dimensions of policymaking and to reduce political and social issues to technically 
defined ends that can be assessed and measured through administrative means (Williams, 
1998). This approach ignores the inherently normative and interpretive nature of policy 
problems and pays scant attention to the context within which social problems and policy issues 
unfold (deLeon, 1988). Rein (1976) calls for a value-critical policy analysis that acknowledges 
the central role of social value, leading to an epistemological shift to post-positivism or post-
empiricism in policy analysis. This epistemological orientation denies the existence of a single 
objective “truth” out there and neutral scientific policy analysis, foregrounds the essentially 
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constructed nature of any empirical statements, and turns to focus on the crucial role of 
language and discourse in mediating policy questions, framing normative assumptions of 
policy definitions and understanding, and so on (Hawkesworth, 1988). Not only does a critical 
approach challenge the possibility of the mobilisation of a solely technical rationality in 
analysing policy issues, but furthermore it criticizes rationalistic policy analysis for oft-times 
co-opting ideology that masks elite political and bureaucratic interests, as any policy is deeply 
grounded in subjective factors and less visible presuppositions (Fischer, 2003). Generally 
speaking, a critical approach denotes an interest in analysing opaque as well as transparent 
structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, and control. 
 
Secondly, critical policy analysis requires a fundamental shift in viewing the relationship 
between language and society, discourse and power. The “linguistic turn” in social science 
introduced by Wittgenstein’s analytical philosophy rejects the Kantian possibility of ideas 
originating with individuals but instead turns its focus to language as a medium of generating 
meaning and constructing reality (Fischer, 2003; Harris, 1990; Thompson, 1984). As Hall 
(1997) argues, if language is taken as the primary order of experiencing the life world, then it 
is inherently implicated in struggles over power and is itself a means of exercising power 
through representation. Therefore, the use of language is important in more than just a linguistic 
sense: it sets up a dialectical relationship between discourse and power. As a medium of 
domination and social force, language serves to legitimize relations of organized power. 
 
Here I pause to discuss my understanding of the term discourse. Usually there are three ways 
for political scientists to collect data to test hypotheses: interviews, document analysis, and 
observation (Johnson & Joslyn, 2001). Researchers turn to written records when the political 
phenomena cannot be measured through other two means. Written records are composed of 
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documents, reports, statistics, manuscripts, and other written, oral or visual materials. This is 
similar to the way text is defined by Fairclough as “the written or spoken language produced 
in a discursive event” (Fairclough, 1993: 138), emphasizing the polysemic nature of texts 
including visual images and sound. However, discourse contains two layers of meaning, 
entailing a much more sophisticated implication than writing. At a basic linguistic level, 
discourse refers to the use of language, in forms of written, visual or speech. Foucault goes 
beyond that and conceives it as a system of representation, more specifically, “a group of 
statements which provide a language for talking about—a way of representing the knowledge 
about—a particular topic at a particular historical moment” (Hall, 1997: 72). Therefore, 
discourse is more than a linguistic concept but also materially grounded and materially 
promoted.  
 
Ideology works through discourse by making the social world appear to be natural and 
unproblematic (Billing, 1991; Fairclough, 1992; Hawkesworth, 1988; Oktar, 2001). Discourse 
practices are viewed as having major ideological effects, helping to produce and reproduce 
unequal power relations though particular ways of representing and positioning (Brooks, 1995; 
Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). The process of naturalisation of common sense makes embodied 
struggles over power seem neutral and without any ideological burden, which paradoxically 
indicates a fundamental ideological effect (Gramsci, 1971). Critical policy analysis is helpful 
in that it recognizes the ideological nature of discourse and helps make explicit power 
relationships frequently hidden under taken-for-granted political statements. Power, ideology, 
and hegemony are issues inherent in critical inquiries. 
 
To sum up, language uses in political statements should be analyzed not only as texts, but also 
social practices that construe social relations, identities and systems of knowledge and beliefs. 
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Critical policy analysis treats language as a means of exercising power conditioned by its 
specific social context, and aims at uncovering ideological prejudices neutralized, social 
inequalities naturalized, and the exercise of power legitimized through political documents at 
the discursive level (Chouliaraki, 2008; Fairclough, 1993; Widdowson, 2000).  
 
A common critique levelled at critical political analysis is the lack of validity. Major concern 
has been expressed about whether a critical approach is able to produce valid knowledge given 
its interpretative features which apparently render analysis highly subjective and ideological 
(Hammersley, 1997). As Widdowson puts it, this approach is “in a dual sense, a biased 
interpretation: in the first place it is prejudiced on the basis of some ideological commitment, 
and then it selects for analysis such texts as will support the preferred interpretation” 
(Widdowson, 1995: 169). Similarly, Schegloff (1997) points out the risk of slipping into mere 
ideological analysis when the critical analysis of social context does not bind to data. 
Fundamentally, what differentiates critical discourse analysis from other forms of analysis is 
the recognition that the world is “always already” inflected by language and therefore the truth 
is ideologically textured (MacLure, 2003). Any knowledge, including policy documents, 
knowledge about policy analysis, and knowledge derived from policy analysis, is far from 
neutral but implicated in complex power relations. There is no escape from the subjective 
interpretation of any texts, hence the concern of producing biased, ideologically-charged 
knowledge through critical policy analysis is rather irrelevant. It is exactly the interpretative 
and explanatory power of critical policy analysis that I rely on to conduct my research. In a 
general sense, I do not aim to provide definite answers or hard evidence to a social question, 
but rather to commit to offering interpretations of discourses whose production, distribution 
and consumption are conditioned upon historical background.  
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Another criticism centres on the lack of detailed and systematic procedure in relation to data 
collection. It is true that critical policy analysis does not contain a well-defined and widely 
applicable data-gathering method. However, the requirement to incorporate a sophisticated 
sampling technique as in content analysis is itself ideologically biased against critical policy 
analysis. Essentially, critical policy analysis is not evaluated as a method concerned about 
representativeness, hence techniques of data collection has never been a major theoretical issue. 
It does not set out to identify universal processes and indeed, it is critical of the idea of 
generality as discourse is “always occasioned-constructed from particular interpretative 
resources and designed for particular context” (Gill, 2009: 186). Instead, critical policy analysis 
is more about how to critically draw out underlying meanings from “typical texts” such as 
political speeches in a way that other methodologies are unable to accomplish (Wodak, 2009). 
 
The criterion of data selection in my thesis is primarily subject to the text’s significance in 
political terms, its capability or potential in influencing and shaping the discourse contour and 
whether it is easy to get access to. I will elaborate on this issue in chapter 4. Indeed, the value 
of this work is strengthened further by my deployment of elite interviews to complement the 
textual analysis and triangulate the findings. I discuss the sample and methodological 
implications of these interviews in the following section. 
 
3.3 Elite producer and policy interviews 
3.3.1 Defining elites and confronting power relations 
 
Elites can be “loosely defined as ... those with close proximity to power” (Lilleker, 2003: 207) 
or with particular expertise (Burnham et al., 2004). There is some debate about whether there 
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are overlaps and distinctions between experts and elites since being expert in a particular field 
is not always a sign of belonging to the economic elite. Morris (2009) uses the term ‘elite 
interviews’ to describe interviews with individuals or groups who ostensibly have closer 
proximity to power or particular professional expertise. What is unquestionable is that this is a 
method which allows researchers to get unprecedented and quick and well informed access to 
the key debates and topics in a particular field, and if the experts happen to work in media 
production, to the contextual dilemmas and knowledge which inform aspects of their choices 
and daily decision-making around cinematic production. This was my reason for settling upon 
this as one of my central methods. Of course,   
 
The particularities of interviewing elites have been extensively discussed in general social 
sciences texts on research methods (Bryman, 2004; Creswell, 2003; Harvey, 1990; Hertz & 
Imber, 1995; Mikecz, 2012; Morris, 2009; Neal & Mclaughlin, 2009; Silverman, 2006; Welch 
et al., 2002). Among a variety of methodological challenges associated with conducting elite 
interviews, the predominant one is gaining access, followed by issues of establishment of 
rapport and maintaining a balance of power between the researcher and the interviewee. 
Literature on elite interview abounds with practical guidance on strategies and techniques that 
could be employed to help interviewers gain access and establish rapport. Jeremy Tunstall 
(1993) has been prolific in conducting research on the media industries and employing 
interviews as his primary method.  
 
“Elite interviewing is characterized by a situation in which the balance [of power] is in favor 
of the respondent” (Burnham et al., 2004: 205), and this can lead to additional challenges in 
gaining access and to the respondents’ tendency to seek to control the agenda (Burnham et al., 
2004; Bygnes, 2008). These difficulties tend to result in the majority of research interviews 
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being undertaken with less powerful people, who may also be less skilled at deflecting 
questions (Homan, 1991; Ostrander, 1995), and less likely to be able to pass the researcher to 
a public relations department (Burnham et al., 2004). Professional identifications with 
filmmaking practices are historically formulated, and are embodied in transformative patterns 
of film culture enabled by technological development, shifting political environment and 
economic conditions, etc. In this thesis I incorporate film culture as part of the object of 
research, which refers to professional perceptions of film market, film as cultural commodity, 
and film consumption. There has no research of a similar kind in existing literature. My way 
of reconciling this set of complexities was to approach the positioning of my interviewees 
rather as cultural intermediaries than as elites and to prepare extremely thoroughly the 
background knowledge required. The concept of cultural intermediaries bears some further 
discussion.  
 
In Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste (1984), Pierre Bourdieu uses “cultural 
intermediary” to describe a subsection of the new petite bourgeoisie, whose work involves the 
provision of symbolic products and services. In comparison to the cultural intermediary as 
critic in the traditional sense of the term proposed by Bourdieu, this concept has been picked 
up by many scholars who broaden its explanatory capacity to include professionals 
participating in all cultural and media industries that have the role of linking producers of 
symbolic content with consumers of symbolic content (Cronin, 2004; Hesmondhalgh, 2012; 
McFall, 2002; Negus, 2002; Nixon & du Gay, 2002; Wright, 2005). Some even go further and 
apply the idea of the cultural intermediary to consumers to describe and explain the prosumer 
trend (Lee, 2012). In his book The cultural industries (2012), Hesmondhalgh traces the concept 
to its origin and compares that to the ways it has been utilized today. Bourdieu uses cultural 
intermediary to describe “the producers of cultural programmes on TV and radio or the critics 
   
 
 75 
of ‘quality’ newspapers and magazines and all the writer-journalists and journalist-writers” 
(1984: 325). However, in later studies of cultural intermediary, its definition is not always 
clarified in terms of how it is different and to what extent its meaning is extended. As a result, 
Hesmondhalgh prefers to terms such as “creative manager” coined by Ryan in the book Making 
Capital from Culture (1992) and “symbol creator”. Slightly contrasting from David 
Hesmondhalgh’s approach of abandoning the concept to avoid definitional confusion, but not 
going as far as to apply this to audiences or users of media, I argue that this concept serves a 
central methodological purpose in this thesis as a rationale for the sampling of particular 
experts involved at different levels of the Chinese film industry. 
 
3.3.2 Sampling and operationalizing of the research question and the topic guide 
 
As discussed above, cultural intermediaries are people who develop myths and rituals which 
help legitimate norms and values regulating and shaping industrial practices (Bourdieu, 1996). 
Through circulation of rhetoric, they intermediate not only power relations within a specific 
industry, but also social trends and ideologies linking the industry with society. Moreover, 
cultural intermediaries have the capacity of critically reflecting on their practice (Cronin, 2004). 
In the case of Chinese film industry, I break down the concept into three categories to represent 
people who function as agents of neoliberalizing cinema according to their relationship with 
the film industry.  
 
1. At the core is the group of film professionals including directors, producers, distributors, 
exhibitors, and screenwriters. They build the foundation by directly partaking in filmmaking 
practices. 
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2. The second group is comprised of people involved in policymaking process, working in the 
state apparatus. They are conventionally considered at the top of power hierarchy within the 
film community. 
3. The last group consists of people from marginal positions of the industry, such as critics, 
researchers, self-media practitioners, etc. They play mediating roles between the film industry 
and a wide range of audience through different platforms and serving different interests.  
 
I started the process of sampling and contacting potential interviewees at a very early stage of 
my research by sending out interview requests mainly through social media, or any kinds of 
internet platforms that I could find. I didn’t establish any filtering or selection rules in the initial 
phase. About three months prior to my fieldwork trip in China in 2013, I began to make the 
most use of my own research credentials, affiliations and personal connections.  
 
I chose Beijing as the fieldwork site for my research because Beijing is the centre of film 
production in the Chinese film industry and has been so for the majority part of its history, 
except the early years when Shanghai was the cultural and financial centre. 43  All my 
respondents and their companies resided in Beijing. When I was officially based in Beijing, 
the snowballing technique was the most important strategy that I relied on to reach out to new 
interviewees. At the end of every interview, I always asked for names of contacts that the 
interviewees thought would be able and willing to provide information in the form of an 
interview. Meanwhile, I kept myself busy by going to activities and events which could 
potentially put me in touch with future interviewees, such as attendance at relevant conferences, 
meetings, public discussions and seminars. On various occasions, I was given contact details 
of potential interviewees. Some of the interviewees provided me with additional reading 
 
43 https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-media-001.html  
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materials. I learnt an enormous amount about the topic from each encounter, and deployed it 
carefully in the following interviews. Following each interview, I sent each a letter thanking 
them for their cooperation, retaining professional goodwill with my interviewees. This gesture 
not only served as a reminder in case the interviewee offered additional help, such as reports 
or additional contacts during the interview, but also kept the door open for follow-up 
interviews.  
 
In the end, a total of 15 extended and in-depth elite interviews with Chinese film industry 
professional and producers were conducted between July-October 2013, and August 2014 (see 
table 3.1 below). They consist of three categories of cultural intermediaries as I described 
above. Apart from that, I attended one book launch and one industry forum during the summer 
of 2013 in Beijing, and three directors’ Q&As at the BFI in London in 2014 (see table 3.2 
below). These participant observations also provided important insights, and a way of 
triangulating data, that I could not get from elite interviews alone.  
 
In line with the Ethical Guidelines of my institution and the commitment to my interviewees’ 
confidentiality, I ensured that interviewees who did not wish to be named or whose identities 
would place them at risk from the revelatory nature of their interviews would remain 
anonymous and their testimonies used only as background and supporting data. For this reason 
they are not listed below in Table 3.1.  
 
 
No Name  Affiliation  Date  Location 
1 Peng Kan 
(彭侃)  
P&D Director, 13/07/2013 
3pm 
Mann Coffee (Wangjing store), 
Beijing  
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Legend Media Co. 
Ltd. 
北京漫咖啡望京店 
2 Su Yi (苏
毅) 
Wechat public 














Sculpting in Time (Beijing 
Normal University Store), 










China Daily Lobby 
中国日报社 

















25 Xinwai Street, Beijing 
北京新外大街 25 号 
 
7 Pan Yanyun 
(潘烟云) 
Production manager, 




Beijing International Center, 
Sanlitun, Beijing  
北京三里屯 






Director of the 
Market Research 





























6 Xiaozhuang, Chaoyang 
District, Beijing 
北京朝阳区小庄 6 号  
11 Jin Fuxin 
(靳赋新) 
Vice President, 




Zhongqi Building, Xiaoxitian, 
Beijing 
北京小西天中器大楼 







Donglang film industry park, 
Beijing 
北京东郎影视产业园 
13 Stego Film Editor  23/09/2013 
11am 
798, Beijing  
北京 798 艺术产业园 
14 Xu Yunze 
(许云泽) 
Screenwriter, Film 
Workshop Co., Ltd. 
19/08/2014 Mann Coffee (Qinian Street 
store) 
北京漫咖啡祈年大街店 
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15 Huang He 
(黄河) 




Media Co. Ltd. 
20/08/2014 SOHO, Beijing 
北京银河 
Table 3.1 List of elite interviewees, in chronological order  
 
 
Event  Participants  Time  Location  
Book launch for 号脉电影 Zhou Tiedong (Writer, 
President, CFPI) 
Zhou liming (Film critic, 
ChinaDaily) 








17th Beijing Screenings: 
Can China devise a strategy 
to promote its films abroad? 
Obstacles and suggestions 
Zhou Tiedong (Chair) 
Luan Guozhi (Deputy chief, 
SAPPRFT) 
Stanley Rosen (Professor, 
USC) 
Patrick Frater (Asian 
Bureau Chief, Variety) 
Jiang Yanming 
(President&CEO, China 
Lion Film Distribution) 
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Wang Fan (Film scholar) 
Q&A with Feng Xiaogang Feng Xiaogang 21st Feb 2014 
7:00pm 
BFI, London 
Q&A with Jia Zhangke Jia Zhangke 8th May 2014 
7:00pm 
BFI, London 




Table 3.2 List of participant observations during 2013-14 
 
Before entering into fieldwork, I developed a generic topic guide that would allow me to cover 
all three aspects of the Chinese film industry that I wanted to address, as indicated in Chapter 
1. And as the pool of my interviewees expanded over time, I started to have a better grasp of 
the reality in terms of what types of contacts would most likely lead to an actual interview. The 
topics of interviews were thus a process of improvisation on my original plans. On the one 
hand, I had to keep adjusting the original topic guide as my knowledge and expertise with 
regard to the industry grew. On the other hand, I also needed to keep it on track to prevent it 
from straying too far away from my main research interests. I categorize my interview 
questions based on different themes I want to address (see table 3.3 below). 
 
 
Themes Typical questions  
Film regulation  Film policy 
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• What do you think of certain film policy? (the policy varies 
accordingly depending on which sector of the film industry the 
interviewee works in, production, distribution, or exhibition, or 
others) 
• What do you think of the general trend of commercialization in the 
Chinese film industry?  
• In your opinion, what kind of role do you think the Film Bureau 
should play in the marketization and commercialization of the 
Chinese film industry?  
• How do you understand the ideological function of cinema in 
general?  
Censorship  
• Do you think film censorship has impact on your day-to-day 
practices and if so, in what ways? 
• What are the difficulties or maybe opportunities film censorship 
has brought to your work? 
• What is your opinion on the current film censorship system? 
• How do you position yourself in relation to the censorship 
machinery?  
Coping strategies  
• How do you deal with challenges arising from censorship? 
The role of Party-
state  
State-owned media conglomerates/film studios 
• What are the challenges involved in promoting Chinese films in 
foreign markets? 
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• What do you think of the relationship between state-owned film 
studios with private media corporations? 
• What’s your experience in dealing with state-owned film 
corporations such as CFG (depending on the job title of the 
respondent in the film industry)?  
China Film Group (CFG) 
• How do you perceive the role of CFG in the Chinese film industry? 
• Do you think the role of CFG has changed and if so, in what ways?  
• Through what means and for what purposes does CFG 
accommodate to the changing political economic context to 
maintain its position? 
• In what ways do you think the hegemony of CFG manifest itself?  
Conglomeration • Do you think the trend of conglomeration has affected on your 
daily work in any way? 
• What do you think of the participation of these big Internet 
corporations (in particular BAT) in the entertainment sector? 
• In what ways do you think this trend of conglomeration has 
changed or would change the Chinese film industry?  
• what do you think of the relationship between state-owned media 
conglomerates and the newly emerging powerful players in the 
field? 
Globalization  • What are the forms of transnational collaboration?  
• What are the difficulties you have encountered in forging 
transnational deals? 
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• What do you find particularly challenging, rewarding, or 
frustrating in dealing with transnational film corporations? 
• What is the process of making a transnational co-production? 
• Who are the active participants of this process, what role does each 
of them play, in what ways and to what extent do they engage in 
the process? 
• What changes do you think globalization has generally brought 
about in the Chinese film industry and how do you perceive these 
changes? 
Professional identity • How do you navigate in the Chinese film industry that is changing 
so rapidly? 
• What are the major challenges or struggles in your daily work and 
how do you cope with them? 
• How do you perceive your profession? 
• What is your main motivation? 
• What kind of changes you hope you, or others, can make to the 
Chinese film industry, if you want to? 
Table 3.3 Elite interview topic guide  
 
 
My fieldwork experience calls for a nuanced interpretation of industry professionals’ 
reflexivity in line with Caldwell’s book Production Culture (2008) which focuses on the lived 
experiences of film/TV production workers (prestige and anonymous) in Los Angeles by 
exploring their cultural practices and belief systems. Caldwell argues that, far from involving 
rote or merely intuitive work, many film/television workers (including those in the manual 
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crafts) critically analyze and theorize their tasks in provocative and complex ways. He contends 
that communities of film/tv production themselves are  
 
cultural expressions and entities involving all of the symbolic processes and collective 
practices that other cultures use to gain and reinforce identity, to forge consensus and 
order, to perpetuate themselves and their interests, and to interpret the media as 
audience members. (2008: 2) 
 
Like him, I found “the relative power and autonomy of individual agents to express divergent 
political perspectives, creative visions, and cultural attitudes within larger institutional 
structures” (Caldwell, 2008). Kuper, Lingard and Levinson (2008: 689) argue persuasively that 
 
Reflexivity refers to the recognition of the influence the researcher brings to the 
research process. It highlights the potential power relationships between the researcher 
and the research participant ... It also acknowledges how a researcher’s [characteristics] 
... influence the choices made within the study, such as the research question itself and 
the methods of data collection.”  
 
As Plesner (2011) argues, “being an insider and an outsider are not finite positions but 
constantly negotiated” (p.480). Mikecz (2012) maintains that positionality is not solely 
determined externally in the context of an insider/outsider dichotomy but is on a continuum 
that can be proactively influenced by the researcher. My experience supports the argument that 
researcher’s positionality is fluid, operates on an “insider/outsider” continuum rather than as a 
binary, and evolves over the course of research depending on several factors.  
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During the course of my fieldwork that spanned two summers, I discovered that it was too 
simplistic to fit my position into the “insider” versus “outsider” dichotomy. Being a 
postgraduate student with no prior working experience in the Chinese film industry, or in any 
other profession for that matter, definitely made me an outsider. However, my affiliation with 
an elite UK university granted me the academic status which in general proved to be highly 
valuable in terms of gaining access and trust in the fieldwork. This was particularly true when 
the interviewees saw the potential of their favours being reciprocated through my credentials.  
 
One example was my experience with the chief editor of an English language magazine 
dedicated to giving “comprehensive coverage of the rapidly growing Chinese film market”.44 
This magazine’s distribution network cover a diverse range of channels, including class A 
international film festivals, industry associations, official agencies, film production companies, 
distribution companies and related cultural institutions. The interview itself was not fruitful as 
the editor was not a film worker to begin with. The interview took an interesting turn when the 
editor asked me if I would be willing to lead their London office, or put it in a fancier way, to 
be their “London ambassador”, which was a title I was sure made up on the spot. Being a small 
magazine, they were in dire need of expanding its public exposure and I was expected to 
circulate hard copies of their magazines at film conferences or any film related events I would 
attend around London in the future. In this case, I was offered the opportunity to build a closer 
relationship with the respondent due to my credential, which however was very unbalanced by 
nature. In the end, I found myself turn into my interviewee’s medium of fieldwork, with our 
positions completely reversed on the “insider/outsider” continuum.  
 
 
44 The interviewee asked to remain anonymous.  
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Although my initial concern of not being able to gather enough data due to the difficulties in 
interviewing elites never completely disappeared during the process, over time I realized that 
the success of interviewing elites to a large degree hinges on the researcher’s knowledgeability 
of the interviewee’s background. Thorough preparation and research of the interviewees’ 
background, including career path, corporations or organizations they work for, publications 
under their name, could help decrease the status imbalance between myself as the interviewer 
and my expert interviewees, and in some cases, could significantly change the tone of the 
interview in a positive direction. 
 
My work with some of the interviewees proved that sufficient background research could 
greatly enhance the chance of successfully eliciting useful and trustworthy information from 
elite interviewees. Zhou Tiedong, the president of China Film Promotion International, was 
very unimpressed by the first few questions I raised and started to show signs of irritation and 
impatience ten minutes into the interview. Zhou thought the questions were too generic which 
showed my lack of knowledge of his professional accomplishments. I was caught off guard at 
first but soon regained composure by shifting the focus of the conversation to his book 号脉电
影  (haomai dianying, 2013), which was launched just two weeks ago and very luckily I 
attended the event. I quickly realized that Zhou held himself in high regards as a writer and 
researcher of Chinese cinema. Therefore, I took out his book which I bought at the launch event, 
showing him all the notes I have made throughout the book, meanwhile expressing my 
appreciation of his astute observations and insightful analysis of the Chinese film industry, not 
only as a policymaker but also as an intellectual. It effectively diffused the tension between us 
and changed the dynamic of the interview to a more open and trusting one. In the end, the 
interview proved fruitful and I learned a big lesson on how to accommodate to different 
respondents with different character predispositions and traits.  
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My experience of conducting elite interviews, particularly the one with Zhou, propels me to 
agree with Ezzy’s (2010) argument that “emotions are central to the conduct of interviews” (p. 
163). What I found particularly challenging in my fieldwork, was not only the anticipated 
power imbalance between majority of my interviewees and I, but also the unpredictability 
caused by various contextual eventualities. Depending on each individual’s working 
experiences, professional credentials, affiliations, age, gender, and very importantly but often 
neglected, unpredictable personalities, interviewing elites could be result in very different 
experiences. Every interviewee was different and should be approached differently. Some of 
the interviewees didn’t hesitate at all when approached by me and were pleased to lend their 
expertise and perspectives to my research throughout the interview, including post-interview 
follow up. Others were less approachable and put up barriers. Overall, I found myself learning 
much from each different type of interviewee and each experience.  
 
3.4 Limitations and conclusion 
 
Methodologically, this project is limited in three main respects. The restrained access to 
industry elites is the first and foremost problem. I cherish every single opportunity of face-to-
face interview due to the difficulty involved in actually getting one. However, in retrospect, 
there are times when different respondents are providing repetitive information, while in other 
cases I find the empirical data generated from the interviews are insufficient to answer certain 
research questions. Secondly, the validity of my secondary data is weakened by two factors. 
Data collected from trade publications are filtered through layers of rhetoric, hype and 
misinformation. Another problem relates to the temporary scale of this research. Temporally 
speaking, my data only covers a considerably shortened period of time from 2013 to 2015, 
rather than the timescale I set out for this thesis, which is from 2002 onwards. The last 
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limitation also concerns time, but in a different way. The landscape of the Chinese film industry 
changes so dramatically and quickly that by the time I write the analysis, some data becomes 
invalid or needs update, which unfortunately goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 FILM POLICY, CULTURAL GOVERNANCE, AND CENSORSHIP 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Ever since China’s first domestically produced silent movie Conquering Jun Mountain (定军
山) was born in a Beijing photograph shop in 1905, Chinese cinema has survived tense and 
turbulent political and cultural havocs throughout the 20th century. Evolving with the 
development of Chinese cinema is the continuously shifting state-cinema relationship 
conditioned by the larger socio-cultural and political context, consonant with the changes in 
China’s cultural policies, administrative institutions of control, and censorship and propaganda 
systems.  
 
Existing studies on the relationship between the state and cultural production in contemporary 
China revolves around one major question: does deepening marketization and 
commercialization in the culture domain necessarily undermine the power of the state in 
regulating cultural production (Meyer-Clement, 2004, 2016; Pickowicz, 2013; Zhang et al., 
2012)? The question is framed in opposing terms between state control and economic liberation 
based on the premise that the latter with the potential capability of contradicting, challenging, 
and destabilizing the agendas of the former. One prominent argument in recent research about 
China’s media regulation is that, the Party-state proves to be proactive and resourceful in the 
face of rapid marketization intensified by globalization and technological convergence (Yeh & 
Davis, 2008; Zhu, 2003). It is argued that the implementation of market economy in the media 
and entertainment sector is carefully designed, supervised, and controlled by the CCP through 
a variety of means, particularly forging elaborate and flexible state-market alliance.  
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Based on close reading of cultural and film policy documents as well as first-hand data 
collected from interviews, I aim to challenge this argument at three levels. First, the belief that 
economic liberation would help the Chinese film industry shake off the chain of the state falls 
prey to a romantic liberal market logic that ignores the complicated political economic milieu 
of contemporary China. The state and the market are two inseparable forces, neither 
antagonistic nor collaborative by nature. Secondly, the Party-state indeed proves to be 
ingenious in the process of installing market mechanism in the Chinese film industry. 
Nevertheless, the machinery of cultural governance is far from a self-sustainable monolithic 
organ, but fraught with contradictions, ambiguities and uncertainties caused by a Party-state 
experiencing pain from societal transformation. Thirdly, at the level of policy implementation, 
constant but restricted amount of power negotiation takes place between state authorities and 
film practitioners. Despite the CCP’s heavy-handed manner at the ideological frontier, there 
exists space for struggle mediated by and through individuals with desires and ambitions.  
 
Discussion in this chapter falls into three sections. First, I delineate changes in China’s film 
policy in the context of China’s overarching cultural system reform since 2002.45 Second, I 
examine Xi’s talk on literature and art in parallel with Mao’s historic Yan’an talk and employ 
critical policy analysis to try to understand the implications of Xi’s talk for the Chinese film 
industry. The last section focuses on the film censorship regime, exploring the characteristics 
of its functioning, and how the CCP maintains a regulatory environment in favour of the Party 
consolidating its dominant power in the Chinese film industry. 
 
 
45 In China, film policy documents are constituted by statements and regulations issued by the CCP’s Central 
Committee; the State Council; Ministry of Culture; State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and 
Television of the People’s Republic of China (SAPPRFT), formerly known as the State Administration of 
Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT); speeches and talks from Party leaders. 
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To begin with, I offer a succinct historical retrospective of China’s state-cinema relationship 
in the past century, which would put into perspective of the continuities and changes in the 
evolving agenda of Chinese film policy in the new millennium.  
 
Up until the 1920s, Chinese cinema didn’t experience much political interference as the 
nationalist government hadn’t yet established its control in this emerging cultural arena.46 This 
laissez faire state of affairs was partially made possible by the fact that the earliest history of 
Chinese cinema was by and large created by foreign hands when film was first imported to 
Shanghai from the West in 1896 (Zhang, 2003). However, the entrance of domestic forces into 
film production in the 1930s brought the foreign-controlled era in Chinese cinema to an abrupt 
end. Visionary industry frontrunners introduced market mechanisms to a budding domestic 
cinema based in Shanghai, the home to early Chinese cinema. Upon the arrival of native 
companies that gradually grew into formidable players through the integration of production, 
distribution, and exhibition, Chinese cinema was ushered into a “golden age” that spanned two 
entire decades.  
 
Indeed, the chaotic and unruly political milieu between the 1930s and 1940s gave birth to a 
national cinema that became a contentious site for both artistic experiments and complex 
ideological expression. Despite heavy censorship by the KMT regime, progressive leftist 
filmmakers, including a group of CCP cadres who infiltrated the expanding studio system, 
established a strong presence in the cinematic space. Leftist filmmakers of the 1930s and 40s 
aspired to a more just and equal society, championed utopian ideals, and utilized cinema as a 
platform to envisage possible solutions for China’s future, be they revolutionary or 
 
46 The nationalist government, officially the National Government of the Republic of China, refers to the 
government of the Republic of China between 1 July 1925 to 20 May 1948, led by the Kuomingtang (hereafter 
KMT). 
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conservative. Historical events intervened, and this relatively creative, liberated and tolerant 
space for collective negotiation and imagination came to a standstill and was eventually 
eradicated during the following decades.  
 
Soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the end of the civil war in 
1949, Chinese cinema was deliberately steered into a period of significant nationalization under 
the Maoist regime. Chinese cinema under the leadership of the CCP was arguably born with 
ideological imprints and nationalist obligations, in other words, it was part of the ideological 
state apparatus from its inception. Cinema was systematically stripped of previous commercial 
elements and began to serve primarily as the CCP’s mouthpiece, propagating communist 
ideology and revolutionary creeds. To realize Mao’s Utopian idea of a socialist country, 
various political movements were initiated in order to curtail private space and politicize the 
citizens of China (Zheng, 2004). Consequentially, the profit motive of cinema was downplayed 
entirely due to the political circumstances. Particularly during the ten years of the Cultural 
Revolution, films appeared to be reduced almost entirely to vehicles of political messaging, 
that scholars have called ideological indoctrination, subject to the political demands of the CCP 
leadership (Yin & Ling, 2002).47  
 
The last two decades of the 20th century witnessed the gradual shedding of overtly politicized 
narratives of the Chinese film industry in official discourses, as a result of the CCP’s endeavour 
to transform China’s planned economy to market economy under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping, in the name of the “Reform and opening up” policy (改革开放). When Mao’s 
 
47 The Cultural Revolution was a social-political movement initiated by Mao Zedong and driven by the the PRC 
from 1966 to 1976. Focusing on class struggle, this movement aimed to enforce socialism by removing 
capitalist elements in Chinese society, and to consolidate Mao’s absolute power within the Party. This 
movement significantly affected China politically, economically and culturally.  
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successor Deng Xiaoping came into power in the late 1970s, he was facing a dilapidated 
economy and an over-politicized Chinese society while the CCP was struggling with a crisis 
of its political legitimacy. To restore the CCP’s ruling legitimacy, Deng opted for pragmatism 
and marketization in both practical and ideological spheres by initiating an opening up 
enterprise, prioritizing economic development over ideological battle.48 The task of rebuilding 
legitimacy through economic performance was met with the brunt of another ideological crisis 
caused by the 1989 pro-democracy movement and the breakdown of communism in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe.  
 
In 1992, Deng made the historical southern tour to the coastal special economic zones which 
symbolically reaffirmed the course of economic reform and removed any possibility of political 
and ideological debate triggered by the turmoil of 1989 (McGrath, 2008). Deng’s famous 
statement “development is the hard rule” (发展是硬道理) became part of the new indisputable 
canon. At the 14th Party Congress held in the same year, the CCP leadership issued The 
Decision on Economic Reform, in which the concept of a “socialist market economy” was 
proposed for the first time, marking the CCP officially commit itself unambiguously to the 
transition from planned economy to market economy.  
 
Responding to CCP’s call to install market mechanism to energize crumbling state-owned 
enterprises, the Chinese film industry entered into the period of marketization and 
commercialization, which nevertheless, overshadowed by the development of other industry 
sectors. Throughout the 1980s and even 1990s, the cultural domain only played a “peripheral” 
part in the market reform as priority was given to other industries (Kraus, 2004: 22). In 1993, 
 
48 The “reform and open up” policy was launched by Deng Xiaoping, referring to the programme of economic 
reforms that started in December 1978.  
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breakthrough for the Chinese film industry finally came on the heels of the promulgation of 
socialist market economy, with the publication of the policy document entitled Some Opinions 
on Deepening the Reform of the Film Industry System (关于当前深化电影行业体制改革的
若干意见), often referred to as Document Number 3. This monumental document dismantled 
the centralized managing model of film production, distribution, and exhibition, particularly 
the long-entrenched distribution-exhibition monopolistic control of China Film Corporation, 
which exemplified by the policy of “tonggou tongxiao” (统购统销,meaning unified purchase 
and unified sale) (Zhu, 2002). From then on, the Chinese film industry embarked on the 
plodding and tortuous journey of marketization and commercialization.  
 
In spite of various market reform measures, by the end of 1990s, the Chinese film industry 
plumped to its historically lowest point in terms of annual production output and revenue 
returns. Zhang (2004) attributes the collapse to several key factors: disintegrating previously 
state-supported cinema infrastructure, irresolute market reform policies, the rise of alternative 
entertainment choices like television, and the re-entry of Hollywood in 1994. In the face of 
China’s imminent accession into the WTO, the looming threat of Hollywood was something 
the Chinese film industry had to take into account. Therefore, the central government speeded 
up the pace of economic reform in the cultural realm by introducing the “cultural industry” as 
a key concept in framing the cultural system reforms in 2001, among which the film industry 
was put on a priority list. 
 
4.2 From film institution to film industry 
 
Transformation of the Chinese film industry in the post-WTO era unfolded against the 
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backdrop of China’s Reform of the Cultural System (文化体制改革). Based on a revised 
understanding of culture in socialist market economy, the Chinese government initiated the 
cultural system reform by adopting a conceptual distinction between public cultural 
undertaking or cultural institution (文化事业) and commercial cultural industry (文化产业) 
at the 16th Party Congress convened in 2002. 49  For the first time the Chinese leadership 
officially integrated the term “cultural industry” into cultural policies and assigned a key 
position to cultural industry with significance for national economy. However, it is until 2005 
the concept of cultural industry—including audiovisual entertainment, news media, and book 
and magazine publishing—was materialized upon the issuing of the Guiding Opinions on 
Deepening Reform of the Cultural System (关于深化文化体制改革若干意见) by the CCP 
Central Committee and the State Council. This cultural policy was further consolidated when 
the China State Council promulgated the Culture Industry Promotion Plan (文化产业振兴规
划) on September 26, 2009, enhancing the status of the culture industry to that of a strategic 
industry. The People’s Bank of China, together with the Central Propaganda Department, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Culture and nine other departments, jointly issued the 
Guiding Opinions on Financial Support for Culture Industry Development and Prosperity (关
于金融支持文化产业振兴和发展繁荣的指导意见) on March 19, 2010. This document is 
the first guidance supporting the development of the culture industries, and it means that 
cooperation between the financial and culture industries has finally gained policy support. The 
most recent policy boost for the development of the cultural industries came with the 
 
49 The term “cultural industry” was only loosely employed in policy documents during the 1990s. It was 
introduced in the “Decision of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Accelerating the 
Development of the Tertiary Industry” in 1992 during the 8th Five-Year Plan period (Zhang, 2006, pp.93). The 
dual formula of “shiye jituan qiye guanli” has made occasional appearances in governmental documents, 
suggesting that the news media sectors manage public institutions in the way like commercial business 
enterprises. However, the term was legitimized in the “Proposal of the CCP Central Committee on the 10th 
Five-Year Plan” adopted in 11 October, 2000 by the 5th Plenary Session of the 15th CCP Central Committee. 
   
 
 97 
publication of the Decision to Deepening Reform of the Cultural System and Promoting the 
Great Development and Flourishing of Socialist Culture (关于深化文化体制改革推动社会
主义文化大发展大繁荣决定) in 2011, which marked the beginning of an intensive policy-
facilitated expansionist period.50  
 
Another document of immense ideological significance for the cultural system reform is 
“Document No.9”, also called A Briefing on the current situation in the ideological realm, 
which was circulated within the Communist Party by its General Office in April 2013.51 The 
strident tone of this document suggests the Chinese leadership’s determination in tightening 
ideological control over all social spheres in the wake of economic liberalization, including the 
market reform undertaking in the cultural domain. This internally disseminated document set 
up and reinforced boundaries at the ideological front for cultural system reform, which also 
provided the political context for the restructuration of the Chinese film industry towards 
further marketization and commercialization. 
 
The Chinese film industry comes under the direct jurisdiction of the State Administration of 
Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), which simultaneously reports to the State Council and 
the Propaganda Department of the CCP.52 As the regulatory body overseeing radio, television 
and film, SARFT aims at ensuring cultural programmes generated by these sectors are in 
accordance with the ideological requirements of the Propaganda Department. In March 2013, 
 
50 6th Plenum of the 17th CCP Central Committee in October 2011 was dedicated to cultural system reform. It 
called for the production of a socialist culture that would satisfy domestic cultural demand, provide genuine 
mainland entertainment for overseas Chinese communities and present the image of a strong China abroad. 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=14720&lib=law  
51 A translated version of the full text of Document No.9 can be found on ChinaFile, by courtesy of Mingjing 
Magazine, a U.S.-based Chinese-language magazine. http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-
translation#start  
52 In March 1998, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) was established following a 
major restructuring of the former Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MRFT) under the direct control of the 
State Council.  
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the State Council merged the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television with the 
General Administration of Press and Publication to form the State Administration of Press and 
Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (hereafter SAPPRFT) as a means to streamline 
censorship process under a more centralized administration.  
 
In 2002, the State Council passed the first post-WTO administrative regulation about the film 
industry called the Film Administrative Regulations (电影管理条例), preparing the legal 
ground on which the market reform of the Chinese film industry operates.53 In 2004, with a 
view to carrying out the overall planning for deepening cultural system reform, SARFT issued 
the Several Opinions on Fostering the Development of the Film Industry (关于加快电影产业
发展的若干意见).54  This directive advocates a more market-oriented film industry with 
increased diversity in every aspect of the industry, so as to “form several large modern film 
enterprises through five to ten years of development…and make China’s film industry stronger 
and bigger so that it can become one of the world’s film powerhouses” (China Film Yearbook, 
2005: 10). Under the close supervision of SARFT, these regulations and guidelines served to 
pave the way for the growing marketization and commercialization of the Chinese film industry 
(Zhang, 2008). In 2010, the central government released a critical policy document titled 





53 http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=2253&lib=law  
54 This document was invalidated by SARFT in 2010. Accessed at 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=3430&lib=law&SearchKeyword=film%20industry&SearchCKeyword=  
55 http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-01/25/content_1518665.htm  













Note:          stands for supervision 
Figure 4.1: Division of labor between SAPPRFT and MIIT (Source: Wu & Leung, 2012) 
 
Breakthrough on the legislative front came with the promulgation of the Film Industry 
Promotion Law (电影产业促进法,hereafter Film Law) by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress in 2016.56 The formulation of China’s first law targeting the film 
industry specifically started as early as 2003, but the following decade only brought about years 
of frustration and disappointment, with constant announcements of its imminent arrival by film 
bureaucrats and news media but no result. Before the finalization of the Film Law, two drafts 
seeking for public comments were respectively published in 2011 and 2015. After years of 
laborious and tortuous legislative process, the Film Law finally got approved and enacted, 
acting as the highest-level statutory regime for the Chinese film industry. 
 
 
56 http://news.xinhuanet.com/2016-11/07/c_1119867357.htm  
The Propaganda Department of 
Central Committee of CCP 
The State Council 
State Administration of Press, Publication, 
Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) 
Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT) 
Technical Standards Content Network Hardware 
   
 
 100 
The release of this long-awaited Film Law is lauded as “a milestone” by film authorities as it 
prepares a legal framework for further development.57 As SAPPRFT deputy director Yan 
Xiaohong commented, the objective of the new law is to “cut red tape and motivate the market” 
so as to promote further reform in the film industry.58 This is also part of a broader government-
wide effort to reform and simplify China’s complex and sprawling system of administrative 
approvals across all fields.59 Without proposing fundamental changes to the existing regulatory 
system, the Film Law makes some tweaks to streamline censorship procedures through cutting 
approval items, ratify relaxation on certain aspects of film activities, delegate supervisory 
power from the central government to provincial level, and bolster law enforcement on 
copyrights infringement, movie piracy and box office fraud.60  
 
As a part of wider governmental institutional reforms in 2018, SAPPRFT was dismantled and 
succeeded by a new television and radio administration attached to the State Council, while the 
functions of the film, news and publication industries were subordinated to the Publicity 
Department of the CCP.61 According to CFG, assigning the National Film Bureau (NFB, 
hereafter Film Bureau) to the direct supervision of the Publicity Department demonstrates the 
CCP’s resolution to maximize the film industry’s ideological role in implementing the Party’s 
propaganda principles and policies.62 This move of putting Chinese cinema under the direct 
 
57 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-11/07/c_135812127.htm  
58 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/culture/2016-11/08/content_27309688.htm  
59 http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f733536d-95bd-4598-90b0-43e9d565392c  
60 http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4c29bbdf-d917-46c9-a391-229d0c35dcb2  
61 The Propaganda Department of the CCP is an internal division of the CCP in charge of ideology-related work 
and China’s information dissemination system. The key responsibilities of the Propaganda Department on film 
oversight are managing administrative affairs; guiding and supervising production, distribution, and screening; 
organizing the review of movie content; guiding the coordination of major national movie activities; and 
undertaking cooperative foreign productions, international cooperation and exchange of input and output films.  
It changed its name to the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China (CPCPD) for the negative 
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supervision of the Propaganda Department of the CCP was alarming for the film industry for 
obvious reasons. I turn to this issue in the next section through a critical reading of Xi’s Being 
Forum talk. 
 
4.3 A new era for China? Critical policy analysis of Xi Jinping’s talk  
 
Ever since Xi Jinping took over power in 2013, the Party under his leadership has exercised 
heavy-handed political control through a series of initiatives including a forceful anticorruption 
campaign. Observers from western media speculated about whether Xi’s efforts to centralize 
his political power represented a more authoritative leadership style and more importantly, an 
ideological revival of Maoism (Keck, 2013; Moses, 2013; Osnos, 2015). This uneasy sentiment 
was reaffirmed in 2017. The 19th National Congress of the CCP held that year witnessed a 
critical shift in China’s political arena when President Xi Jinping proclaimed in his almost 
three-and-half hour long report that, China has “entered a new era”, an era “that will see China 
move closer to the centre of the world” (Xi, 2014). Rallying the Party behind the ideological 
banner of “socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era”, Xi set the goal of realizing 
the “Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation”.63 Concerns abounded based on the perception 
that the report was a strong signal of Xi further consolidating his political power.64  
 
As discussed in section 3.2 when I justify the methodological choice of critical policy analysis, 
my focus is to lay bare the ideological underpinnings of political texts that shape the ideological 
contours of the Chinese film industry. Therefore, instead of singling out specific film policy 
 
63 Xi’s reported has a lengthy title “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in 
All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. English 
version of the full report could be accessed at 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf  
64 https://variety.com/2018/film/asia/china-movie-regulation-communist-propaganda-department-1202732209/  
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documents, I examine part of a talk given by Xi Jinping at the Beijing Forum on Literature and 
Art in October 2014, 65  which instantly serves as a potent reminder of Chairman Mao’s 
momentous talk at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art (hereafter Yan’an Talk) in 1942.66 
In light of these two speeches’ respective historical and political significances in relation to the 
CCP’s governing approach to the culture sector, I argue that a closer scrutiny of Xi’s talk could 
yield insights that other methods would struggle to provide.  
 
The text overall is narrated in first person and structured in the form of normative 
argumentation, claiming what should be done. The speaker presents four subjects in the text: 
the (Chinese) nation, the Party, and the (Chinese) people, and the literature and art workers. 
The Chinese nation is articulated in the form of phrases like “motherland”, “the whole nation”, 
“our country”, “Chinese society”, “a common spiritual home”, which all contribute to creating 
a sense of unitedness and timeless.  
 
To perpetuate the concept of a geographically integrated and temporally eternal China, Xi 
makes consistent references to the Chinese history of “more than 5000 years”, quoting 
historical figures epitomising the patriotic spirit that is the “most profound, fundamental and 
eternal matter” of the socialist core value view. By taking the references out of their specific 
historical contexts, this rhetorical strategy attempts to frame patriotism primarily as a cultural 
matter detached from any political and ideological implications. Filtered collective memories 
are deployed here as a rhetorical device in the aim of evoking a sense of belonging and 
strengthening identification with the entrenched tradition of patriotism that is rendered a 
historically coherent and ideologically self-evident doctrine.  
 
65 http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/10/xis-arts-speech-historical-context-and-soft-power-implications/  
66 Chairman Mao’s talk marked the beginning of the Rectification Movement, a campaign within the Chinese 
Communist Party for turning the liberal and independent Chinese intellectuals into party mouthpieces. The talk 
can be accessed at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_08.htm      
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The Party is portrayed as a leader, protector, educator, and motivator. It enjoys an authoritative 
image that is granted with political legitimation and armed with knowledge, strength, and 
commitment to be able to “rally”, “educate”, “inspire”, “guide”, “encourage”, “nurture”, 
“mobilize”, “satisfy”, “serve” the people to achieve common objectives. 
  
Xi repeatedly uses the first-person plural word “we” to refer to literature and art workers to 
whom the speech is specifically addressed. Given its inclusive nature, the word “we” helps call 
for identification with the Party from the audience. And it is often followed by active verbs and 
phrases (“realize”, “carry forward”, “practice”, “march”, “endure and overcome”, “create”, 
“plumb”, “ruminate”, “reflect”, “resolve”, “prioritize”, “learn from”) that emphasize the 
agency of the subject.  
 
The subjectivity of the people is constructed in a slightly more complex manner. On the one 
hand, the people are hailed as the “creators” and “witnesses” of history, from whom literature 
and art draws inspiration. Their “hearts and voices” must be “reflected” and “spiritual and 
cultural needs” must be “satisfied”. Essentially, the Party and socialist literature and art are at 
service of the people who are the “sons and daughters” of China. Xi emphasizes this point by 
referring back to a string of statements given by previous Party leaders (Comrade Mao Zedong, 
Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao), expressing the same concern on the nature of socialist 
literature and art.  
 
On the other hand, the people are represented as weak, inferior, susceptible to external 
influences, easily to be manipulated by wrong ideologies and misled to do wrong deeds. They 
are usually associated with negative words such as “muddleheaded” and “indulge”, “lost value 
views” in the wake of market economy, thus in urgent need of “guidance” from the Party.  
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Upon a closer look, these two seemingly contradictory perceptions of the people can find 
reconciliation in the removal of the people’s agency in narrating the history supposedly created 
by themselves. Despite the people’s “creator” status, nowhere could be found their actual 
contributions to the national history and culture. What’s also omitted is their ability of 
presenting and articulating their own “hearts and voices” and “spiritual and cultural needs”, the 
task of which should be relayed to the hands of the Party and told in a way in conformity with 
the principles of socialist literature and art.  
 
Together, the Party, the nation, and the people, take up particular positions in articulating a 
narrative that the Party devotes itself to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” as 
always, and meanwhile assumes the responsibility of realizing, safeguarding, and expanding 
the fundamental interests of the “overwhelming majority of the people”. However, the 
definition of “people” itself has witnessed nuanced changes in the sense that the previous 
emphasis on the central position of the “working class” has disappeared entirely. The CCP 
downplays the problem of widening class divisions in China’s political sphere by eschewing 
the usage of the word “working class” altogether in official discourses and replacing it with a 
general term “the Chinese people”.  
 
Moving beyond the literal meaning of the text, Xi’s talk puts emphasis on reinventing China 
as a player in an impending global cultural war. Words and phrases such as “battle”, 
“commanding heights”, “fierce”, “competition”, “hostile”, “plot”, “Westernize”, “divide”, 
“infiltration”, “struggle”, “ring the alarm bell”, “on a long-term guard”, “forceful measure”, 
“on guard and react” together construct an ongoing intense ideological confrontation between 
China and Western powers. Moreover, the Party shows its determination to “reverse” the 
“international cultural and public opinion structure of ‘strong West and weak us’”. What 
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vividly portrayed is an ongoing and almost invisible cultural war across the global. A 
fundamental conflict is set up between China and apparently hostile foreign powers within 
which China is presented as the underdog in terms of its cultural power and in urgent need of 
defending itself from an invasion coming from malicious foreign countries. 
 
In this text, the articulation of the relationship between China and other countries is a crucial 
dimension constitutive of the imagination of Chinese nation. Chinese nation is defined against 
the existence of an opposite Western. The construction of a cultural war between China and 
“hostile foreign power”, “Us” and “Them” and a depiction of China as an armed player who is 
ready and resolute in defending itself on the battlefield not only indicates a more proactive 
foreign policy but more importantly, reinforces the Party’s dominating role in building socialist 
culture which functions to boost “national cohesion”.67  
 
To better understand and evaluate the weight of Xi’s speech for the CCP’s approach to 
ideological work and culture governance in the “new era”, I juxtapose the text with Mao’s 
historic Yan’an talk. Given their drastically different historical and political contexts, my aim 
is not to do a systematic comparison between the two speeches, but to illustrate in what ways 
and to what extent Xi’s leadership represents a rupture rather than a continuation of previous 
two eras, and more importantly, the implications for the development of Chinese cinema. 
 
The above analysis uncovers some of the CCP’s deft discursive strategies in alignment with 
the logic of depoliticized politics explained in section 2.5.1. Xi’s speech differs from Mao’s on 





   
 
 106 
policy to the extreme by stipulating that literature and art should remain subordinate to politics, 
and fulfil its revolutionary purpose by serving the advancement of socialism and the needs of 
the working classes and peasantry. Xi carries forward the narrative in terms of encouraging 
literature and art workers to adhere to Party leadership and promote socialism and patriotism 
with their work. However, Xi tones down certain aspects of the ideological rhetoric by 
forsaking the usage of “working class and peasants” whose interests the CCP used to claim to 
represent and serve. By circumventing the class dimension and class conflicts, Xi’s 
homogenizing conceptualization of “the people” loses the ability to articulate differing needs 
and negotiate incongruities in an increasingly stratified society (Lin, 2014).  
 
By the same token, culture is discharged from its historical mission of representing the working 
class and peasants, and instead re-designated with responsibility for promoting Chinese values 
and building China to be a global cultural power against hostile western values and culture. 
Liberating it from progressive ideological doctrines but reconnecting with Chinese history, the 
CCP strategically articulates a depoliticized notion of culture, rendering it no longer “a site of 
struggle between antagonistic social forces over the fundamental directions of society” (Zhao, 
2013: 21).  
 
Hence, Xi’s critique of rampant commercialism and market logic in the cultural sector that 
gave rise to “superficial” and “vulgar” works should not be read as an attack on capitalism or 
economic liberation per se, rather an attempt to avoid pitting socialism against capitalism as 
ideological opponents which would evoke the old “line struggle” debate. In the face of a crisis-
ridden China plagued by the irreconcilable discrepancies between the CCP’s socialist promises 
and capitalist development policies, the CCP tactfully translates the ideological contestation 
between socialism and capitalism to a battle between China and the West competing for the 
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authority of articulating a global vision for the future of all humankind and a more just global 
order (Hong, 2012; Zhao, 2012). This shift is in part crystalized in the form of China embracing 
the rhetoric of soft power. As Zhao shrewdly puts it, what is at stake is “not so much about 
Chinese soft power but a fundamental conflict between competing global political economies 
and cultural imaginaries” (Zhao, 2013: 27). 
 
The above critical policy analysis of Xi’s speech renders the assertion that Xi’s leadership 
indicates a return to Maoism unwarranted. Indeed, Xi attributes the problem of “vulgar” works 
to the tendency of prioritizing market value over social value in the cultural industries, which 
he claims should be rectified by sticking to the principle of “serving the people”. However, the 
critique is not aimed at marketization and commercialization per se, neither does it touch upon 
how the implementation of marketization and commercialization has “reconfigured the class 
orientation of cultural production” (Meng, 2018: 183).  
 
4.4 The film censorship regime 
 
Prior to the administrative reshuffling in March 2018, The Publicity Department and SAPPRFT 
together set the ideological parameters for the film censorship regime. Only a few general 
guidelines are provided as the bottom line that cannot be trod upon. This allows the authorities 
wiggle room to interpret policy deemed necessary upon implementation, a practice that has 
received the most protests from film workers. In its simplest form, censorship subjugates all 
films to eight rules explicating forbidden content:68 
 
 
68 In 2008, SARFT offered a few more broad codifications of film taboos. 
https://www.indiewire.com/2011/11/how-to-be-censored-in-china-a-brief-filmmaking-guide-50870/ 
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1. Violating the basic principles as established in the Constitution or instigating resistance 
to or disruption of the implementation of the Constitution, laws, and administrative 
regulations; 
2. Jeopardising China’s unity, sovereign, or territorial integrity, leaking national secrets, 
endangering national security damaging China’s dignity, honour, and interests, or 
advocating terrorism or extremism; 
3. Defaming fine national cultural traditions, instigating ethnic hate or discrimination, 
infringing upon ethnic customs and habits, distorting national history or national 
historical figures, hurting national sentiments, or undermining national solidarity; 
4. Instigating the disruption of the religious policies of the state or propagating cults or 
superstition; 
5. Jeopardising social ethics, disrupting the public order, undermining social stability, 
advocating obscenity, gambling, abuse, highlighting violence or terror, instigating 
crimes or teaching methods for committing crimes; 
6. Infringing upon the lawful rights and interests of minors or damaging the physical and 
mental health of minors; 
7. Insulting or defaming others, disseminating others’ privacy, or infringing upon the 
lawful rights and interests of others; 
8. As prohibited by the laws and administrative regulations. 
Table 4.1: Source: SARFT 
 
The Film Censorship Committee consists of 30 or so individuals from a broad range of 
backgrounds, including the film industry, the Communist Youth League, the Women’s 
Federation, and various government departments. Censorship decisions are normally delivered 
in the form of suggestion for adjustments yet articulated in a decidedly elusive way. On legal 
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grounds, the details of censorship are allowed to be made public. In reality, proactively 
disclosing censorship details only does a disservice to filmmakers. Thus, the disclosure of the 
verdict of the film censorship board regarding Jiang Wen’s Devils on the Doorstep (2000) 
provides a rare opportunity for outsiders to get a glimpse into the authority’s censoring methods 
and priorities.69  
 
Jiang Wen’s movie Devils on the Doorstep is inspired by the novel Survival by You Fengwei. 
Set in the last years of the Second Sino-Japanese War during the World War II, this movie tells 
a story of a Chinese villager (played by Jiang himself) who is forced by a mysterious figure to 
take custody of two prisoners from the Japanese Army. Fearing both the mystery man and the 
Japanese, the village falls into a dilemma over what to do with the two prisoners. In an 
interview, Jiang revealed that, rather than an anti-Japanese war film, Devils on the Doorstep 
intended to show “how Chinese literature and film has perpetuated an attitude of blaming the 
aggressor and casting the Chinese population as passive victims of aggression… this common 
human psychological trait of blaming others for disaster that goes beyond Chineseness.” 
(Raynes, et al., 2000). This theme unsurprisingly angered the film censorship board.  
 
The main part of the verdict relates to what they considered to be the “incorrect” and 
“degrading” portrayal of Chinese villagers and of the nature of the Chinese people. For 
example, one note was,  
 
 
69 I do realize this film falls out of the timeframe of 2002-2017. It is included here because it provides a rare 
opportunity to look into some of the CCP’s censoring measures.  
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“the common Chinese people do not show sufficient hatred towards the Japanese, do 
not sufficiently differentiate between foe and friend, and display ignorance and 
apathy”.  
 
Another note read,  
 
“the film does not correctly display the cruelty of the Japanese army but, amongst 
others, shows a Japanese soldier giving sweets to children”.  
 
And one more note said,  
 
“Japanese army songs are played often, putting a spin on the Japanese imperialists 
flaunting their strength, which may gravely hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” 70  
 
This example illuminates the importance of Chinese cinema as a vital instrument of fostering 
nationalism in the eyes of the film authorities. Films that deal with sensitive topics such as the 
Sino-Japanese War, a national trauma that bears unparalleled significance in sustaining the 
CCP’s ruling legitimacy and in constructing national collective memory and identity, would 
receive extra attention from the authorities to ensure the representation of Chinese nation, 
Chinese people and the historical events depicted are in accordance with official ideologies. 
The same logic applies to movies like Lu Chuan’s City of Life and Death (2009), Yin Li’s The 
Knot (2006), Zhang Yimou’s transnational co-production The Flowers of War (2011). Lu’s 
movie also deals with the Second Sino-Japanese War, but focusing on the Battle of Nanjing 
 
70 All three notes retrieved from https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/10/17/devils-on-the-
doorstep-an-interesting-look-into-film-censorship/  
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and the following massacre committed by the Japanese army.71 Director Yin Li is the Deputy 
Director of China Film Director’s Guild and famous for producing a series of high profile main 
melody movies thanks to his prestige position in the film industry. These war movies are all 
endorsed by the state, though in different ways, mainly depending on the directors’ relation 
with the state, how it is financed, and who the target audiences are.  
 
Nationalism also plays a role in greenlighting transnational co-production. Many co-production 
projects have been killed off at an early stage of script development due to bizarre censorship 
rules in that regard. Xu Yunze shared one story when she worked at Tsui Hark’s film studio as 
a screenwriter.  
 
A Hollywood studio once approached us with a sci-fi/action genre movie script. In the 
story, human resurrect and weaponise Peking Man, which unsurprisingly turn out to be 
highly intelligent and autonomous creatures not hesitating to wipe out human and take 
over the planet. To survive the crisis, American and Chinese military forces have to 
work together. The project was cancelled because they [censorship board] think in the 
script the Chinese military forces are portrayed in a negative light while the Americans 
are the hero who save the day, which is unacceptable. (Personal interview with Xu, 
Beijing, 19th August 2014) 
 
Without transparent criteria on which to categorize films depending on their content, all films 
are gauged against a few indiscriminate rules as a yardstick (see the above table). This 
inevitably leads to one problem plaguing all film workers, that is the absence of a motion 
picture rating system. As an organic element of the film law, the establishment of a rating 
 
71 This movie is also known as Nanking! Nanking! 
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system has always been on the policy agenda. As early as 2004, Tong Gang, then Director of 
Film Bureau with SARFT, declared the approach of a film rating or classification system as a 
vital part of the film promotion law in an interview, though not in the form of a copycat but a 
rating system with its own characteristics.72 However, the latest film law passed once again 
failed to incorporate the installation of any equivalent of a rating system, even the possibility 
of it.  
 
More than a decade of waiting indicates that the hope of instituting a Chinese rating system is 
probably farfetched, and the authority’s resolution on this matter is somewhat dubious. Indeed, 
film academics and industry elites have made strenuous lobbying efforts on numerous 
occasions, which have usually met with elusive responses from officials claiming that such a 
system would not be “appropriate” in China.73 Xie Fei, a renowned director and a professor at 
the Beijing Film Academy, released an open letter in 2012, in which he called for the abolition 
of censorship procedures in favour of a standardised rating system similar to that used in the 
US. In this open letter, Xie expressed widely shared concerns regarding China’s censorship 
system: 
 
[China’s censorship system] has long ago lost its real social, economic, ideological and 
cultural significance … In the past few years, there were so many unwritten laws when 
censoring movies. Unwritten laws such as: “ghosts are not allowed in contemporary 
settings,” “extramarital affairs are not allowed,” “certain political incidents are not 
allowed,” etc. The censorship system [in China] is not defined by law but done 
according to individuals. Such rules are killing artistic exploration. [Censorship system 
 
72 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/17/content_401171.htm  
73 http://www.economist.com/node/10498786 One proposal surfaced when Ang Lee’s Lust, Caution (2007) was 
released in Mainland China in a heavily censored form. 
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needs to] move from the current administrative review system to a rating system that 
allows for a self-governed and self-disciplined film industry, bound by legal restrictions 
and administrative supervisions. 
 (Xie, 2012)74 
 
This was by no means the first time industry elites urged for changes in the censorship regime 
in public since the takeoff of culture system reform. As early as 2003, it was the Film Bureau 
that took the initiative to hold an open conversation on China’s film censorship with several 
celebrated independent filmmakers, including Lou Ye, Jia Zhangke, Wang Xiaoshuai, the so-
called Six Generation filmmakers who supposedly took the brunt of censorship. 75  The 
exchange between the officials and filmmakers was materialized in a document titled 1113 
Four Recommendations, in which the filmmakers formulated four proposals as to reforming 
the censorship system. More than a decade later, none of them came to fruition. There are 
optimists extoll it as a progress that stories about film censorship could be told and heard in 
public, even just sporadically. However, the very fact that discussion about film censorship 
fixates on the lack of a rating system resonates with the overall de-politicizing trend in the 
culture domain. 
 
Some industry practitioners consider the policy-makers’ reluctance to introduce a rating system 
primarily as a strategic move to preclude potential compromising effect on the CCP’s political 
control and ideological hegemony. According to Wang Yong, 
 
 
74 http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-free-2956111-1.shtml  
75 https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20121231/cc31censorship/  
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“SARFT tactically confuses pornography and violence with politics when setting up 
criterion for censorship … a rating system would get in the way as it would require 
publicly disclosing details of their decisions why certain movies fail censorship, 
particularly in cases when the reason is political.” (Personal interview with Wang, 
Beijing, 3rd August 2013)  
 
By removing or deliberately blurring boundaries between approved content and unlawful one, 
the current film censorship makes all filmmaking practices succumb to an evaluation system 
that is devoid of political and ideological coloring.  
 
There are also practical issues that put film officials on alert for a rating system. Huang He, an 
industry veteran with years of work experience in global film marketing and distribution, 
pointed out that “a rating system would make it more difficult to curb the distribution in China 
of foreign films, many of which fail to meet current censorship standards” (Personal interview, 
Beijing, 20th August 2014). Film producer Robert Cain, a seasoned consultant on Sino-
Hollywood co-productions, shed light on the matter contending that by not establishing a rating 
system, the CCP is patronizing its public in the name of protecting them from harmful things 
(See discussion in chapter 6 of the ways in which Chinese censors are removing content and 
tweaking content in co-productions).76 
 
What dominates the discourse surrounding Chinese film censorship is one based on a 
constructed antagonistic relationship between an authoritarian censoring machinery and 
suppressed filmmakers. The censorship regime is primarily regarded in existing literature as a 
highly politicized arena. Despite a relaxing tendency in legal formulations particularly with 
 
76 http://www.voanews.com/a/chinese-movie-industry-debates-proposal-to-end-censorship/1574994.html  
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regard to film production approval procedures, the censorship regime remains a key instrument 
for the CCP to maintain and reinforce ideological control over the Chinese film industry. I 
agree with the premise that the censorship regime imposes grinding and crude constraints on 
the freedom of cinematic expression in any political sense. However, by conceptualizing the 
censorship regime solely on political terms, this argument is analytically inadequate to address 
three issues.  
 
First, the popular perception of censorship by pitting it against the creative autonomy of film 
practitioners offers little insight into the complexity of work mentalities of the latter. 
Depending on their position and status in the business, film workers demonstrate divided 
feelings about censorship. In practice, there is a long spectrum of views and attitudes towards 
film censorship. 
 
The prototypical noncompliant type is the most recognizable in mass media. For instance, 
director Feng Xiaogang stirred up China’s online social media for a speech he delivered when 
he accepted the honour of director of year from the China Film Directors Guild in April 2013.77 
In the speech, Feng lashed out at censorship: 
 
In the past 20 years, every China director faced a great torment and that torment is 
[beep]. A lot of times when you receive the order [from the censors], it’s so ridiculous 
that you don’t know whether to laugh or cry, especially when you know something is 
good and you are forced to change it into something bad. Are Hollywood directors 
 
77 Feng gained his industry status as the precursor of China’s commercial filmmaking for series of New Year 
urban comedies since the late 1990s (Gong, 2009; Zhang, 2008; Zhu, 2007).  Seemingly at odds with his 
previously brazen commercialism, in recent years Feng started to uphold his artistic ideals and present himself 
as the defiant figure brave enough to take on the issue of censorship openly, lamenting the lack of creative 
autonomy under the current censorship regime. 
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tormented the same way? ... To get approval, I have to cut my films in a way that makes 
them bad.78 
 
It is both ironic and befitting that in the video circulated on the Internet, the word “censorship” 
in the first sentence was beeped out, which renders Feng’s message even more poignant. 
However, adding another layer to the irony is the fact that Feng Xiaogang is known for his 
endorsement of an unabashed commercialist orientation in filmmaking and the rationale for 
him speaking up in this manner is itself somewhat doubtful. Feng represents a rather small and 
exclusive group of industry elites, whose social and cultural capital enable them to be relatively 
vocal about the destructive impact of censorship on the Chinese film industry.79 Among them 
are a few established independent filmmakers who re-emerged from the underground scene, 
trying to work around the censorship on the one hand, and to adapt to the commercialising 
tendency on the other. This dual pressure steers their creative energy in new directions, for 
instance into making films that are less provocative and more (international or national) market 
friendly.  
 
In general, film workers’ struggles with censorship are ever more marginalized in public spaces. 
Only very limited media exposure exists about the negotiation between film directors and the 
authorities. For example, After a five-year ban from all filmmaking activities because of The 
Summer Palace (2006)80, Lou Ye released through his Weibo account details he received from 
 
78 https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/chinese-film-director-censorship-is-torment/275114/  
79 People inhabiting different positions in the film industry carry different levels of bargaining power when they 
are in conflict with the authorities. Those well-connected with the CCP, through personal networking or other 
informal ways, may yield more power. However, close affiliation is a double-edged sword, casting both 
enabling and limiting influence at once. A closed circle of industry elites is entitled to unparalleled level of state 
support under specific circumstances. To reciprocate and also to strengthen status in the industry, these 
established individuals also need to “fulfil their duty to the CCP and the nation” in ways desired by the 
authorities, who would exploit the cultural capital possessed by the film directors to achieve maximal amount of 
mass influence. Director Zhang Yimou is the example at hand. 
80 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/06/AR2007090602550.html?noredirect=on  
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the censorship committee for his first feature film since the expulsion, Mystery (2012).81 The 
dispute in question seemed trivial, SARFT requested him to modify a scene in which a person 
was struck to death by a hammer more than a dozen times. The suggestion was to moderate the 
level of violence by cutting excessive strikes to just twice, considered a reasonable amount of 
violence to kill a person on screen. At first Lou refused to comply with the advice for its 
ludicrousness. Yet under the pressure of impending release date, Lou made concession after 
several rounds of negotiation and reportedly volunteered to give up his right of authorship to 
the released version. Lou revealed a moment of disillusionment afterwards in an interview,  
 
“In the end, I came to the realization that for them [SARFT], it is not a matter of whether 
I make the adjustment and how, it is a matter of me showing the gesture of compliance, 
a message that everyone without exception must play by their rules.”82 
 
The same sentiment is shared by other independent filmmakers such as Jia Zhangke, whose 
status as a globally acclaimed film director couldn’t secure his movie A Touch of Sin (2013) 
promised cinematic release. 83  The growing sense of disenchantment with the censorship 
regime among these reputable film directors contributes to producing an environment in which 
the desire to push the envelope of filmmaking in China becomes almost irrelevant. In this 
context, the conventional debate of how to balance and integrate political and artistic pursuits 




81 http://www.infzm.com/content/82356  
82 http://www.chinanews.com/yl/2012/09-27/4218122.shtml  
83 https://cn.nytimes.com/film-tv/20131030/tc30jiazhangke/  
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority of mainstream majority of the filmmaking 
community develop the survival strategy of taking on censorship as a practical problem not an 
ideological one. By treating censorship merely as a string of practical challenges that they have 
to overcome in their day-to-day work, film workers proactively de-politicize the censorship 
regime. Especially for those leaning on the creative side of the film industry such as producers, 
directors and screenwriters, how to minimise potential future hassle from censorship committee 
is engrained in their mindset in the earliest stage of any film project. Thus, the ability of 
exercising self-censorship becomes a valuable asset that enables film workers to deal with 
challenges presented by the muddy and capricious censorship system on a daily basis. Producer 
Pan Yanyun perfectly articulated this point:  
 
“Political censorship has become a default setting for us. You have no choice but to 
work with it tactfully. Disappointment, setback, failure, are to be expected in this 
business. In the process, you start to learn, gain experience, build the boundaries within 
which you are free to operate. They (boundaries) are not written in black and white, 
which means you have to figure out yourself where the invisible lines lie.” (Personal 
interview with Pan, Beijing, 6th August, 2013) 
 
Another producer Chen Honglin went further right on the opinion spectrum by saying that:  
 
“Politics do not concern me, I am making commercial movies, movies that audiences 
are willing to pay for a ticket to watch. I do not go anywhere near it [politics]. It is what 
the market wants matters.” (Personal interview with Chen, Beijing, 13th August, 2013) 
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In comparison to Pan, whose voice was representative of filmmakers who bear the same pain 
caused by censorship, Chen completely detaches herself from that sentiment and demonstrates 
little concern for the ideologically repressive nature of the censorship regime. This response 
could be in part explained by Chen’s position in the film industry and her close ties with the 
local government which she hints at in an informal conversation but about which she subtly 
and tellingly declined to share further details. For Chen and her counterparts whose business 
largely relies on connections with the Party, it is in their interest to help maintain the status quo. 
The amount of resources Chen received from her local government to some extent made her a 
complicit in reproducing and naturalising the censorship regime. 
 
Producer Ji Erwei addressed the question of censorship from a different perspective: 
 
“When you consider Iranian cinema, the censorship in Iran is much harsher than in 
China. But movies such as A Separation (2011) still get produced and released. It is not 
about the censorship (which accounts for the low quality of Chinese movies), but the 
lack of storytelling skills, as well as relatable and universally accepted value system. It 
is the attitude of blaming censorship for everything, no matter in mass media or in 
academia, that provides the scapegoat for the Chinese film industry. Censorship should 
not be the shortcut to understanding China’s film policy and regulation.”  (Personal 
interview with Ji, Beijing, 24th July, 2013) 
 
Second, the idea of the CCP managing censorship as an iron-fisted institutional colossus 
betrays a simplified understanding of the ways in which censorship actually works, and makes 
consigned to oblivion of various proxies of interposition in the censoring process. I argue that 
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negotiation room could be, and has been created among different stakeholders through 
mediating agents, consisted of censorship board members, powerful individuals, etc.  
 
The multiple working organs create frictions that allows negotiation room for certain degree of 
autonomy from hard-boiled control. Under the supervision of a variety of regulatory bodies 
serving different interests, the Chinese film industry sometimes has to answer to contradictory 
demands. One example is the treatment of violence in films.  For the film bureau, “excessive” 
violence is not allowed on the big screen, though the usage of “excessive” conforms to 
consistent ambiguity in film policy documents. This constraint has taken its toll on films that 
engage with violence as a crucial plot device or the very subject of the film, particularly in 
crime films. Censorship plays a major part in squeezing certain film genres while encouraging 
others. The upsurge in romantic comedies and coming-of-age movies since the box office 
success of Love is not Blind (2011) owes to the “play it safe” mindset of producers. An 
interviewee who asked to remain anonymous expressed his frustration when asked why there 
is such a limited range of film genres available in the cinema. He used crime film as an example 
to illustrate the constraints on producing certain film genres due to harsh censorship.  
 
I participated in the development of a crime film script. It was a crime thriller drama 
about a policeman pursuing a criminal for years. The movie was not interested in right 
or wrong, good or bad, instead we had the vision of a power play between these two 
equally intelligent individuals, each bearing the cross of their own demons. However, 
after two years of countless rounds of modifications based on “suggestions” from the 
censorship board, the script still didn’t gain the nod from the authorities. The major 
concern was “over the top” representation of violence. Another note was that, we overly 
mystified the power of the criminal and the Chinese policemen were portrayed as 
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incompetent in comparison, which was unacceptable. The funny thing is, this script 
eventually got approved by moving the setting to a foreign country and significantly 
toning down the depiction of violence. (Anonymous) 
 
However, the display of violence in a film is accepted to overstep the invisible boundary when 
the film is partly commissioned by governmental agencies with specific agendas. For example, 
Ministry of Public Security, People’s Liberation Army Ground Force and People’s Liberation 
Army Navy respectively involved directly or indirectly in the production of Operation Mekong 
(2016), Wolf Warriors 2 (2017), and Operation Red Sea (2018). These three movies represent 
a new movie type that is hybrid of action-packed commercial movie and main melody 
propagandistic movie. In all cases, SARFT has to withdraw to secondary position in making 
censorious decisions when conflicts rise between different supervisory parties.  
 
Another example would be Lu Chuan’s City of Life and Death (2009) which I mentioned before. 
Despite dealing with similar cinematic materials as Devils on the Doorstep which by nature 
entails certain extent of nudity and violence, the former passed censorship while the latter was 
banned. The irony lies in that, even with higher level of violence, Lu’s movie got greenlit for 
theatrical release because it complied with official ideological requirements.84 Therefore, the 
workings of censorship process defy a forthright conclusion due to the fact that the film 
industry has to serve various purposes and interests. 
 
Third, the censorship has become such a powerful and convenient tool accounting for problems 
in the Chinese film industry that oftentimes the economic dimension of those problems is 
overlooked or underplayed. A prominent example is the proliferation of horror movies, more 
 
84 http://ent.sina.com.cn/m/c/2009-04-20/21412483084.shtml  
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often referred to as ghost movies in China. On the list of censored themes and subjects in 
Chinese films, the “ghost” (gui) occupies a particular position due to the Party’s fear of 
promulgating superstitious ideas. In the mainstream filmmaking, one strategy usually 
employed by filmmakers to circumvent this restriction is replacing ghosts with other forms of 
supernatural being, such as “demons” (mo) in A Chinese Ghost Story (2011) or “evil spirit” 
(yao) in Gorden Chan’s Patined Skin I (2008) & II (2012). These big budget commercial “ghost 
movies” proved there are shades of grey in the censorship system that can be exploited. 
However, basing in Zhejiang Province, there are hundreds of small-budget, low-quality ghost 
movies churned out every year, and a small fraction of them made it to the cinema. Those lucky 
enough to get onto the big screen are often criticized by audience for their low production 
values and more importantly, lack of real ghosts despite promoted as ghost movies on the 
posters. Commonly, the blame is put on the film censorship for completely depriving Chinese 
films of any kind of ghosts. However, Producer Pan stressed the economic and cultural 
particularities of making horror movie in China, which she believed are imposing more 
restrictions on this film genre than censorship.  Unlike the big budget ghost movies relying on 
creative ways to tell a good ghost story, the second type of ghost movies are simply ripping off 
the film genre.  
 
Horror movies are kind of “taboo art” in the Chinese film industry for superstitious 
reasons. It is a common practice in the Chinese film business to conduct a worship 
ceremony on the first of shooting and this is particularly important for ghost movie 
crews. Today, production of Chinese horror movies is clustered in Zheng Jiang 
Province where traditions, norms and practices of making horror movies has been well 
established and therefore makes it the most economically efficient locale to produce 
generic horror movies. The geographical concentration of economic and personnel 
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resources in making horror movies lead to a half-closed circle of film community that 
devotes to producing low budget no-ghost ghost movies. This distinctive film genre not 
only complies with a specific set of cultural norms, but also operates within a self-
sustained system of production, distribution and exhibition. (Personal interview with 




This chapter has demonstrated that since administrative regulations are issued by government 
administrations rather than by the people’s congress in China, these are vulnerable to party 
intervention. As Majone (1989: 117) argues, policy instruments are seldom ideology-free, and 
my critical policy analysis of Xi’s Beijing Forum Talk examines in minute detail the ways in 
which the language driving changes in orientations towards filmmaking and cinema culture are 
entwined with political rhetoric and ideological positioning of the nation. It can be seen that 
cultural policies driving film production and globalization in China still depend in large 
measure on the party-controlled institutional framework in China and its changing political 
imperatives, one of which, ironically, happens to be an encroaching economic neoliberalism.  
 
China’s film censorship system is notorious for being obscure, erratic and ideologically stifling 
and this chapter has analyzed the multiple ways in which producers interact with it. There is 
no denying that harsh censorship puts a tight leash on creative freedom in terms of 
experimenting with a diverse range of film genres, extending the boundaries of cinematic 
exploration of reality, and enriching the cinematic presentation of humanity in its entirety and 
complexity. Nevertheless, I take issue with the conventional way of framing the censorship 
question in existing literature along the lines of whether or to what extent film censorship has 
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relaxed its ideological grip since the take-off of economic reform (Calkins, 1999; Kraus, 2004; 
Nakajima, 2010; Pickowicz, 1995; Silbergeld, 1997; Xie, 2012).  
 
I maintain that, the very question of whether the state’s censoring hands are getting tighter or 
looser falls prey to the ill-defined assumption of censorship as merely an airtight repressive 
institutional system safeguarding the CCP’s ideological security. It is of vital importance not 
to treat the censorship regime as a self-contained actuality imposed from above by the central 
authorities that serve political and ideological purposes, and would spontaneously elicit varied 
reactions from industry practitioners, be it cooperation, resistance, or indifference. Chapter 5 
explores the further tensions inherent in in the competition and conglomeration taking place 
between state capital and private capital both foreign and domestic.  
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CHAPTER 5 MARKETIZATION, CONVERGENCE AND CONGLOMERATION 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the installation of market mechanisms and the 
prevailing power of capital accumulation have led to market concentration in the Chinese film 
industry. In this chapter, I delve deep into the wider economic context, and continue to explore 
the changing market dynamics in the Chinese film industry against the backdrop of intensifying 
digitisation taking place across the media and entertainment sector in China. I examine the rise 
of a new media economy that is profoundly influenced and shaped by the Internet era within 
which the Chinese film industry operates, and more importantly its implications for the Chinese 
film industry in terms of structural reorganization as well as content production. Drawing 
evidences from interviews and secondary data collected from media publications, I discuss the 
features of the merging media ecology, strategies that Chinese companies are adopting to 
navigate in the new business environment, and consequences of this fast-developing trend for 
the Chinese film industry at large.   
 
Behind the bold declaration by Jack Ma that Feng Xiaogang should “catch up with the trend” 
as described in Chapter 185,  lies a shifting discourse of crisis in the Chinese film industry in 
the 21st century. China’s WTO accession in 2001 stirred up sentiments of anxiety towards the 
opening up of Chinese film market, specifically to Hollywood. The well-known “wolf is 
coming” narrative in the beginning of the new century expressed concerns over the looming 
prospect of Hollywood crushing the ailing Chinese film market (Rosen, 2002; Su, 2010; 2016).   
 
 
85 Jack Ma said this when he was giving a keynote speech at WSJ.D Live conference in Laguna Beach on 27th 
October, 2014. http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/jack-ma-alibaba-is-biggest-744371  
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A decade later, the threat is felt more poignantly from new players of the Chinese film industry, 
mainly consisting of large domestic Internet companies. This phenomenon can be best captured 
in a statement made by Chinese studio Bona Film’s chairman Yu Dong. During the Shanghai 
International Film Festival in 2014, Yu made a speech predicting that the dominant film studios 
of the future would be Baidu, Tencent and Alibaba (commonly referred to as “BAT”), with all 
the current top studios such as Bona, Wanda Media and Huayi Brothers serving them. This talk 
echoes an unsettling sentiment among established companies in the movie business who are 
concerned with the possibility of a future when it is the Internet behemoths dominate the movie 
industry.86  
 
The trend of conglomeration characterized one of the defining transformations of the Chinese 
film industry in the new millennium. Initiated and encouraged by the state, the Chinese film 
industry started to experience market concentration and consolidation exemplified by large 
scale of mergers and acquisitions across the media and entertainment industries since the late 
1990s (Frater, 2015). This tendency has been accelerated in the past few years by companies 
based in e-business such as Alibaba, Internet giants Tencent and Baidu, and even real estate 
company Wanda Group.  
 
State-owned film studios led the reforms of the Chinese film industry, but they also thwarted 
it by a lack of motivation. Private enterprises have become the major forces of conglomeration.  
Regulation restrictions limit the range and scale of conglomeration. Power resides with CFG 
because of its political clout, and with outsiders for their ability to capitalize film into versatile 
and profitable products accessible on multiple platform.  
 
 
86 https://www.techinasia.com/baidu-alibaba-tencent-dominate-chinas-movie-industry-3-years  





Figure 5.1: Film financing channels in China, source: www.entgroup.cn 
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The State Administration of Press Publication, Radio, Film and Television said that the 
integration of different media “falls short of central authorities’ requirement and public 
expectation,” and set a target of 2020 for improvement, reported state news agency Xinhua. 
Specifically, media organizations should integrate systems across different media and make 
greater use of cloud computing and “big data”. This was not the first call for the development 
of more powerful media conglomerates. Similar calls went out in 2009 and in 2014. 
 
5.2 Production and distribution 
 
Market reforms really took hold first and foremost in the sector of film production. The story 
involves a range of practices from the initial licencing to shoot films to the ways in which box 
office sales are reported and the meaning those reports hold. 
 
Only movies dealing with “special” themes need to submit a full screenplay prior to shooting 
for review and approval, while those with “general” themes only need to file a synopsis with 
the government. The original requirement of a “film production license” for each individual 
film has now been abolished, provided that the enterprises or organizations have the 
appropriate personnel, funds and other resources and receive approval from the relevant 
authorities at the provincial, regional or municipal level. Approval after completion of 
production is still required but may be obtained from the authorities at the provincial, regional 
or municipal level. Relevant authorities of the State Council must formulate applicable review 
standards and make them available to the public. 
 
There are two ways in which theatres generally "forge ticket sales." The distributors can inflate 
box office takings to make the film appear popular, thus attracting more viewers and 
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screenings; or theatres can conceal their true ticket sales and pocket the earnings without 
sharing them with film makers87. In March, SAPPRFT suspended the license of a distributor 
that had inflated box office receipts for the domestic movie Ip Man 3 (2015). These examples 
are embedded in a much longer history of production, distribution and exhibition.  
 
5.2.1 Production: Retreating state sector, growing private sector 
 
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the central state administration repeatedly 
proclaimed that only the films produced by the 16 state-owned studios could be distributed 
domestically through the monopoly of the China Film Corporation. To bypass the stringent 
rule, private investment had to find “official” partners to get a “banner” from those state-owned 
studios for their films to be distributed domestically. Some studios sold the “banner” to private 
investors even when the studio itself did not involve in the actual filmmaking. This situation 
ceased in 1995 when the right to film production was extended to smaller provincial studios 
(which usually produce educational films, science programmes, TV documentaries and TV 
films). Private investors were also allowed to be the official producer of the films if the 
investment was more than 70 percent of total production cost. In 1996, the percentage was 
lowered to 30 percent.  
 
5.2.2 Distribution: Consolidating state sector, struggling private sector  
 
Su (2014: 96) argues that distribution is the key to understanding changes in the power-play at 
the heart of the Chinese film industry: 
 
 
87 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-11/07/c_135812127.htm  
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 The Chinese state reinforces its authoritarian power by weaving both market forces 
and global capital into the state mechanism. The state employs a strategy that takes 
advantage of Hollywood resources to build the domestic film industry in order to 
promote Chinese soft power. However, this strategy faces the continuous challenge 
posed by Hollywood, which requires a constant adjustment of the state’s role and the 
continuous revision of its cultural policies.  
 
In March 2003, the Film Bureau widened access to domestic film distribution to private 
investment, though the permit could only be granted when the investing organization met the 
threshold of 500 thousand yuan initial investment, and had successfully completed three 
“surrogate distributions” or distributed one “state-recommended film” (often a political 
propaganda film).88 
 
The reform of cinema chains put film production under a more coercive market discipline. 
In 2000, to reduce administrative obstacles against the free flow of films as commodities, 
SARFT along with the MOC implemented a cinema chain exhibition system as another major 
move of industrial development. The market-oriented reconfiguration of distribution has 
produced spatial and social biases that have wide-reaching implications for film exhibition.  
 
5.3 Consolidation and convergence 
 
As discussed in the opening chapters of this thesis, the Chinese film industry at the end of the 
1990s was in a seemingly dire situation, caught in the middle between an ailing state-subsidized 
 
88 “Surrogate distribution” refers to the practice in the 1990s that private investment worked with state-approved 
distribution organizations to distribute their films by paying certain amount of fees. It worked in a similar way 
as production investors buying “banner” from state-owned film studios to produce.  
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system and nascent market reform. This grim condition was made worse by China’s imminent 
accession to the WTO. Hence, the party-state advocated industrial consolidation and 
conglomeration (集团化) in the film industry as one of the corresponding economic strategies. 
 
5.3.1 First phase: 2001-2008 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the party-state introduced conglomeration through three 
key policy documents. In 2000, SARFT and the Ministry of China jointly published Opinions 
on deepening the reform of the film industry (Document Number 320) in which conglomeration 
is proposed the first time in official policy document as an important means to further the cause 
of marketization. Later in the same year, SARFT published another document on 
conglomeration, Principal Opinions on Experimental Works of Radio, Film and Television 
Conglomeration Development (Document Number 841). In February 2001, SARFT sanctioned 
the move to conglomeration by publishing Basic Opinions on Encouraging the Establishment 
of Film Groups (Document Number 126). The document stated that the film industry would 
form the system of six film groups in China including the Big Three of Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Changchun, as well as Zhujiang, Xi’an and E’mei.  
 
To secure state’s firm control of the Chinese film market, CFG is pushed to the centre of the 
conglomeration trend, enjoying the most favourable position in harnessing benefits of 
marketization. CFG was formed under SARFT in February 1999, aiming to become China’s 
“most comprehensive and extensive state-owned film enterprise in China with the most 
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complete industrial chain that facilitates film production, distribution and exhibition as a 
coordinated process and integrates film, TV and video into one single entity”.89  
 
CFG’s state-owned status endows it with political and ideological imperatives that lead it to 
become China’s first and biggest media conglomerate in the Chinese film industry. Under the 
centralized planned economy, CFG assumed the role of carrying out the policy of central 
buying and underwriting. Indeed, CFG enjoys advantages inherited from socialist legacies, 
which have helped it to establish a monopolistic position in the film industry through carefully 
manoeuvred marketization under the supervision of the party-state. Despite the seeming 
incongruity of this effect, policy deregulation and market liberalization appear to have been 
designed in China in a way that tries to ensure the party-state’s continuing control over the film 
industry. In this landscape, CFG serves as a crucial weapon to ensure market reform does not 
jeopardise and diminish that control. Another major state-run film group is the Shanghai Film 
Group (SFG) which also plays a similar role.  
 
Other than CFG and SFG, other major state-owned film groups have been struggling to survive 
in the rapidly developing film market. On the one hand, an avowed lack of motivation to 
transform from state-sponsored studios to profit-driven corporations, and a notable lack of 
expertise, management skills, state support, and socialist burden, all contribute to make these 
companies stagnant and ineffective. On the other hand, the government’s need to prioritize 
CFG leaves other state-owned film studios far behind in reinventing themselves to adjust to 
the market economy. All of this, however, demonstrates the party-state’s flexibility in creating 
a favourable environment with limited resources at hand.  
 
89 The China Film Group Corporation started in 1951 as the China Film Management Corporation, in charge of 
nationwide distribution. The company was renamed the China Film Distribution and Exhibition Corporation in 
1958. Then in 1971 it was consolidated with the China Film Archive and China Film Equipment Corporation to 
become the China Film Corporation (CFC). Then in 1999 it further consolidated into CFG. 
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5.3.2 Second phase: 2009-2012 
 
I set the year 2009 as the starting point for the second phase of conglomeration in the Chinese 
film industry when Huayi Brothers went to public in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.90 It is since 
then private film companies started to make profound presence in the Chinese film industry by 
consciously integrating their core film business with other derivative media and entertainment 
sectors to form media conglomerates, with the help of the capital market.  
 
China’s media and entertainment industry has witnessed an abrupt eruption of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). It is reported that since 2009 there have been more than 300 M&A deals 
covering film, TV, publishing, advertising, gaming, Internet (totalling almost $10.3 billion). 
Among all the cultural domains, the film industry constitutes an integral part in shaping the 
process of conglomeration.  
 
Under the guidance of the party-state, private film companies were also encouraged to become 
“shadow national media empires” that are expected to grow into the scale of Warner Brothers 
and become national icons par excellence so as to compete with Hollywood majors.91  
 
As a traditional film company specialised in production, Huayi is well aware of the importance 
of giving group earnings greater stability by diversifying its business away from film and TV 
production. It has been committed to both vertical and horizontal integration through a string 
of M&A deals since 2013. For example, to strengthen its theatre activities, Huayi bought a 
 
90 Starting as an adverting company in 1994, Huayi Brothers (hereafter Huayi) is currently China’s largest listed 
film company. 
91 China’s major private media companies include Huayi Brothers Media, Bona International Film Group, 
Enlight Pictures, Orange Sky Golden Harvest, Beijing Perfect World Media, and Beijing Galloping Horse 
Pictures. 
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20% stake in Jiangsu Yao Lai Cinema Management. While to shore up its ailing television 
sector, Huayi purchased 70% of Zhengjiang Changsheng, a television show production 
company. Few months later, Huayi bought a 51 percent stake in Zhejiang Yongle, a film and 
TV corporation. In July 2013, Huayi Brothers bought a controlling 51% stake in the mobile 
games developer Yinhan Technology Company Limited., a Guangzhou-based mobile game 
company. This transaction marks a strategic move for Huayi Brothers to venture into the 
gaming content space, further enriching its business structure in the entertainment industry.92 
However, to what extent the sort of strategy is really benefiting Huayi’s movie business is 
questionable at best.93  
 
Apart from making some quick money, engagement with gaming companies hasn’t created 
actual economic value for Huayi in terms of content production. All these deals are attempts to 
diversify its business beyond high-risk feature film production. Apart from that, Huayi is also 
determined to follow the Disney model of exploiting movie content through building movie-
theme parks. In 2011, Huayi announced a plan to build a theme park in Suzhou, a popular 
tourist destination about an hour from Shanghai. Insiders say Huayi has four such projects 
mooted during the past few years but only one really comes to fruition this year, that is, Mission 
Hill. Huayi Brothers Feng XiaoGang Movie-Themed Town located in Haikou. Designed to be 
a major entertainment and commercial district, this complex features settings from some of 
Feng’s famous movies, including Temperature So 1942 (2013), Aftershock (2010), If You are 
the One I (2008) & II (2010) and series of Lunar New Year movies showcasing the historical 
revolution in Chinese architecture over the last century. Additionally, the project will see the 
construction of five or six professional movie studios with supporting filming facilities. The 
 
92 It is worth noting that the mobile game industry in China is already the fastest growing, most competitive, 
most fragmented and fastest changing mobile game market in the world. It was reported that Huayi made more 
profits from its mobile gaming arm than its TV and film production and distribution in 2014. 
93 Huayi’s purchase of stake in Beijing Ourpalm is a good example. 
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failure of other similar cultural projects obviously has a great deal to do with governmental 
policy regarding real estate development. The Chinese government tightened regulation on the 
development of theme parks in the country, which is interpreted as a move to cool property 
speculation and the development of risky enterprises.  
 
5.3.3 Third phase: 2013-2015 
 
The “trend” suggested by Jack Ma in the little anecdote in the beginning of this thesis and 
which I referred to again at the opening of this chapter, refers to the collaboration between the 
Chinese film industry and the Internet industry. The arrival of Internet corporations in the film 
sector significantly speeds up the pace and widens the scope of conglomeration. The logic of 
synergy and tight diversification is magnified when it is met with larger forces of digitisation 
and globalization, which results in an intensified process of conglomeration.  
 
Alibaba  
Alibaba was put in the spotlight when it launched record-breaking IPO launch in 2014. and its 
grand ambition of becoming the biggest platform builder in the cultural industry. As a 
combination of Amazon, eBay and PayPal, Alibaba’s existing range of activities run from 
provision of Internet backbone, through e-commerce, to games and mobile music and online 
booking of movie theatre ticket. However, it has been steadily expanding beyond its core 
business of online retail and tackling all sorts of new ventures. Interest in entertainment started 
at individual level. Alibaba’s Chairman Jack Ma purchased a 4% stake in Huayi Brothers 
Media as early as 2006, which increased to 8.1% after Jack MA and his investment film 
increased their stake in late 2014. Alibaba’s investment in cultural industries picked up speed 
since 2013 and intensified afterwards. In 2013 Alibaba bought an 18% stake in Sina Corp.’s 
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Weibo microblog (the Chinese equivalent of Twitter as a way to attract mobile users). Earlier 
in 2014, Alibaba acquired a controlling 60% stake in ChinaVision Media Group, a Hong Kong-
based Chinese television and film production firm for US$804 million.94 Later the company 
changed name to Alibaba Pictures Group and in a rare coup, it hired Zhang Qiang away from 
his job as vice president of state-owned China Film Co. to become CEO of Alibaba Pictures.  
 
Alibaba has also unveiled a deal with Dragon TV, a subsidiary of Shanghai Media Group, to 
jointly create an entertainment platform that combines traditional media, the Internet and 
mobile communications. At the forefront of China’s online video market, Alibaba sunk 
US$1.22 billion in China’s most popular video portal Youku Tudou in exchange for 16.5% 
stake. In the same month, it contributed to a US$1.05 billion investment in streaming media 
partner Wasu Media. Later that year, Alibaba took another tentative step into the movie 
business with the launch of Yu Le Bao, which translates as “Entertainment Treasure”. It is a 
vehicle similar to crowdfunding that allows ordinary Chines to become micro-financiers for 
films, television programs and online gaming projects through insurance and wealth 
management products offered by Guohua Life, a Shanghai-based life insurance company. It 
aims to provide a grassroots investment platform to bring the public closer to the cultural 
industry. Each individual investor is allowed to buy a maximum of two plans from the available 
list of projects and investors have been offered an interest rate of 7% on their investment. The 
most recent investment is a cinema-ticketing system. Alibaba Pictures has agreed to buy 




94 The purchase of the ChinaVision stake will allows Alibaba to offer entertainment content as well as access to 
games and even English Premier League soccer. 
95 The firm currently supplies more than 1,000 theatres across China with electronic ticketing systems, as well 
as facilitating third-party electronic payments using systems such as Alipay. 




Alibaba’s arch-rival Tencent is beefing up its online video arm to take advantage of its strong 
social networking business. With WeChat and QQ social networks as ubiquitous in China as 
Facebook elsewhere, Tencent put itself ahead of other Internet companies in terms of attracting 
and accessing China’s mobile users. As Tencent’s trump card, the massively popular mobile 
messaging application WeChat allows Tencent to channel 500 million monthly active users to 
its entertainment services, a huge consumer base for subscriptions or marketing–pay dirt for 
media and advertising partners. With delivering channel in place, Tencent desperately needs 
content to fill. It has spent billions of dollars in recent years building up its content library. 
Flushed with cash, Tencent has locked down exclusive deals with some of the biggest names 
in Hollywood in exchange for top-tier film, television, game and music content.  
 
In my fieldwork it became obvious that Baidu is also striving to make a mark in the 
entertainment sector just like its rivals. As an Internet search engine giant, Baidu has good 
resources and platforms to promote its productions as well as marketing campaigns. Also, its 
adequate supply of capital makes a great advantage in the filmmaking sector. It acquired iQiYi 
and PPS respectively in 2012 and 2013, both online video streaming sites, forming the largest 
online video platform by the number of mobile users and video viewing time, competing for 
online viewers with Youku Tudou. Among which, iQiYi unveiled its own in-house film 
production studio iQiYi Pictures in 2014 which plans to co-produce seven domestic films and 
one Hollywood movie in 2015.96  
 
 
96 http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/154871/alibaba-and-tencent-focus-on-entertainment-sector  
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The rivalry has been taken overseas with all three companies setting up offices in the US to 
slug it out for programming deals with Hollywood studios and producers.97 With Hollywood 
turning to the world’s second largest film market for money, Chinese companies are craving 
for their quality content to fulfil voracious local audiences’ desire to be entertained. A win-win 
situation therefore is easily forged. Alibaba is actively seeking partnership with foreign 
companies to expand its content library of video as well as music. Last year, Alibaba teamed 
with Lions Gate Entertainment to stream Hollywood movies and television shows exclusively 
through Alibaba’s latest generation of set-top box. It also signed a digital music distribution 
deal in China with BMG, the music division of Germany’s Bertelsmann SE. As for Tencent, 
since 2014 it has added to its media arsenal streaming rights to 21st Century Fox Inc.’s FOX, 
FOX Sports and the National Geographic Channel, Sony Corp.’s Sony Music Entertainment, 
Warner Music Group, Time Warner’s HBO network and the US National Basketball 
Association. 98  Baidu established a new venture based in Los Angeles, Aquamen 
Entertainment, marking its first foray into the film production business.  
 
The quest for synergy was spurred by multiple factors, notably the dramatic growth of home 
video and cable, media deregulation policies, free-market economics, and the obvious impulse 
to enhance and exploit the value of blockbuster hits. Given the current industry structure and 
the proliferation of delivery systems, the Old Hollywood model of vertical integration no 
longer made sense. Far more effective was the strategy of multiple “pipelines” to consumers 





98 http://www.ejinsight.com/20150513-how-tencent-uses-wechat-to-command-entertainment-space/  
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The three major Internet players have been busy seeking alliances in a wide range of industrial 
sectors and services including film, TV, gaming, online video streaming sites to acquire 
content, services or technology that the companies don’t already have. The aim is to grow in 
each other’s markets, enlarging and consolidating user base. Not only are they awash with 
capital which the always-risky film business is craving and depends on, they also provide 
platforms which are crucial for building a sustainable infrastructure of a sophisticated film 
market in the future. 
 
Internet corporations try to make inroads into the film market by producing their own content.99 
Internet marketing which relies on social media and other new tools becomes a vital part of 
movie promotion by building buzz online. There are more and more audience-targeted and 
platform-specific products based on collection and analysis of user-generated data. The 
widespread of gadgets, tablets and other digital mediums significantly widens the option of 
distribution channels and creates more platforms for reproducing, franchising and licensing 
copyrighted content, therefore more revenue streams. Major forces behind these changes are 
China’s three Internet giants, known collectively as BAT—short for Baidu, Alibaba, and 
Tencent who have been competing fiercely for domination in the online marketplace (Frater, 
2015; Fry, 2018). Specialising in different areas, e-commerce giant Alibaba, top search engine 





99 https://www.ibc.org/content-management/bat-vs-faang-the-battle-for-digital-dominance/3103.article  
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5.4 Factors contributing to conglomeration 
 
During the century long course of its development all over the world, the film industry has 
been evolving in conjunction with the advancement of technology. The introduction of sound 
into motion pictures, the invention of radio, television, DVD and digital technologies have 
greatly changed the film industry in ways that are at once distinctively and strikingly similar. 
The film industry has gone through repeated periods of resisting, negotiating with, harnessing, 
and incorporating new technologies which at first glance might be a big threat to the industry, 
but always turn out to be providing more vibrant and lucrative sources of profits for the 
industry. However, the proliferation and diffusion of new technologies means more than 
technological convergence, they are shaking up the very ground on which the media industries 
stand in terms of changing the ways in which media industries operate in all respects, from 
production, distribution, exhibition and marketing, to the content of productions.  
 
BAT are not alone in the race to change Chinese film industry, property and leisure industry 
giant Dalian Wanda is another game-changing newcomer who have also tried their hand at 
television.100 Together, they are soup-to-nuts integrators of all the components along the movie 
life cycle, either through organic growth, acquisition or alliance. What they have facilitated is 
a trend of convergence which, however, has already been at play since the end of the 1990s.  
 
Once the regional CEO of News Corp. and Microsoft, a board director of Phoenix TV and 
initiator of New Corp.’s investment in Bona Film Group, Jack Gao acutely observed the trend 
of convergence in the media and entertainment industry: 
 
100 See Michael Keane’s discussion, 2016. Disconnecting, Connecting and Reconnecting: How Chinese 
Television Found its Way out of the Box.  




“The $4 trillion industries－IT, Internet, telecom and media－are in convergence … 
The entertainment industry is being continuously impacted by digital technologies and 
quickly changing in terms of the business model and also in the way how premium 
content is produced and distributed.”101 
 
Le Vision 
Le Vision, claimed to be “a film company in the new media age”, is a leading player riding the 
tide of conglomeration. As the filmmaking entity of online video portal LeTV, Le Vision was 
founded in 2011 by Zhang Zhao and ranked No.4 among private film companies in the Chinese 
market share within two years. Compared to its competitors, Le Vision enjoys two distinct 
advantages. Firstly, Le Vision pays particular attention to marketing relying on analysis of data 
collected from the Internet, such as social media, so as to analyze, anticipate, and even shape 
niche market with consuming power. CEO Zhang Zhao made it very clear that “the Chinese 
film industry is still small and could be shaped with better marketing and O2O (online to 
offline) strategies” 102 . Secondly, LeTV is committed to building a vertically integrated 
industrial chain covering content, distribution channels, and exhibition platform. For example, 
LeTV is building a huge library of licensed content of television dramas and major movies. It 
expanded its business to hardware when it started to produce its own SuperTV, a kind of smart 
TV and set-top box. With Le TV’s technology support, it simultaneously distributes content on 
four integrated screens: the theatre screen, PC screen, TV screen and the mobile phone screen. 
The secret of success lies in the fact that it produces content and builds pipeline at the same 
time and collect enough data from a variety of online channels to help create and market 
 
101 http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-09/19/content_18626596.htm  
102 http://jazzhsu.com/2013/08/23/zhang-zhao-the-game-changer/  
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audience-tailored products. Theoretically, this strategy will enhance Le Vision’s films to be 
distributed and screened on a much wider and larger scale. However, whether it is just wishful 
thinking needs further observation.103  
 
Wanda Group 
The last example is the Wanda Group. Clearly it is not yet a media conglomerate. However, it 
indicates the increasing involvement of non-media corporations in the film industry. Across 
my fieldwork it is evident that few can challenge Wang Jianlin, Chairman and CEO of the 
Wanda Group, in his ambition to go big and to go global. In 2012, this real estate mogul made 
a serious splash when he purchased America’s number two movie theatre chain AMC, which 
helped him successfully capture the attention of Hollywood’s leading players. In 2013 he took 
this this ambition a step further by summoning Hollywood A-listers and major studio senior 
executives to Qingdao to participate in the unveiling of the $8.2 billion Qingdao Oriental 
Movie Metropolis. An industry insider whom I interviewed but who did not wish to be named 
said that Wanda had been planning the metropolis for about four years, but in a different 
location, Dalian. Speculations at the time of my fieldwork were that the breakout of the Bo 
Xilai scandal was partly involved in the dramatic twist of relocating the movie metropolis to 
Qingdao.  
 
The mission of this grand studio is claimed to lure Hollywood talents and capital here to make 
co-productions. That is however, just one side of the story. Technically it wouldn’t be possible 
to attract Hollywood runaway production deals here in the immediate future due to the lack of 
skilled workforce, the lack of agency and middleman to “make the deal happen”, as one 
 
103 So far it hasn’t born fruit. For example it is reported that 60% of Chinese users do not really know how smart 
their smart TV are.  
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executive of Chinese media corporation said in a private interview with me, and lack of 
competitive advantage compared to other global runaway locales for Hollywood such as New 
Zealand and Canada where the governments provide generous tax breaks. After all, it is more 
about real estate than film business, even Wang himself implied that in interviews. Wang got 
himself a great deal with local government in Qingdao as the land was traded at a price of 
1800rmb/m2, way below the usual average price at that area, which makes it a land grab 
wrapped in a Hollywood story.104 The metropolis is hoping to facilitate tourism relying on the 
attraction of its entertainment facilities and boost business in other areas, like hotel and huge 
shopping mall located in the metropolis.  
 
Wang found himself a new way to accumulate wealth by investing in cultural industries in a 
disguised form, with a little encouragement and help from the government. The biggest 
advantage Wang has is that his ambitions are highly congruent with the Chinese government’s 
key priority to expand the country’s soft power and show that the “Chinese dream” can compete 
with the American dream (see Chapters 1 and 2), which has always been epitomized by 
Hollywood. The government is keen to develop Chinese cultural industry into a major sector 
of national economy, in the meantime grab on culture’s ideological function to promote the 
“Chinese Dream”. The real impact is however uncertain and yet to be discovered. One 
Hollywood studio executive said that there was no substance of the opening event, but arranged 
mostly to please Wang’s political friends, impress the local government and party officials to 
get better deals and favours. Still it came as a welcome move for Hollywood studios as they 
have long been good at following the money. And ideally, this metropolis would help them 
 
104 The facility is set to have 10,000 square meters of studios, a film museum, movie theatres, resort hotels and 
other “cultural tourism projects”. It will open in June 2016 and be fully operational in 2017. Wanda also 
announced plans to bring in over 50 domestic production companies to make 100 films and TV shows per year, 
with another 30 foreign movies expected to be made in China. 
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achieve greater access to the Chinese film market. What’s for sure is that Wang has bigger 
ambitions; and this studio is just one step towards his goal of building a much larger media 
empire.  
 
5.4.1 Conglomeration, ownership and risk in a time of Internet capital 
 
A closer study of these examples points to some factors contributing to the surge of 
conglomeration. The state has adopted a series of cultural policies to encourage and promote 
the establishment of national media conglomerates since the late 1990s. The Chinese state 
created a favourable regulatory environment for the consolidation, mainly for two reasons. 
Firstly, on the eve of China’s entry into WTO, China needed to protect domestic cultural market 
from the invasion of transnational capital. To build media conglomerates that are vertically and 
horizontally integrated is crucial to compete with their transnational counterparts. Secondly, 
the state also seized the opportunity to consolidate its own power over cultural production and 
circulation under the socialist market economy. The most powerful and comprehensive media 
group CFG is a telling example. CFG was formed under SARFT in 1999, becoming China’s 
“most comprehensive and extensive state-owned film enterprise in China with the most 
complete industrial chain that facilitates film production, distribution and exhibition as a 
coordinated process and integrates film, TV and video into one single entity” (CFG website).105 
The group takes lead in financing, co-production, joint ventures, and cinema circuits. 
 
Therefore, it can be seen that, as my arguments in chapters 1, 2 and 4 suggested, 
conglomeration is a political imperative led by the Chinese party-state in response to the 
perceived cultural and media imperialism after China joined the WTO. It takes place under the 
 
105 http://www.zgdygf.com/Introduction 
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institutional umbrella of the party-state, combining a resistant consciousness, a victim complex 
and pathos of heroic nationalism. What’s more important however, is the dimension of 
commercial consideration. The conflux of opposite possibilities facilitates the strategic alliance 
and convergence of state interests and popular imperatives, local designs and global ambitions. 
This provides a precondition for the emergence of new forms of hegemony over media and 
cultural production in contemporary China. 
 
It is widely recognized that film business is highly risky considering the massive initial costs 
of development, production and marketing of a film and the extremely low ratio of hits against 
losses. This is especially true for the Chinese film industry. Despite the seemingly thriving and 
lucrative film market, only about 30% movies produced every year get theatrical release and 
less than one third of them turn a profit. Even worse, unlike Hollywood studios whose profits 
coming from a wide range of releasing windows and licensing their products to toy makers and 
theme parks, theatrical release is almost the only source of income for producers and 
distributers in China. The key to reduce high risk, maximize audience and profits lies in 
recognizing the significance of intellectual property for cultural industries.  
 
As Wasko (2003) explained, the media industries are increasingly operating according to the 
ownership of rights to films, TV programmes, songs, brands. The key to success of media 
industries is to combine ownership of content and distribution. Disney is a very good 
embodiment of the perception. Some media conglomerates in China have already said the 
corporate strategy is to follow the footstep of Disney, trying to build a media empire based on 
its model. And crucial to this strategy, is vertical integration, stretching companies’ market 
power across all stages in the vertical supply chain so as to maintain control on the distribution 
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channels. By circulating copyrighted content across a wide range of media platforms, the 
products get intensive cross-promotion, the corporation hugely widens its sources of revenue.  
 
Media conglomeration is one way to generate capital required in a competitive market and to 
provide long-term financial stability for film production companies. By its nature, the 
filmmaking business is voracious for capital. From its earliest days, the film industry has relied 
successfully on outsiders to spread its capital and mitigate the high risk of producing and 
distributing movies. The Chinese film industry has witnessed intensive capital investment in 
the Chinese film industry.106 The rise of various types of equities in the 1990s and the 21st 
century including hedge funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds has changed the 
financing side of the film business. For example, the growth of slate deals in the industry is 
thanks to the expansion of these diversified forms of investment capital. In China, until the 
August of 2013, Chinese VCs and PE firms established 25 PE funds focusing on production 
and development of film and TV products in the expectation of raising $5.26 billion, as China 
Venture Group reported. Other investment sources include local governments, bank loans, 
implantation of Ads and presales of film copyrights, etc. The reliance on intensive capital 
investment explains why film companies are actively seeking to be publicly listed, which is an 
important way to raise funding. Before 2013, listed companies such as Huayi, Bona, Enlight 
were the main forces of M&A deals. After that, the underperforming of the Chinese stock 
market in 2013 delayed plans for initial public offering (IPO) for many media corporations, 
which triggered a wave of M&As.  
 
 
106 The development of film industry always has some kind of connection with black money. In a private 
conservation I was told the record-breaking movie Lost in Thailand (2012) received part of its funding from 
black money worthy 20 million RMB. Usually black money is used to cover unaccounted production costs, 
even under-the-table actor fees. The investor is later paid back in cheque from the film's profits. 
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Though the massive scale of conglomeration in the Chinese film industry started way before 
the arrival of Internet companies, it intensified multiple times when Internet firms worked their 
way into the media ecosystem of the big screen. Internet companies are taking the lead in 
forming media conglomerations thanks to several factors. 
 
The enthusiasm of Internet companies entering the entertainment industry is in part due to 
national policy of encouraging the integration of Internet and traditional economy. In the 
“Report on the work of the government” delivered by Premier Li Keqiang at the Third Session 
of the 12th National People’s Congress on March 5, 2015, the proposal of “Internet Plus” action 
plan is for the first time unveiled as following: 
 
“We will develop the Internet Plus action plan to integrate mobile Internet, cloud 
computing, big data, and the Internet of Things with modern manufacturing, to 
encourage the healthy development of e-commerce, industrial networks, and Internet 
banking, and to get Internet-based companies to increase their presence in the 
international market.”107 
  
The avowed aim of the plan is to promote innovation-driven development and upgrade China 
from being a “big industrial country” to a “powerful industrial country”, a goal often seen in 
recent Chinese government policy pronouncements. 108  Under the general framework of 
upgrading traditional economy with the help of mobile Internet, a series of cultural policies 
have been announced and implemented regarding taking advantage of technology to boost the 
long-term development of Chinese film industry. Luan Guozhi, deputy director of SAPPRFT 
 
107 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015twosession/2015-03/05/content_19729663.htm  
108 http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2015/03/15/content_281475071697289.htm  
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said the involvement of tech firms such as Alibaba in the film industry “has a positive meaning 
and can promote the film industry, improve the quality and make the Chinese film market 
bigger”.109 
 
With drastically accumulated wealth within a rather short period of time, BAT is in a good 
position to expand. No longer content to nurture their natural monopolies in peace, BAT are 
engaging in a frenzy of acquisitions to compete with each other in most markets. Their ambition 
set them off to be on the mission of monopolising every aspect of daily life that could 
conceivably be put on the web and sold to the public until their power becomes ubiquitous. 
They are fighting on many fronts, from mobile payments to social media to taxi service, 
entertainment is only one of them, but one the most prosperous. Capital abundance gives them 
the advantage over traditional media players who have much smaller scale of revenue streams. 
Unlike Hollywood studios whose profits coming from a wide range of releasing windows and 
licensing deals, theatrical release is almost the only source of income for producers and 
distributers in China.  
 
With huge numbers of subscribed users to be capitalized upon, Internet companies are eager to 
find ways to develop these customers’ loyalty by providing premier services and entertainment 
content. Despite coming from respective bases of dominance, with Alibaba based in e-
commerce and payments, Tencent in messaging, social networking and mobile gaming, and 
Baidu in search engines, they arrive at the same conclusion that to lure and retain users they 
need to meet their demands for entertainment content, domestic as well as foreign.110  
 
 
109 http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/china-media-watchdog-welcomes-tech-783022  
110 Online video programs and entertainment have become the most popular applications on the Internet and 
mobile Internet, boasting 440 million subscribers and 7.44 billion hours of access time a month in China. 
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The mobility that is attached to new technologies has shaken up the previously dull or cosy 
world of the Chinese entertainment industry. Nearly half a billion Chinese use smartphones 
and tablets to access the Internet now. Most of the new acquisitions in terms of film companies 
discussed in this chapter have been made with mobiles in mind.111 It is the perfect embodiment 
of the concept of convergence which refers to “the flow of content across multiple media 
platforms, the cooperation between multiple media industries, and the migratory behaviour of 
media audiences”. Through the integration of platform and content, media companies are able 
to accelerate the flow of media content across delivery channels, so as to expand revenue 
opportunities, broaden markets and reinforce viewer commitments.  
 
5.4.2 Distribution  
 
The most prominent change Internet companies have brought to the film industry is a much 
more flexible and diversified distribution mechanism. During my fieldwork I have observed 
the rise of video-on-demand (VOD) services that are now offered by a wide variety of hosts 
with a diverse selection of titles at a remarkably low price. This provides more options of 
distribution models for film companies who are actively experimenting with new “window” 
strategies. For example, on April 9, 2014, iQiYi, Baidu’s online video platform, officially 
released the first revenue-sharing model for film distribution in “online cinemas”. Based on 
this model, an individual film will have a 7-month payment option, with which the revenue-
sharing ratio depends on the number of viewings; after the seven months, users could watch 
the film for free, and revenue-sharing will be based on advertising revenue. This online 
 
111 For example, Baidu paid $1.9bn for 91 Wireless, an app store designed to give it an edge with mobile users. 
Alibaba has an undisclosed stake in UC Web, China’s top mobile browser. Alibaba also made an offer for 
AutoNavi Holdings, a mapping service, valuing it at $1.6bn, and allowing it to compete head-to-head with 
Baidu’s mobile map app. 
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distribution enables those films that do not have the chance to enter Chinese theatres a chance 
to make profits.  
 
A more accessible online video market in China is also perceived as good news for 
transnational media corporations. Having the largest Internet market in the world, China’s 
online video space has become another potential gold mine for Hollywood. Since 2013, 
China’s online video market began to emerge as a viable new distribution channel for 
Hollywood content providers. The online space offers a far different landscape than the 
troubled film sector. There is no quota system, fewer bureaucratic hassles and far fewer 
logistical headaches (no need for a middleman in the form of a state-run distributor like China 
Film Group). Major online video sites are shifting business focus from the user-generated 
business model of YouTube to providing licensed content, mostly of U.S TV series and movies. 
Top U.S. TV series, such as The Walking Dead, Modern Family, and The Big Bang Theory 
were sold to Youku Tudou and other streaming services. Though the sums involved in such 
licensing deals remain slight due to still rampant digital piracy, the potential of the market is 
enormous.  
 
Strategic partnerships are taking also place between Chinese corporations and transnational 
media corporations. For example, Tencent has recently partnered with Warner Bros., 
Universal, Miramax Films and Lionsgate for a new online video venture called Hollywood 
VIP. Video platform Youku Tudou has partnered with Disney to be the exclusive online movie 
marketing platform in China for its Marvel collection of movies and TV series. The agreement 
spans online marketing through trailers, online ticketing, live events and original programming 
dedicated to feature movies. The deal underlines the growing role of China’s online video 
platforms, not just as distributors and ancillary market platforms, but also as pre-release 
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marketing vectors. However, as the famous tax standoff between Hollywood studios and the 
main movie distributor China Film Group demonstrated, the unpredictable Chinese film market 
is not easy for transnational media corporation to navigate. 
 
There are several e-commerce companies serving as third party between distributor and 
exhibitor by selling low priced movie tickets at RMB9.9 or RMB19.9 to customers.112 In 
extreme cases, ticket price dropped to RMB3.8. Those mobile ticketing apps have initiated 
waves of price wars since early 2014, with the latest full-scale battle unfolded during the 
Chinese spring festival season. The impact on theatre owners is immediate and multifold. As 
ticket sales at cinemas declined considerably, thought with overall box office intake not 
affected that much, revenue from drinks and snacks gets hit hard. VIP membership at cinemas 
starts to lose its attractiveness to regular moviegoers when tickets charge as low as just RMB20. 
Those ticketing apps are changing the distribution mechanism by combining distribution, 
promotion and ticket sales into one tight package, in other words, by integrating itself into the 
industry chain.113 Ultimately, what they desire for is to enlarge their user base. Those ticketing 
apps do not make up the extra cost for nothing. The more tickets they sell, the more registered 
users they acquire. By putting extra promoting efforts on a particular movie its parent company 
invests, it gets to grip a larger piece of the box office. 
 
5.4.3 Promotion and marketing 
 
 
112 Major players include maoyan.com (movie ticketing app belong to Meituan, a group buying website), 
dianping.com (consumer site offering restaurant reviews, discounts and group-buying services), gewara.com, 
wepiao.com (movie ticketing app which enables users of Tencent messaging apps WeChat and QQ to buy 
tickets), dianying.taoboa.com (movie ticketing system under taobao.com, Alibaba Group). 
113 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/909975.shtml  
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2013 was labelled the Year Zero of Big Data’s application in China’s media industries. The 
hype of big data is created and sustained by a belief that it is a useful and effective tool to 
collect and analyze user generated data hence predict audience tastes and potential box office 
performance of any particular film.114 This lends great advantage to online video sites with 
access to abundant user generated information through which they can build database to the 
purpose of analysing audience behaviour and psychology. Leading online video portals like 
Youku Tudou, Tencent Video, iQiYi of Baidu, are all claiming to utilize their sources to 
establish databases of such sorts. This function is made possible based on an identification of 
audience tendencies via the conduct of niche market research. Successful examples include 
Love is not Blind (2011), So Young (2013), Tiny Times (2013, 2014).  
 
Apart from providing convenient advice to what kind of movies might sell well in the market, 
big data and sentiment analysis is also considered useful in informing and attracting potential 
audience to participate in online promotional events and local gatherings to ensure an effective 
O2O varied marketing in different regions. The importance of the application of big data to the 
search for newer and larger audiences is also a contributing factor in consolidation. The 
cooperation between Youku Tudou and Alibaba is an illustrative example.  
 
It is reported that Youku Tudou and Alibaba will jointly establish a Marketing Innovation Lab 
to drive the adoption of big data in marketing. This deal makes sense in that these two 
companies share same strategic goals. Youku Tudou’s strategy is to leverage the data on 
audience preferences that it harnesses from its 500 million multi-screen users to produce films 
to the tastes of the Chinese audiences, and improve film marketing and distribution.115 While 
 
114 The first and most-talked-about reference is House of Cards, an American TV series produced and 
broadcasted by Netflix which developed a new model for television industry. 
115 http://variety.com/2014/film/asia/chinas-youku-tudou-launches-heyi-film-production-arm-1201292734/  
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Alibaba Pictures expects to analyze consumer shopping patterns and behaviour on (e-tailers) 
Taobao and Tmall through big-data technology so as to create customized movies and TV 
programs while marketing and distributing them efficiently across Alibaba’s platforms. 116 
Alibaba Pictures said it and its parent “have explored a user-demand-oriented e-commerce 
customization model through the Internet and big data, in addition to developing a cross-
industry in-depth cooperation model for e-commerce and cultural and creative industry by 
taking advantage of the deployment of O2O (online to offline) film related business in ways 
such as conducting promotion and marketing activities on Alibaba Group’s e-commerce 
platforms.”117 As Victor Koo, Chairman and CEO of Youku Tudou summarised,  
 
“The Youku Tudou Cloud and Alibaba’s data and technology will collaboratively bring 
consumer behaviour in media and entertainment and consumer behaviour in products 
and services closer together. Both parties will work in stride to realize the ‘Screen is 
Channel’ and the ‘Content is Storefront’ vision, creating strong synergies between the 
domains of media and entertainment, and commerce and payment.” 118 
 
Despite the big fuss presented in mass media about the effectiveness and pervasiveness of big 
data, many executives of film companies maintain a much more cautious and pragmatic view 






117 http://www.wsj.com/articles/alibabas-entertainment-plans-hidden-behind-the-curtain-1427879745  
118 http://variety.com/2014/digital/asia/alibaba-signs-video-marketing-deal-with-youku-tudou-1201342990/  





Arriving alongside the rising power of Internet companies in the film industry is the vexed 
concept and practice of Intellectual Property (henceforth, IP). IP has probably become the most 
fashionable word in the Chinese film industry since 2014. Even a cursory glance at the 
questions of IP facing the Chinese film industry suggests two things. First, the Chinese film 
industry is shockingly short on original content to fill rapidly increasing number of screens. 
Second, to reduce the risk of developing original material that hasn’t been tested by the market, 
producers tend to seek gold from IPs that have already proven successful in a certain niche 
market. Newly established film production arms of online video platforms are among the 
pioneers capitalising on the opportunity by bringing successful IPs from the online and offline 
worlds to the silver screen.119 Online video sites are not only building an ecosystem for Original 
and User Generated content, but also trying to improve in-house production capabilities by 
producing their own films, in the form of micro-movie which can be watched on mobile 
devices, which can be further developed into feature films.120  
 
For example, Heyi Pictures was established in 2014 as the stand-alone movie production 
operation of Youku Tudou, a development and finance company that aims to incubate more of 
its shorts and series into properties that can be exploited both online and off. In practice this is 
expected to mean that Heyi develops intellectual properties and helps scale up content from 
micro-movies to theatrical features. Among a slate of six feature films it just unveiled to co-
produce with various partners, most of which are adaptations of original properties that have 
 
119 http://variety.com/2015/film/asia/chinas-heyi-unveils-six-picture-movie-slate-1201423350/  
120 The short, low-budget, amateur movies known locally as micro-movies have emerged as a popular 
alternative to professionally produced films and TV series among media consumers in China. 
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become popular on Youku Tudou’s online platform. As senior VP of Youku Tudou and CEO 
of Heyi Pictures Allen Zhu said, 
 
“Chinese movie audiences are calling for more quality titles, while the Chinese movie 
business demands a larger and continuous flow of new IPs. By working with prominent 
partners across different domains, Heyi Pictures is building an open platform to 
develop stronger IPs across multiple screens to bring to these audiences.”121  
 
Content production signifies a shift accommodating to new distribution platforms. In a sense 
the Internet has become one of the hottest breeding grounds of feature films. There is plenty of 
quality IPs from other cultural domains such as online literature that film producers can choose 
from. However, selected IPs do not usually travel well when transformed and transferred to a 
different cultural format. The chosen IPs have all been proven successful on the Internet, but 
the problem is that originally, they served the taste of a quite particular – and even, one might 
say, peculiar – audience, which significantly limits the range of presentable subjects on screen. 
However, this seems the least of the concerns of film companies. As long as films with a certain 
subject prove marketable and profitable, within a short period of time, the film market would 




Sections of the Chinese film industry are proactively restructuring themselves to a be a 
commercially viable industry by foregrounding the economic and cultural dimensions while 
downplaying the propagandist and pedagogical role of cinema. In line with this, Chinese films 
 
121 http://variety.com/2015/film/global/youku-tudou-film-development-1201475656/  
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have gone through a process of depoliticization, and the industry through a process of 
commercialization and marketization, which means cinema is turning from an instrumental 
tool for solely propagandist and identity building purposes to a market–driven economic sector 
aiming for profit maximization but retaining a range of complex connections to national 
identity. Indeed, striking as these changes are, they do not entail the complete retreat of politics 
from the domain of cultural production. While not at the top of agenda anymore, political 
considerations are working as a bottom line that cannot be crossed at any cost. 
 
Throughout this chapter I have examined how state-owned studios and private production 
companies try to maintain their position on an increasingly competitive market. I have also 
looked at cases of convergence and conglomeration, especially in relation to the dominant 
Internet companies and the investment coming from non-media sectors.  
 
The rise of the China Film Group (CFG) and its attempt to re-nationalize and transnationalize 
Chinese cinema proves the inherent tension in China’s integration to global media. Rather than 
serving to liberate creative genius of the people and endowing them with more freedom, 
marketization in China is only a part of a scheme to utilize the market to consolidate state 
power. Of course, the binary thinking of putting state and people at opposite position is 
misleading and non-constructive. It would be naive to argue that the depoliticizing trend of the 
Chinese cinema as a whole does not leave space for any progressive or alternative expression 
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CHAPTER 6 CINEMA ON A GLOBALIZING MISSION  
6.1 Introduction 
 
Now we already have a slate of public listed film companies such as Huayi, Enlight, 
Bona, their performance in the next few years in the capital market is extremely critical, 
together with other might-be listed media corporations, regardless state-owned or 
private. Let’s take Huayi as an example, when its market value grows to $15 billion, it 
will be in the same league as Warner Brothers. Imagine then, integration and 
conglomeration of global capital will be the new norm. It won’t be impossible if say, 
Huayi acquires Universal. We will see real export of Chinese culture and values with 
the help of those Chinese media conglomerates. Their impact will be profound, much 
greater than Confucius Institutions. (Personal interview with Ji, Beijing, 24 July 2013) 
 
Ben Ji, the Managing Director and Producer of Reach Glory Communications, could hardly 
contain his excitement when painting an optimistic picture in which Chinese media 
corporations are perceived as well-matched players alongside their Hollywood counterparts. 
Looking out through the floor-to-ceiling windows of his office, there stands a giant Iron Man 
model, an indication of pride for this Beijing-based leading entertainment marketing company 
that has for a few years now been navigating between Hollywood studios and Chinese 
corporations.  
 
This was in July 2013. The Chinese film industry had received a glimpse of a possibly lucrative 
domestic film market after the unexpected and explosive success of the comedy film Lost in 
Thailand which released in December 2012. And already there were film professionals 
hovering, imaging a rosy future for the Chinese film industry on the global scale. Yet, just a 
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decade previously, globalization had been greeted with a completely different and of course 
understandable sentiment of scepticism and anxiety. 
 
As discussed in chapters 1, 2 and 4, the defining moment of WTO entry in 2002 instantly forced 
China’s infantile film industry into a position vulnerable to unprecedented global competition, 
which not only stirred up industry-wide anxiety among film professionals, but also ignited 
intellectual interests on the possible impacts of globalization on the Chinese film industry. One 
of the gravest concerns emerging from that monumental moment was the imminent threat 
brought by Hollywood, the formidable global force waiting to prey on a foreign film market 
that had barely been exposed to its dominating weight. Ever since then, globalization has 
become a forcibly shaping factor in the Chinese film industry.  
 
In this chapter, I look at ways in which the Chinese film industry has been adjusting itself to 
embrace the challenges rising from integrating into the global film market in the historical 
setting of China joining WTO. In light of the increasingly tightened connections between the 
Chinese film industry and transnational media capital since 2002, I set out to explore intricate 
power interplays between global media capital, domestic capital and the party state in shaping 
the globalization path for the Chinese film industry. To achieve that, I put the China-Hollywood 
relationship under closer scrutiny, with a specific focus on co-productions, in the attempt to 
illustrate power dynamics between the three power players, demonstrating the roles each of 
them have individually played to push through their own agendas so as to reap benefits from a 
rapidly growing Chinese film industry. I argue that the globalizing process is spearheaded by 
a small group of industry elites privileged with skills and resources that enable them to navigate 
among multiple stakeholders with respective agendas and interests in mind.  
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6.2 The “going global” mission 
 
I was not at all surprised when I found out that on the back of Zhou Tiedong’s business card 
there were words printed in red: Catch the Chinese Dream (捕捉中国梦). Zhou was the 
president of China Film Promotion International (hereafter CFPI), a corporation established 
under the authority of China Film Group Corporation in 2005. The avowed mission of CFPI 
was to provide assistance and service for the promotion and commercial distribution of Chinese 
national films overseas.122 In this section, I propose a multi-layered reading of the “Chinese 
film going global” narrative. There are two identifiable systems operating in parallel but subject 
to different sets of rules and logics.  
 
The first layer of the “going global” narrative, as I discussed in Chapter 4, refers to the top-
down political commandment to make Chinese films attract a global audience and which 
conforms to the Party-state’s cultural policy of performing cinema’s ideological function to 
serve political purposes. The main task going along this track is seen as being to build 
collaborative relationships with industries in other countries so that middle or small budget 
Chinese movies with relatively low production values can find platforms to obtain global 
exposure. However, my fieldwork reveals that this is a theoretically tenable but practically 
unfeasible mission.  
 
When I asked Zhou what kinds of efforts they had been making to promote Chinese films 
overseas, he gave me a definitive answer without any hesitation.  
 
 
122 http://www.chinesefilms.cn/index.htm  
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It is impossible [for Chinese films going global]. If we use Hollywood as the standard, 
there has no other national cinema really achieved this goal, or ever will be able to. 
Almost 97% films on the U.S. film market are their own products, which left about 3% 
for non-Hollywood movies. And within that 3%, 75% are in English language, which 
means there is only 1% space for real foreign language movies including Chinese films. 
This is an industry fact, undeniable consensus. Hollywood has a stricter form of 
censorship, just not in the sense we use the term, which I call the “market censorship” 
(无形的铁幕, translated into English invisible iron curtain). This is a much tougher 
version of censorship to crack. That is why Hollywood has dominated the global film 
market for so long, and why we should learn from Hollywood, treating filmmaking in 
the way they should be treated, within the default political perimeter that we have no 
control of. At the end of the day, cinema is business, it abides by basic economic laws. 
Forget about going global, we [the Chinese film industry] are just taking baby steps 
towards a full-fledged commercialised film industry like Hollywood and that is what 
we should be focusing on. Political censorship is irrelevant in this conversation and 
should not be used as the scapegoat for commercial failure. (Personal interview with 
Zhou, Beijing, 26th July 2013) 
 
The CFPI is acting as the Chinese counterpart of the MPA for promoting Chinese cinema 
worldwide and for encouraging exchanges between China and the rest of the world. Its main 
obligations are to facilitate Chinese films’ participation in international film festivals and 
markets, to hold China film festivals, to provide information on overseas distribution for 
Chinese film producers, and to build up distribution networks for Chinese films in the 
international market. However in reality, CFPI is facing tremendous difficulties in fulfilling its 
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functions. In an interview with the magazine Southern Weekly, Zhou Tiedong addressed the 
challenges of promoting Chinese films internationally in greater detail.  
 
The fundamental problem lies in the question that, who is appealing for “going global”? 
The authorities or the private sector? For political, or cultural, or commercial reasons? 
It is a question that has never been brought up for open discussion. The narrative of 
“Chinese film going global” is propagated by the film officials, who might themselves 
have conflicted opinion about this undertaking contrived by the Party, which has 
obviously been manifested at the level of execution. It is just a concept on the paper, 
with no infrastructure support in place, including financial allocation, organizational 
and administrative arrangements. We have reached agreements with national television 
stations of countries like New Zealand, Australia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Pakistan, 
United Arab Emirates. They are willing to launch a channel exclusively for Chinese 
films, but they don't want to pay copyright fee. The television station from Turkey 
would only offer 600 dollars for each Chinese film. Essentially, when your films are 
not commercially appealing, the only way to go global is free giveaway123.  
 
Zhang Wanmin, Governing Director-General of Asia Film & Television Federation (hereafter 
AFTF), shared similar view on this matter. 
 
It doesn't matter how much effort we put into this mission, it is unattainable because 
the rationale behind it is against the nature of filmmaking. Primarily, cinema is a 
business, films should only be evaluated according to the logic of market mechanisms 
as a commercial product. At the end of the day, what people are paying for is 
 
123http://www.infzm.com/content/94479  
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entertainment, but not ideology. Of course, strictly speaking, no entertainment is free 
from ideology, ideology is everywhere. What I mean is that, when films are 
intentionally made or distributed as something expected to fulfil ideological functions, 
they cannot travel far across transnational boundaries, not even in the domestic context. 
It’s just working against film’s nature. (Personal interview with Zhang, Beijing, 15th 
August 2013) 
 
Sun Hongyun, a professor from the Beijing Film Academy, was more straightforward in 
expressing her point of view on this topic.  
 
They [the Party authorities] don’t care about the feasibility of this project. It is pure 
politics and nothing more. They are not the ones need to worry about operationalization, 
about money, about creating a viable business model to sustain the vision. And more 
frankly, they don't care even they realize it is doomed to fail. The film officials are the 
ones put in the dilemma, how they perceive their job is another story. Sometimes, I 
have sympathy towards them, but only sometimes. (Personal interview with Sun, 
Beijing, 14th July 2013) 
 
Two important insights can be drawn from my interviews with film officials affiliated with 
governmental organizations. First, it is considered a commonly acknowledged “fact” within 
the community of film officials that “going global” equals conquering the North American film 
market, or put in a different way, it means being competitive on the same level as Hollywood. 
This mindset resonates with Ji’s remark which I quoted at the beginning of this chapter, that 
Hollywood serves as the yardstick against which the Chinese film industry can be gauged as 
truly global or not. The extent of globalization of the Chinese film industry could only be 
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defined and evaluated within a framework created and controlled by Hollywood. And to 
achieve the goal of competing with Hollywood on the same footing, many thinks that the 
Chinese film industry should imitate the Hollywood style of filmmaking, its business model, 
as well as its techniques of storytelling.  
 
This trajectory can be seen also in other film industries. As Govil (2016) writes in Orienting 
Hollywood: A Century of Film Culture between Los Angeles and Bombay, at the time when 
Hollywood had a strong presence in the Indian film industry before the 1940s, “Hollywood 
film marked the horizon of technological achievement… Its marketing and promotional 
machinery was the envy of newly institutionalising Indian industry organizations…Hollywood 
functioned as a crucial marker of film form” (2016: 4). Guo Xiaoping, the Director of the 
Market Research Center from Bona Group used the term “Hollywood complex” to describe 
the Chinese film industry’s “obsession” with “going global”.  
 
The “Hollywood complex” is something almost hardwired into the mindset of Chinese 
film officials, film workers, and even ordinary audiences. Hollywood serves as role 
model for China to imitate or as an arch-rival to defeat. You can hear talks by media 
executives about how the development Chinese film industry is in parallel with 
Hollywood at the 1980s when a wave of consolidation taking place, how the Chinese 
film industry will be dominated by several major studios just like the Hollywood, how 
the horizontal and vertical integration of the media sectors will lead to media 
monopolies, even global conglomerates, within ten years. (Personal interview with Guo, 
Beijing, 9th August 2013) 
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Second, my interviewees’ self-reflexive response help shed more light on the inconsistent and 
frequently self-contradictory nature of China’s film regulatory machinery that I discussed in 
Chapter 4. There exists a discrepancy in the attitudes towards the Chinese film industry 
between the Party-state and the Film Bureau. On the one hand, the Film Bureau has shown 
signs of shifting its focus away from using films as a propaganda tool in ways which they 
assume will facilitate the marketization and commercialization of the Chinese film industry. 
On the other hand, despite the fact that the Party-state granted Chinese cinema industry status 
as early as 2002 and has since promulgated numerous de-regulatory guidelines conductive to 
the establishment of market mechanisms in the film sector, the Party-state has been exerting 
an ever tighter and more centralizing ideological grip on film production over the past few 
years.  
 
In this context, the second layer of the “going global” narrative is partly driven by domestic 
private corporations’ ambition to expand globally and establish foothold world-wide, 
corporations whether within the entertainment industries or not. It resonates with chapter 5 
where I discuss the trend of conglomeration facilitated by Chinese Internet companies in the 
entertainment industries and its impact on the Chinese film industry. The forces of 
conglomeration and globalization joined together in paving a path for the development of 
Chinese film industry in the 21st century that is featured by an intensifying China-Hollywood 
relationship.  
 
Only in recent years, with the help of local agents serving as the middleman, have Chinese 
companies discovered a new way of tapping into the North American market—always the last 
territory to conquer—through product placement in entertainment programmes. TCL is a 
forerunner as it purchased the naming rights for Chinese theatre in 2013, a landmark for 
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Hollywood. Ji’s company is one of the most significant Chinese companies specialising in this 
area.  
 
More and more Chinese companies are looking to create opportunities for the exposure 
of Chinese products in foreign movies, be it a television set from multinational 
electronics company CTL, or a milk box from dairy company Yili. (Personal interview 
with Ji, Beijing, 24th July 2013) 
 
So, what does it look like when Chinese cinema does “go global”? There are two ways of 
“going global”. The first involves domestic capital investing in foreign projects, whether these 
are China related or not. The second way involves making a domestic film up to what is 
considered a global gold standard in technical and aesthetic terms, usually with the help of 
leading international companies.  
 
Our latest endeavour is the movie Zhong Kui: Snow Girl and the Dark Crystal (2015). 
Zhong Kui, known as “the demon queller”, is a figure from Chinese mythology who 
fights against demons and evil spirits. Though Zhong Kui is a household name in China, 
he is a complete stranger to foreign audiences. To make this character more visually 
relatable, we made one specific change to his costume. Zhong’s conventional image is 
a disfigured burly man dressed in loose robes, which speaks to his identity as a Taoist 
demon exorciser. However, this signature look was disapproved by our art director who 
we hired from Hollywood, for “the Western audience might find the dressing style 
bizarrely impractical for a ghost hunter who needs to fight a lot”. (Personal interview 
with Huang, Beijing, 20th August 2014) 
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It can be seen here that revision of the central character’s dress performs something of the role 
of cultural translator in regard to the bridge between audiences in a film example such as this 
one. Whether or not this form of translation helps all films to “go global” in the same way is a 
moot point.  
 
While in the international market, the demand for mainstream Chinese films has declined, 
sharply in recent years, this is not a surprise because, with a few exceptions, Chinese 
commercial films have never been popular with foreign audiences. What’s surprising is that 
the situation for art film, or independent film, is not promising either. At an industry forum in 
Beijing last year, Professor Rosen Stanley pointed out that Chinese films are just not wanted 
that much in the overseas as before. The oriental spectacle suddenly seems lost its charm for 
foreign audience. That’s a question needs to be answered if the government tries to showcase 
and promote Chinese culture through the exportation of Chinese movies. 
  
The problem lies in the paradox of making films that resonate with domestic audiences while 
also remaining attractive to international audiences. For local film companies, producing films 
for transnational audiences is not their priority and neither is it a realistic goal. Even if they 
team up with foreign studios to make co-productions for the international market, it is more of 
a strategic decision and won’t be on the top of their agenda. It is the state pushing for the 
exportation. However, overemphasis on using film as means to promote soft power is actually 
paralyzing the healthy development of a film market that is in urgent need of building a solid 
domestic market.   
 
The influence on content is going beyond Chinese movies only. Any film that is hoping to enter 
Chinese theatres, has to comply with certain rules. Foreign studios are making changes to their 
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movies to accommodate the Chinese market. Dreamworks has thrived in China with family 
films devoid of sex and violence which are considered taboo, but many studios stumble at the 
censors or when in talks with putative Chinese partners, resulting in delays, frustration and 
cancelled co-productions.  
 
Blockbusters of recent years such as Iron Man 3, Django Unchained, Transformers 4 and Brad 
Pitt's World War Z, have all been modified to please Chinese authorities and audiences, 
prompting accusations of artistic surrender. All of this is certainly influencing the visibility and 
representation of Chinese characters in co-productions and even in some foreign movies. For 
example, in the second Sino-U.S. Film Co-Production Forum held by MPAA at FOX Studio 
in October 2012, James Cameron said he was considering inserting Chinese elements into two 
sequels to Avatar, saying it would be “logical” to have Chinese characters on the planet 
Pandora. Peter Shiao, chair of the US-China Film Summit and founder and CEO of the Los 
Angeles-based Orb Media Group said that playwrights more often turn to Middle East when 
they need a baddie in the movie, and will probably continue to do so until they have their own 
rising film market like China.   
 
6.3 The China-Hollywood relationship and beyond 
 
6.3.1 Entering the Chinese market: attractions and barriers 
 
It goes without saying that the lucrative film viewing market makes China highly desirable for 
foreign film companies who have been seeking a foothold in China. After decades of feeling 
thwarted by tight quotas for imported movies, foreign studios begin to see China as a land of 
opportunity. However, it remains far from easy for foreign players to undertake film business 
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in China given China’s complex and volatile political economic environment. Attempts by 
Hollywood to tap into the Chinese market started as early as 1990s. Back then, restrictive 
import policy and elusive regulatory regime has been putting Hollywood studios off alongside 
with other prohibiting factors. Warner Brothers, for instance, temporarily pulled out of the 
Chinese market. Other studios shifted attention to different national markets such as India. 
Indeed, apart from the Village Roadshow who invested in Stephen Chow’s Journey to the West 
(2013) which set new record at the Chinese box-office, no partnership has yielded any 
significant result yet.  
 
Amongst other factors, the challenges and uncertainty of doing business in China usually derive 
from cultural policies which are viewed as nebulous because so little understood, regulatory 
hurdles, restrictions on foreign capital and the apparent and real hubris of Chinese officials.  
One key aspect stems from the fact that unlike other countries, where joint productions are 
often limited to financing agreements, Chinese film authorities are not content to just sign the 
cheques and then wait patiently for the film to be delivered. They also expect editorial oversight 
and are more likely to greenlight scripts with an ideological point of view that they can identify 
as strongly Chinese in one way or another.  
 
Chinese officials of course expect that this kind of partnership will broaden the cooperation 
platform which allows local corporations to absorb production experience and expertise from 
overseas and will eventually open the channels for Chinese movies to air globally and offer 
international audiences a better understanding of Chinese culture. However, the reality 
apparently does not satisfy film authorities, leading to films doing poorly at the box office. In 
response to this, recently, the Chinese government tightened the requirements for a film to 
qualify as a co-production.  
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In order to enter the Chinese film market, foreign films must jump through bureaucratic hoops 
including qualifying for film import quotas, censorship, the scheduling system, and the revenue 
sharing model. Only 34 foreign films are qualified for import and entitled to take away as much 
as 43% of the box office revenue just like any other Chinese films (it was 13% before China 
released new policies for Sino-US films in January in 2012). This urges foreign studios to join 
forces with Chinese companies, either by establishing jointly owned companies or through co-
production deals with domestic companies. For example, the Closer Economic Partnership 
Agreement (CEPA) stipulates that films coproduced by Mainland China and Hong Kong would 
be treated as domestic films while Hong Kong films will not be classified as imported films 
any more. Other cases include Britain, Indian, France and Italy, whose governments have been 
lobbying very hard to bypass China’s quota system. 
 
The first and most prominent type of co-operation can be summarised in the form that Chinese 
capital, private and state-owned, rushes to Hollywood in exchange for Hollywood’s resources 
in the aim of securing an advantageous position in the roaring competition of building China’s 
indigenous media conglomerates. The second form refers to the reversal flow of capital from 
Hollywood to the Chinese film market, which however is overwhelmingly dwarfed by the first 
type for reasons that are both political and economic. Lastly, I consider China-U.S. co-
production as a unique form of transnational cooperation that deserves closer examination on 
its own terms. 
 
In 2012, Fox International Productions (FIP) partnered with the Bona Film Group, one of 
China’s largest films companies, to develop, co-produce and distribute multiple movies 
intended for the burgeoning Chinese market. In the same year, DreamWorks Animation 
partnered with China Media Capital (hereafter CMC), Shanghai Media Group and Shanghai 
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Alliance Investment to develop a Shanghai studio enterprise valued at $330 million, Oriental 
DreamWorks. This ambitious venture aims to produce one animated feature a year starting in 
2016, and intends to be involved in animated TV production, live action films and live action 
TV—including reality formats—as well as mobile and Internet content.  
 
Acting as the middleman, Relativity Media has partnered with Asian private-equity firm SAIF 
Partners and IDG China Media, the China-focused investment arm of Boston’s International 
Data Group to develop, produce, acquire and distribute Chinese movies with worldwide appeal. 
Relativity Media is also joining with China’s Huaxia Film Distribution Co. to launch a strategic 
partnership to create the first joint venture that will handle distribution along with film 
production and financing in both China and the America.  
 
Founded in 2011, Legendary East was originally a venture formed by Legendary Entertainment 
Chairman Thomas Tull, together with Paul Y. Engineering Group which owns half of the 
company, and Huayi Brothers International taking up 10 percent of the share. However, to 
secure financing, Legendary East scrapped a deal with Huayi Brothers in 2012 and finally 
signed a deal with the China Film Group in 2013. Under the new agreement, the two companies 
would co-produce multiple films over a three-year period. This agreement marked the first time 
CFG had signed a long-term, multi-picture production deal with a Chinese or international 
partner.  
 
Film companies from other countries have also been trying to get involved. EuropaCorp, one 
of France’s largest production companies, and Fundamental Films, a large distributor based in 
Shanghai, formalize a co-production deal in early 2013. As part of the three-year deal, 
Fundamental will distribute up to 15 titles produced by EuropaCorp and co-produce at least 
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three of the movies. For the first joint production, Wolf Totem, an adaption of Jiang Rong’s 
award-winning, semi-autobiographical novel, EuropaCorp was teamed up with China Film 
Group and Beijing Forbidden City Pictures. Christophe Lambert, CEO of EuropaCorp, said 
that his company is seeking partnership with local companies so as to compete on the same 
levels as large Hollywood majors.  
 
Up until now, all major six studios have set up joint ventures with local investors or media 
corporations in China. But it has been a bumpy journey for foreign studios trying to tap into 
the Chinese market. No concrete news has yet come out regarding specific timelines, the size 
of the slate or potential project. As for Legendary East, the first venture with Huayi went south 
as it failed to raise enough money on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange through the shell 
company, Paul Y. Engineering Group at the end of 2011. Huayi Brothers was unable and also 
refused to fill the financial gap. According to an insider, the deal with CFG was closed because 
the CFG brought enough money to the table while the Legendary promised something valuable 
for the CFG.  
 
This also revealed that, ultimately, global film business comes down to dollar signs. For 
example, the Bechdel test—which requires scripts with major female characters who do not 
spend all their time talking about men and the male leads—introduced by the Swedish 
government last year seems like a feminist joke to many producers in Hollywood, as it would 
never survive multiplexes outside Sweden. Sweden’s eight million-strong audience are small 
potatoes for Hollywood. But if Beijing were to demand the same standard, it would be a 
different story. In the current difficult conditions of the capital markets along with the 
continuing volatility in the global media industries, what the studios are looking for from China 
is first and foremost, capital investment.  
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Village Roadshow Entertainment Group Asia is the frontrunner in creating and exploiting Sino-
foreign co-production deal structures. Launched in 2011, Village Roadshow Pictures Asia 
(VRPA) is a platform for undertaking the development, financing, production, marketing and 
distribution of feature films which are filmed principally in the Chinese language and designed 
for audiences in the Mainland China and other Greater China markets. It has established 
strategic partnerships with local producers, directors and media companies, as well as overseas 
alliances to bring international expertise and professional technical services to the Chinese 
market. So far VRPA has co-financed and co-produced Stephen Chow’s Journey to the West 
(2013), Say Yes! (2013), and more recently Keanu Reeves’ directorial debut Man of Tai Chi 
(2013).  
 
Zhang Xun, the president of China Film Co-Production Company (CFCC), emphasized at the 
US/China Film Summit in 2013 that, one crucial condition for a film to become a co-production 
is that the film should be heavily invested in Chinese culture and in presenting a positive image 
of all things Chinese. More specifically, a co-production needs to have a minimum of 20% 
Chinese investment, a joint script, and significantly to feature Chinese talent. It can be seen, 
therefore, that earning the title of co-production is not easy. Movies that initially seemed to get 
that privilege, Iron Man 3 (2013) and The Expendables 2 (2013), ended up being released in 
China without the title of co-productions. However, despite these glitches and barriers, it is the 
general tendency that more and more co-productions have been coming out. At the American 
Film Market in November 2017, executives from China’s top distributors and producers—
CFG, Enlight Media, Bona, Huayi Brothers, Beijing Galloping Horse and Wanda Group 
expressed many positive views about the future of co-productions in China starting this year. 
 





In considering the China-Hollywood relationship, we must also consider the role of U.S. mini-
studios that were founded with the help of generous start-up capital from China in recent years: 
Bob Simonds' STX Entertainment and Jeff Robinov's Studio 8. STX is by now a much more 
established studio than Global Road ever became. The company has 14 films slated for release 
in 2019, as well as two co-productions in development with Tencent and four more with Jack 
Ma's Alibaba Pictures. Founded in 2014, STX has targeted a perceived opportunity in star-
driven, midbudget moviemaking—which the major studios have turned away from—while 
also positioning itself to tap into China's growing pool of investment capital and fast-expanding 
box office. None other than Tang himself helped the company broker a major 18-picture slate 
investment from Chinese studio Huayi Brothers Media in 2015 (that deal recently ran its 
course), and the company also landed an array of high-profile Chinese equity investors— 
Tencent, Hony Capital, and Hong Kong’s PCCW—along with blue chip backers in the West 
like Liberty Global, TPG Capital and others. 
   
Combined with financial backer Hony Capital, STX is well-heeled push through as many films 
as any major Hollywood studio, however their deal structures are very different. The company 
is headed by Robert Simonds with the largest stakeholder being global private investment firm 
TPG Growth. They, along with Gigi Pritzker, have one ultimate goal: to become a major 
Hollywood studio… one step at a time. The mantra for the company seems to be “respect the 
capital”.  
 
6.3.3 Outsourcing and soft power 
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Another way for the indigenous film markets to be integrated into the global market is through 
runaway productions, which constitutes a major part of what Toby Miller called Global 
Hollywood. It is an important form of production used to describe the outsourcing of film work 
from Hollywood to cheaper foreign locales. It occurs when a Hollywood studio outsources and 
offshores parts of the production process to cultural workers clustered in media capitals that 
offer low-waged by skilled workforce, subsidies and tax breaks, desirable locational features 
such as sophisticated studio complexes, and favourable currency exchange rate. Both the film 
bureau and film professionals are keen to establish China as the next desirable runaway locale 
for Hollywood studios. Though this practice is still in its infant stage. China does have 
sophisticated film-studio complex situated in Beijing, Zhejiang, Qingdao, etc. But the major 
obstacle is how to build the confidence of overseas studios to move backlot or part of the 
production process to China. Compared to other runaway locales such as Australia where the 
government would cut studios a 40 percent rebate, Chinese government does not offer enough 
economic incentive. China has no subsidies or tax breaks like in Europe and while labor is 
cheaper, crews and equipment are not as good. 
 
Clearly it is not a media conglomerate, yet. However, it indicates the increasing involvement 
of non-media corporations in the film industry. The real estate mogul Wang Jianlin made a 
splash when he purchased America’s number two movie theatre chain AMC in 2012 which 
helped him successfully capture the attention of Hollywood’s leading players. In 2013 his 
ambition took a leaping step further by summoning Hollywood A-listers and major studio 
senior executives to Qingdao to participate in the unveiling of $8.2 billion Qingdao Oriental 
Movie Metropolis. 
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Technically it will be a difficult task to attract Hollywood runaway production deals to China 
in the immediate future due to the lack of a skilled workforce, the lack of agency and 
middleman who are needed to “make the deals happen”, as one executive of a Chinese media 
corporation confessed to me in a private interview, and the lack of competitive advantage 
compared to other global runaway locales for Hollywood such as New Zealand and Canada 
where the governments also provide generous tax breaks. After all, it is more about real estate 
than film business, even Wang Jianlin himself implied that in interviews. Wang got himself a 
great deal with local government in Qingdao as the land was traded at a price of 1800rmb/m2, 
way below the usual average price at that area, which makes it a land grab wrapped in a 
Hollywood story. The metropolis is hoping to facilitate tourism relying on the attraction of its 
entertainment facilities and boost business in other areas, like hotel and huge shopping mall 
located in the metropolis. 
 
Despite big ambitions, and pronouncements from Wang Jianlin (as discussed at length in 
chapter 5) that he was going to buy one of the major Hollywood studios, his company was 
ultimately handcuffed by the Chinese government amid a crackdown on capital flight and so-
called irrational investments. Jonathan Garrison, a former Goldman Sachs VP and current CEO 
of the Beijing investment consultancy EnRoute Global said that, “Since the start of last year 
[2013], Beijing has made it clear that capital from China will be focused on investment into 
core strategic sectors, with state owned enterprises taking the lead… The obtaining of approval 





   
 
 176 
Just before President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States in 2015, Warner Bros. announced 
a major agreement with China Media Capital (CMC), a giant investment fund backed by the 
Chinese government, to form a joint venture, Flagship Entertainment Group Limited. The new 
entity will develop, distribute and produce a slate of Chinese-language films, including global 
tent poles, for distribution in China and around the world.  
 
Flagship Entertainment will be 51 percent owned by a consortium of Chinese investors led by 
CMC, with Hong Kong broadcaster TVB holding 10 percent within the group. In 2015 it was 
announced that Warner Bros. would own the remaining 49 percent. Flagship plans were 
announced to develop, invest in, acquire and produce a wide range of films for distribution 
throughout China and around the world, utilising Warner Brothers’ unrivalled global film 
distribution network.125 
 
The key to a successful co-production, also the biggest obstacle, is find a universally 
accessible story that could transcend cultural and linguistic barriers. It [the story] should 
retain a hint of distinctive local flavour but repackaged in a way fitting easily into 
recognizable film genres, which have been standardised and practised by Hollywood 
for decades. (Personal interview with Huang, Beijing, 20th August 2014) 
 
6.3.4 Co-productions: a delicate balancing act 
 
Huang was the Vice President of Production and International Affairs of Desen International 
Media Co. Ltd (hereafter DSIM), a Beijing-based film company founded by renowned 
 
125 https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/warner-bros-china-media-capital-825025 
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producer Ann An in 2009. Huang got a master’s degree on communication and film studies 
from the United States and had worked there as a journalist for 6 years and another few years 
in the film business as an individual before coming back to China. He shifted his career path 
to film production and joined DSIM where he was put in the position in charge of all film 
projects that involves dealing with transnational co-operations, most of which with Hollywood 
companies. Huang got the position for his working experience in the US, particularly for his 
knowledge of “how things run in Hollywood” because he found that “when it comes to co-
production projects [with Hollywood], the first and foremost difficulty is understanding the 
way it works, thinks, and communicates” (Personal interview, Beijing, 20 August 2014).  
 
When I conducted the interview with Huang, he had been working on a co-production project 
for over three years. The script was adapted from a novel about a true story of a Chinese nurse 
named Rita Wong (Chinese name: Huang Huanxiao) who cared for injured U.S. Flying Tigers 
airmen during the World War II.126 Huang had high hopes for this film as he had invested 
tremendous amount of efforts in this project. At the time of the interview, Huang was excited 
for finding the perfect Hollywood screenwriter to adapt the novel into a movie scrip, who 
understood Chinese culture and had experiences dealing with Chinese film corporations. Dasen 
even held a press conference before this movie went into official shooting. In the end, the 
project didn’t happen according to plan, which is not unusual in the film business. What’s 
worse, the movie later released under a different title The Chinese Widow (烽火芳菲) in 2017, 




126 The Flying Tigers was the nickname for the first American Volunteer Group of the Chinese Air Force in 
1941-1942. The airmen, whose planes were painted with shark teeth, were known in China as “Fei Hu” (Flying 
Tigers) for their courage. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flying_Tigers  
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It must be emphasized that transnational collaborations are driven by a few elite figures with 
both industry experience and political connections who are powerful enough to navigate the 
landscape. Also there are number of elaborate sets of domestic and foreign alignments of 
principle which have to take place before one of these collaborations gets off the ground or is 
released. In China, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television 
must approve any movie before it can be screened. The 37-person committee, as noted in the 
U.S. government report “Directed by Hollywood, Edited by China”, has a mandate to ban all 
movies that are “anti-China.” It’s headed by a member of the Communist Party who worked 
for 10 years as the deputy director of Beijing’s propaganda department. Censorship is not just 
a domestic issue either.127 
 
In the case of Looper (2012), the filmmakers originally intended for the protagonist to go to 
Paris. But in order to access the Chinese market, the producers signed a co-production deal 
with a Chinese company that was contingent on switching the setting from Paris to Shanghai. 
The Chinese censors probably liked that the movie portrayed China, in the near future, as a 
more attractive place than France; they have balked at scenes that even slightly appear to 
malign China—such as a scene in Shanghai of clothes drying on clotheslines in Mission 
Impossible 3 (2006).  
 
The list of movies that have made changes to appeal to China’s censor board is a long one. The 
makers of Red Dawn (2012), a film that imagines a Chinese invasion of America, switched the 
invaders to North Korean. Leaked Sony emails reveal executives worrying about Chinese 
censors modifying key scenes (“Don’t think we can make a stand on it either way,” one wrote, 
 
127 https://priceonomics.com/hollywoods-new-chinese-censors/ - How Hollywood Changes Movies to Appease 
Foreign Censors 
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“too much money on the line, cross fingers we don’t have to cut the scene out.”), and the 
makers of the most recent China-set Karate Kid (2010) had the censors pre-approve their script.  
 
Chinese censors also demanded changes to the zombie flick World War Z (2013). The original 
script cited China as the source of the zombie outbreak, and the characters discussed how the 
Chinese government covered it up—a plotline that censors probably found too reminiscent of 
accusations that the Chinese government covered up a SARS outbreak in 2003. The filmmakers 
changed the location of the fictional outbreak to Russia! 
 
All of these examples demonstrate that it is far from easy for foreign players to undertake film 
business in China given China’s complex and volatile political economic and ideological 
environment. In order to enter the Chinese film market, foreign films must jump through 
dreadful bureaucratic hoops including qualifying for film import quota, censorship, the 
scheduling system, and the revenue sharing model, etc. This urges foreign studios to join forces 
with Chinese companies, either by establishing jointly owned companies or through co-
production deals with domestic companies.  
 
Next to censorship, which is not in itself conceived in a protectionist way, another tool utilized 
by the Chinese government to protect its own film industry is a blackout period for Hollywood 
blockbusters. Amy Liu, Vice President of EntGroup, a research firm, pointed out that the film-
opening schedule is an important protectionist tool. In July 2018, typically a big month for 
movies, for example, no new Hollywood blockbusters were permitted on Chinese screens. Liu 
adds that subsidies and preferential taxation also favours local firms. 
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From storytelling nous to animation wizardry, Hollywood studios are still far ahead. So why 
are Hollywood producers still so keen to do business when they know their audiences are going 
to be curtailed through these means? The answer may be found in China’s unusual and 
innovative business models.  
 
When it comes to the integration of the Internet into the film business, “China beats Hollywood 
hands down,” Mr Shiao argues. He thinks innovation in this area at Western firms is stifled by 
concerns about such things as pay-television rights and DVD sales—markets that never took 
off in China. Free of such legacy issues, Chinese firms are experimenting with their business 
models to develop new online revenue streams and to enhance fan engagement on social media. 
The producer of Monkey King: Hero is Back (2015), an animated film, crowdfunded the movie 
through WeChat, a Chinese messaging app, promising to add the names of investors’ children 
to the film credits if they gave over 100,000 yuan ($16,000) each; the film raised over 7m yuan 
this way. The internet has also become an important distribution channel. Alibaba, Tencent and 
Baidu, China’s biggest internet firms, are all investing in online video. As in America, revenues 
from streaming services are expected to surpass takings at the box office in a few years. Local 
filmgoers, for their part, are increasingly young and technology savvy: 63% of movie tickets 
are now bought online, compared to 13% in America. Even if Hollywood does not find a pot 
of gold in China, it may be there that it learns what the future of the global film business holds. 
 
There are only two ways for films made abroad to enter the Chinese market: 34 big foreign 
productions a year are let in via a quota system; Chinese firms are also allowed to acquire the 
rights to 30 to 40 smaller foreign films a year for a fixed fee. To bypass these tedious 
procedures, the most convenient way is through co-production projects involving domestic 
capital, transnational capital, and sometimes the Chinese state.  
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The global film market has long been dominated by Hollywood. However, its dominance is 
not built solely on the claim of the so-called universal appeal of its movies’ subject matter. It 
has a long history of engagement with the political economic power shifts across the world. 
The European film industries were decimated after world war I and since then the U.S. turned 
its position from a net importer to an exporter of movies. The state and commerce department 
joined Hollywood to push the exports through a series of policies and services. World War II 
offered another shock to European industries, and then Hollywood used the Marshall plan of 
reconstruction as a tool to require recipients to open up their markets immediately to U.S. 
cinema. Since that time, a combination of the state exerting economic pressure, the ability to 
clear production costs domestically, and the use of the international division of cultural labor 
has kept Hollywood in its position of global dominance. Despite the rapid growth rate of the 
Chinese film industry, it is in no position to challenge the hegemonic position of Hollywood.  
This is a lasting concern for any research on what supposed to be the traditional “peripheral” 
culture trying to survive the decades old plight of cultural imperialism. The whole thesis may 
be obsolete, but the residual spirit is still haunting the third world. 
 
Su (2016) critically and historically reviews the process of China’s encounter with global 
Hollywood from 1994 to 2008, in the light of extensive cultural debates regarding the possible 
impacts of Hollywood on the Chinese film industry and changing cultural policies acting as 
counter-hegemonic strategies in response to global Hollywood. Since 1994, China started to 
adopt the conventional practice of revenue-sharing to import ten foreign mega-productions per 
year. The number rose to 20 after China joined the WTO and rose again to 34 in 2014 after 
Xi’s visit to the US. A prominent yet unnoticed case is that, China’s state-owned film company 
China Film Group made an “eight-figure” equity investment in two forthcoming projects by 
Thomas Tull’s Legendary Entertainment feature-film projects, Seventh Son and Warcraft. The 
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investment marked the first time the state film colossus China Film has taken a stake in 
Hollywood films.  
 
China has reached several prominent cooperative film deals with multiple nations including 
the US, UK, India, South Korean, etc.  Handshakes have been exchanged between top level 
executives, though not necessarily from film companies. CEOs from media conglomerates and 
e-commerce giants can be easily spotted in film industry forums. It is the industry that seems 
everyone is trying to get a foothold. Chris Morgan, the American screenwriter whose writing 
credits include The Fast and the Furious franchise, describing the Sino-Hollywood relationship 
metaphorically: “from a worldwide marketing perspective … the two sides that are fighting are 
sort of Axis and Allies, but it’s not specified who the Axis are, so any country with a movie 
theatre can be on the side of the Allies.”128In April 2015, an investment banker named Donald 




This chapter has demonstrated that Hollywood is an avid pursuer of Sino-foreign co-production 
projects and that Hollywood is also the venue to which most Chinese producers look in terms 
of collaboration and pushing the industrial boundaries. In the face of continuing weak 
performances and a rapidly changing business environment, studio executives cannot afford to 
overlook any potential market for financing and profit. Box-office revenues outside America 
are growing two and a half times as fast as they are domestically. One executive of film 
 
128 Though not specifically stated in the quote, Chris Morgan are referring to Hollywood and China as the two 
sides in the context. See The mogul of the middle, The New Yorker, January 11, 2016 Issue, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/01/11/the-mogul-of-the-middle. 
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production company I spoke to even called the international box office “the lifeboat on the 
Titanic”.  
 
Many Hollywood studios are already engaging with local players and establishing production-
distribution footholds of various kinds. Side-by-side, according to one executive of Chinese 
media corporation whom I interviewed, many Chinese studies and companies are also actively 
looking for opportunities to form strategic alliances with Hollywood studios, such as the mini-
studio Lionsgate (Entertainment Corporation).  
 
Awareness of what a strong entertainment industry means for the Chinese economy at large is 
increasing. My interviews suggest that it won’t come as a surprise within the next decade when 
a Chinese conglomerate buys up a U.S. production company. Therefore it is understandable 
that the indigenous market is witnessing serious redevelopment, while comparatively, in spite 
of the relaxing of quotas, imported movies have not yet made a major breakthrough.  
 
The Chinese government implements a complex regulatory system to decrease the market share 
of imported Hollywood films for theatrical release. The import quota, censorship, and 
competitive release-scheduling policies in particular severely limit Hollywood’s access to the 
Chinese market. However, because the government has a monopoly on film distribution and 
receives nearly half of all box office receipts from Hollywood films, the profit incentive is 
comparatively more important than protectionist motives in the decision to import a Hollywood 
film or grant it a revenue-sharing quota slot. Economics have also come to play a major role in 
what used to be a highly censorious environment for the making of films. As in the case of A 
Touch of Sin that I examined in this chapter, in lieu of a harsh crack down on the making of 
critical films and ones with social conscience, the new Chinese censorship strategy is simply 
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to ignore films that appear critical of their policies, making them invisible for the general public, 
and leading them to fail at the box office. 
 
Meanwhile Chinese mainstream film productions have stepped up their game and Hollywood 
is still losing ground in China, with Chinese films accounting for about 56 percent box office 
receipts. However, these statistics, like many others, also cannot just be taken at face value. 
This situation is by no means the defeat of Hollywood and the victory of the Chinese film 
industry. Indeed, as I showed in regard to the tensions between the ideological and cultural 
features of films which do very well in China, Chinese films have not in any way cracked the 
conundrum of international markets – in fact, they themselves are losing ground even in the 
realm of arthouse movies, and cannot seem to secure the liking of audiences outside China. 
This curious situation means that while capital is becoming more and more globalized  in the 
Chinese and foreign film industries, and while influence over ideas and cultural representation 
is converging through the control exerted by major Chinese funders, there remains a wide gap 
between the tastes of the majority of Chinese movie viewers and those of their counterparts 
outside China’s borders.  
 
Finally, China’s integration into the world film market which has been accelerated after 
China’s entry into WTO has brought about great artistic and political challenges for the local 
film industry to produce a commercially viable, culturally authentic, and yet “politically 
correct” films. Miller (2003) perceptively pointed out the struggle shared by many national 
cinemas between building a viable sector of the economy and providing a national cinema that 
is able to critically reflect upon society through film representation. In the face of tight 
censorship and the encroachment of Hollywood, possible results for the Chinese film industry 
are that directors, as in the case of Zhang, are pushed further and further away from social 
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realities, gradually losing touch with the experiences of ordinary people’s lives, and ultimately 
snarled in finding a proper way to narrate national history, myth and culture which is not 
offensive to the government or to the West, relying on supposedly universal values appealing 
to Western consumers, at the expense of political substance, artistic innovation and self-
reflexivity. 
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CHAPTER 7 HOLLYWOODIZING CHINESE CINEMA 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I shift attention away from institutional re-arrangements of Chinese cinema to 
content, that is, concrete film texts, in an attempt to investigate the exposition of a 
neoliberalizing cinema through its expression at a textual level. My objective is to present 
observations with regard to the changing features of filmic content of Chinese cinema in the 
post-WTO era. All the chosen films here are within the timeframe of 2002-2017 as discussed 
in chapter 1. 
 
How changing socioeconomic and cultural forces shape the aesthetics and ideologies of 
entertainment products is one of the central concerns for any political economic research on 
entertainment media. In reading texts to access their exemplification of the larger political 
economic issues as I hope to do in this chapter, the dilemma is the question of the gap between 
textual analysis in relation to its context and the long-debated lack of reliability of textual 
“reflections” on the socioeconomic and political context.  
 
I therefore clarify that the analysis of film texts in this chapter and previous ones by no means 
takes the film texts per se as objects of historical mobilization for the entire film industry in 
the same way that policy documents are. The intention is not trying to answer ontological, 
epistemological or aesthetic questions through the meticulous reading of movie sequences. 
Neither has this thesis tried to extract any kind of “truth” about the reality within which the 
movie is made through analysis of sequences and representations in the movie. Rather, the 
purpose of doing a very limited “textual analysis” of filmic content now is to illustrate the ways 
in which the negotiation and contestation among various social political and economic factors 
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manifest themselves in choices made about the content, including contingencies that might be 
overlooked by an entirely macro- or meso-level study.  
 
I break down analysis into three sections. Section 7.2 and 7.3 revolve around the phenomenon 
of dapian, or the so-called Chinese blockbuster. Unlike the main melody film, I do not view 
Chinese blockbuster as an established film category that could fit into the classification system 
consisting of main melody films, commercial films, and art films (see section 1.1). These are 
not mutually exclusive definitive terms; hence, a main melody film can also be analyzed as a 
Chinese blockbuster. Here I use the term “Chinese blockbuster” to describe a constellation of 
films that are varied manifestations of a neoliberalizing cinema. The first part is dedicated to 
three films by Zhang Yimou. What is of particular significance here is how Zhang Yimou 
navigates through a convoluted web of forces shaped by multiple players, including the Party-
state, domestic capital, transnational capital, and his personal artistic vision. Then I concentrate 
on commercialized main melody films, epitomized by the famous Founding of New China 
trilogy. As the most recognizable film category in Chinese cinema history, I look at how this 
specific film type has evolved during the course of 2002-2017 in light of China’s rapidly 
changing political economic condition, and its position in the global order. I conclude these 
two sections by zooming in on the most recent commercial hit Wolf Warrior 2 (2017) directed 
by Wu Jing, applauded by the film authorities as a perfect mixture of Chinese blockbuster and 
main melody film. In section 7.4, I put the exclusive nature inherent in a neoliberalizing cinema 
at the center of discussion by asking the question, whose “Chinese dream” is articulated and 
represented on the big screen and in what ways, while whose dreams are now nowhere to be 
found?  
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7.2 One man’s show:  Hero (2002), The Flowers of War (2011), The Great Wall (2016) 
 
Once seen as an edgy filmmaker whose work was frowned upon—and sometimes banned—by 
authorities, Zhang Yimou gained international fame for his early art house films made in the 
late 1980s and 1990s. However, Zhang’s filmmaking career steered to a different direction at 
the turn of the century when he decided to ride the wave of marketization of the Chinese film 
industry and turned to mainstream commercial filmmaking, leaving behind the defiant spirit at 
the heart of his art films. A list of commercial blockbusters helped Zhang garnered excellent 
box office records as well as public condemnation for choosing scale effects over intrinsic 
quality, though his fame and social cultural status climbed to new height after he directed the 
opening ceremony of Beijing Olympics. Once the subversive now has been co-opted to be the 
most powerful mainstream legitimate filmmaker in China, which some have dubbed a sell-out 
by some critics and domestic audience.  
 
However behind this seemingly striking shift we can identify some continuity in Zhang 
Yimou’s filmmaking career. It would be a misunderstanding to think Zhang has only started to 
care about making profits from movie since Hero (2002). In fact commercial success has 
always been a motivational force for him. However, his efforts dwindled in the context of a 
bleak domestic film industry in the 80s and 90s. This also explains why the discussion of 
(suffering) women in his films has always been conducted within a frame of orientalism/self-
orientalism and transnational consumerism (Grossman, 2002). Therefore we cannot see 
Zhang’s “degeneration” into a commercial filmmaker as being a result of a sudden ideological 
change, but rather it should be viewed as emblematic of overall industrial changes, and the new 
possibilities of the market. 
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7.2.1 Where it begins: Hero (2002) 
 
Upon China’s accession into the WTO, there was a palpable sense of urgency in the Chinese 
film industry to catch up to Hollywood on the industrial front. In the face of a sluggish domestic 
film market at the turn of the century, Zhang Yimou reinvented Chinese traditional wuxia genre 
in the form of martial arts period drama, often deemed a conscious attempt to replicate 
Hollywood high-concept blockbuster. Apart from possessing the usual cachet of Hollywood 
blockbusters such as slick and sophisticated production values and all-star cast, these Chinese 
blockbusters are distinguished for spectacular martial arts display, and sometimes enviable 
support from the Chinese film authorities. For instance, Hero was premiered at the Great Hall 
of the People, a venue normally used for legislative and ceremonial activities by the 
government of the CCP.129 Hero’s commercial breakthrough paved the way for a string of 
Chinese blockbusters in the ensuing few years, including Zhang Yimou’s House of Flying 
Daggers (2004), Curse of the Golden Flower (2006), Chen Kaige’s The Promise (2005), and 
Feng Xiaogang’s The Banquet (2006). 
 
It is not a coincidence that Hero came right after Ang Lee’s critically acclaimed and 
commercially successful movie Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), which was often 
considered as a momentous landmark for Chinese-language movies on the global cinematic 
landscape. According to Zhang, he had been working on the script for many years, which 
originally planned to be a low-to-medium budget arthouse movie like his previous ones. When 
Crouching Tiger became a commercial hit in Hollywood and won the Best Foreign Picture at 
Oscar, Zhang hesitated whether he should put the project on hold for fear that people would 
criticize him for jumping on the bandwagon (Yang, 2017). However, Hong Kong producer Bill 
 
129 http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2002/Dec/246677.htm  
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Kong, who produced Crouching Tiger, encouraged Zhang to make the film after learning about 
this project and promised an all-star cast. Hence, an intended arthouse film turned into a 
massive-scale blockbuster that transcended national boundaries. Two years after Hero’s 
Chinese release, Miramax opened the film in U.S. theatres under the persuasion of Quentin 
Tarantino, eventually making it one of the highest-grossing foreign language films and martial 
arts films in North American box office history, and the first Chinese dapian. Without doubt, 
Zhang’s renowned status in both the domestic market and abroad due to his artisan movies 
circulated through international film festivals in the 1980s and 1990s made the highest budget 
Chinese film up to date possible.  
 
Chinese film critic Liming Zhou, also known as Raymond Zhou, considers Hero the first 
endeavour of the Chinese film community to cope with the grim reality that Chinese films had 
to compete with foreign films, majority of which were imported Hollywood blockbusters, on 
an equal footing. This opinion was shared by other seasoned industry practitioners based on all 
the interviews I conducted.  
 
Hero (2002) represented a watershed in the history of the Chinese film industry. 
Chinese filmmakers were forced to accept the fact that once the import quota increased 
[in compliance with WTO agreements], they had to compete with Hollywood films 
head on. Hero was China’s answer to the challenge. On the one hand, for Chinese films 
to stand a chance in competition for market share with 20 foreign films that were largely 
Hollywood blockbusters, film practitioners decided to follow suit and play the game on 
Hollywood’s term, that is, producing our own blockbusters. On the other hand, films 
with high production values were considered the best way to combat rampant movie 
piracy at the time and lure audience back to cinema. Hero signalled the beginning of a 
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new era when film workers put the pursuit of economic benefit on the top of their 
agenda, blatantly, and with blessings from the film authorities. (Personal interview with 
Zhou, Beijing, 15th July 2013) 
 
What’s also imperative for industrial elites such as Zhang Yimou was transform Chinese 
cinema into a storyteller of the Chinese history, values and culture through the universal 
language of cinema. As Zhang Wanmin put it, Zhang’s decision of making Hero was “not only 
a calculated move from a business point of view, but also an intuitive choice out of nationalistic 
impetus” (Personal interview with Zhang, Beijing, 15th August 2013). However, his comment 
of “nationalistic impetus” had another layer of meaning. For a movie like Hero to be produced, 
marketed, and released on such a grand scale, “it was vital to get the nod from the Film Bureau 
on the ideological front, after all, it is business and if it [nationalism] helps the movie to sell, 
it’s part of the package” (ibid).  
 
One of the narrative strategies for a globalized Chinese film was thus to deliver a sense of 
cultural authenticity and cultural universality at once. To make globalized local cultural 
products, producers tend to give their work a universal spin, conveying values such as a 
balanced view of personal freedom and social obligation, or make use of foreign (Chinese) 
cultural symbols and myths that are already familiar to Western audiences, such as Feng’s The 
Banquet, which is a loose adaptation of Shakespeare’s tragedy Hamlet. 
 
However, soon filmmakers found out that this routine does not work magic anymore. On the 
one hand, the domestic audience is getting tired of this genre which they consider to have no 
substance but only style. Moreover, for the audience it becomes increasingly hard to distinguish 
one film from another. On the other hand, these movies are not received well by international 
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markets, except Hero. After all, it is difficult to cross cultural psychic distances to appreciate 
cultural differences without feeling at least somewhat alienated, and self-orientalism is a tool 
that will only work so many times (Yan & Santos, 2009).  
 
7.2.2 The Flowers of War (2011) 
 
A reading of The Flowers of War yields interesting insights when the film is juxtaposed with 
Zhang’s early films—represented by Red Sorghum (1988), Raise The Red Lantern (1991), and 
The Story of Qiu-Ju (1992)—which are adaptations from post-Mao avant-garde literature that 
aims to subvert socialist ideology by constructing alternative narration of national history. 
Alongside accolades earned through the circuit of international film festivals for artistic merits, 
these art films have also attracted criticism among film scholars and cultural critics for playing 
into the hands of self-orientalism (Yu, 2008). One common critique is that the political 
messages embedded in the original literary works are undermined when expressed 
cinematically in the form of ahistorical oriental visual spectacles for the viewing pleasure of 
Western audiences. The political implication of sexuality, which can only be understood in 
reference to local experience, is displaced into discourse of orientalism. By creating a 
feminized China on screen, Zhang’s early films render the Western audiences the authoritative 
position to read the non-Western other as feminized object. In a sense, the films become “the 
cinematic construction and representation of the Chinese nation [thereby turned into the object] 
for the [active] gaze of the West” (Lu, 1997: 126). As Zhang Yiwu (1993) puts it, Zhang is 
“part of the cultural and ideological apparatuses of the discourse of Western postcolonialism 
in the 1990s”. Another critique is about the “authenticity” of the films. Critics question to what 
extent can local audience relate themselves to the China displayed on screen. Put aside these 
commentaries, I would argue that they couldn’t overshadow and discredit the Zhang’s intention 
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and efforts to express a spirit of resistance, the courage and ability to reflect upon the past, 
tradition, and social reality. 
 
The Flowers of War attests to the validity of the self-orientalizing critique to a certain degree. 
The film’s original title was The Heroes of Nanking, but it was changed midstream to 
emphasize the soft and woman-centred aspects of the storyline. When Zhang was asked about 
why chose to turn this novel into movie, he replied: “The story of the Rape of Nanking has 
been told before in films, and is a very political and serious subject, but what intrigued me 
about this story was that it’s actually told from the female perspective, so it’s more humane 
and has a personal touch.”130 
 
In the film, Zhang uses a convent girl Shujuan as the narrator whose gaze at the prostitutes is 
repeatedly presented and highlighted. The prostitutes’ sexuality is accentuated through 
Shujuan’s peeping. One possible reading is that through Shujuan’s peeping, Zhang intends to 
ease and eliminate the tension between the girls and prostitutes as two exclusive social groups 
grounded in the ideas about virtues. It is a process of liberating female sexuality in the form of 
reconciling the relation between convent girl and prostitute. However, it is problematic because 
the deep-rooted cleavage between girls and prostitutes might be erased in the mind of the girls; 
there is no evidence to suggest the same for the prostitutes or the audiences. What is ironic 
about the relationship the director tries so hard to establish between the prostitutes and the girls, 
a bond of friendship, or sisterhood, is that it is built on two premises that other the prostitutes: 
the fundamental difference between them in terms of the absence or presence of virginity; and 
the prostitutes’ act of sacrificing themselves to save the supposedly “innocent” girls.  
 
 
130 http://www.chinanews.com/yl/2011/12-21/3547669.shtml  
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The way the film portrays the prostitutes as self-sacrificing in fact reinforces the entrenched 
view of Chinese female chastity and purity, fusing a Western with a Chinese orientalist 
stereotype, and using death as a cleansing and reconciliatory mechanism. The lonely and 
dangerous journey for those prostitutes at the end is of course a tragedy but presented as a 
heroic action in the name of redemption. Also, the shift in subject of gaze from male to female 
character does not change the object of gaze, in this case, the prostitutes. In the film the 
prostitutes are presented in a highly sexualized way. Their appearances fit the imagination 
people have of the typical 1930s oriental female beauty: brilliant red lips, fine-trimmed 
eyebrows, slanted eyes, fluffy and shining-black hair and tight colorful silk cheongsam. There 
are several scenes in which they are poetically shot. One is the clothes-changing scene when 
the prostitutes slowly unbuttoned their showy cheongsams and let them slip down their bodies, 
then spin round and round to wrap their naked bodies. Another scene is when they give a 
farewell performance for the girls. The victimized convent girls symbolize a feminized and 
hence unthreatening China, who is ultimately saved by a Western white male. The narrative 
structure reveals the fact that this film plays to deeply orientalist themes once again, and with 
even less pretence than previous Zhang films.  
 
Not only does this film fail to change an entrenched patriarchal view of feminine virtue, it also 
enlarges the possibility of the audience’s enjoyment of quasi-pornographic beauty by shooting 
the prostitutes in a deeply objectified way. The “decadent” bodies of the prostitutes are 
supposedly utilized to subvert stereotypes towards them as fallen women, yet it is exactly the 
decadence of their bodies that makes the film possible to feed the scopophilic pleasure of the 
spectators via the sensual display of their bodies. This interestingly indicates some kind of 
continuity in Zhang’s filmmaking mentality and echoes Ray Chow’s argument about Zhang’s 
previous films: “the Chinese films that manage to make their way to audiences in the West are 
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usually characterized, first of all, by visual beauty… we see that contemporary Chinese 
directors are themselves so fascinated by the possibilities of cinematic experimentation that 
even when their subject matter is—and it usually is—oppression, contamination, rural 
backwardness, and the persistence of feudal values, such subject matter is presented with 
stunning sensuous qualities.” (1995: 54). 
 
If there was some genuine political significance of resistance existing in Zhang’s previous 
films, in The Flowers of War Chinese women as a group are completely sold out to the 
patriarchally and racially charged commodifying gaze of the imagined audience, regardless of 
whether this happens to be a domestic or western one. Ironically, this practical strategy 
backfired, with the film receiving heavy criticism in the western world and poor box office 
performances, which presaged the dramatic end of the long-term partnership between Zhang 
Yimou and Zhang Weiping, the executive producer. The split between them may involve many 
reasons and it is impossible to uncover the real story, as Zhang Yimou kept silent in the face 
of Zhang Weiping’s fierce personal attacks in mass media. The only response from Zhang 
Yimou was the view he insinuated on the importance of choosing the right working partner 
who shares the same value system. Without taking sides and well aware of the complexity of 
the story, it is reasonable to say that this comment speaks something about the conflicts 
between the pressure of commercial pursuit and creative autonomy reflected in the two Zhang’s 
relationship since publicly, one represents art and the other represents capital.  
 
The Flowers of War has demonstrated once again Zhang Yimou’s masterful skills in terms of 
telling local stories to global audiences and proved his high adaptivity to the ever-changing 
political economic context. However, in the hope of achieving intercultural accessibility and 
appeal, this film fails to take a point of view when telling a crucial chapter of national history, 
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rather packaging its voice as that of a positionlessness and universal global cultural commodity, 
aiming at becoming the Chinese version of Saving Private Ryan (1998). In order to create a 
globalized visual feast, universalized and accessible themes with the capability of easily 
traveling across cultural differences are indispensable. Zhang himself has explicitly expressed 
this view: 
 
No matter what wars or disasters happen in history, what surrounds these times is life, 
love, salvation and humanity. I hope those things are felt in this story. The human side 
of the story was more important to me than the background of the Nanjing massacre. 
Human nature, love and sacrifice—these are the things that are truly eternal. For me, 
the event is the historical background of the film. But the enduring question of the story 
is how the human spirit is expressed in wartime. (Zhang, 2011) 
 
The emphasis on humanistic factors clearly displays an effort to distinguish the film from 
previous ones depicting the same subject that were written off as unilateral propaganda, and to 
fend off potential criticism of patriotic sentiments. This film achieves this by deliberately 
diluting the nationalist sentiment through a portrait of the Japanese army with multiple layers. 
Instead of demonizing the Japanese army, this film adds a humanistic dimension for them. In 
one scene, a Japanese officer visits the church and apologizes for his subordinates killing a 
convent girl. Then he sits down in front of an organ and plays a Japanese folk song, at which 
point other Japanese officers join him in song to express their homesickness.  
 
For the realm of mainstream filmmaking where the logic of commercialization has much higher 
stakes than it does in underground filmmaking, self-censorship is so prevalent that the political 
elements are of even less concern to officials. The fact that Zhang’s proposal of using white 
   
 
 197 
male as the protagonist in The Flowers of War passed censorship speaks far less of his courage 
in pushing political boundaries and more of the agreement reached between him and the 
authorities about the primary goal of achieving commercial success. It also comes as no 
surprise that to compensate this narrative choice, Zhang strengthens and highlights the heroism 
of Chinese male soldiers in the first third of the film until the death of Major Li, played by 
Tong Dawei, which ironically and astonishingly echoes the storyline of City of Life and Death 
(2009), in which the narrative perspective of a Chinese male soldier dominates the first third 
of the film too. This resonates with the unequal power relations and cultural exchanges in the 
landscape of the global film industry. The desire to tap into the US film market requires a 
storyline that is culturally accessible, which clearly risks losing both cultural specificity and 
critical political commentary.  
 
7.2.3 A failed Sino-US co-production: The Great Wall (2016) 
 
Another landmark of Zhang Yimou’s directing career is the film The Great Wall (2016), the 
biggest Hollywood-China co-production ever with an estimated budget of $150 million. The 
production of The Great Wall signified the return of Zhang Yimou as the industry trailblazer, 
who once single-handedly established with Hero and now elevated the standard for Chinese 
blockbuster.  
 
The opportunity of making a big-budget movie like The Great Wall came to me at a 
point of my career when the external environment created the necessary condition for 
it to be made. I was approached by Legendary Entertainment about the script and first 
declined, because as far as I know, it will just be another typical Hollywood blockbuster 
which I wasn’t interested in. However, my manager told me that the true value of The 
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Great Wall does not lie in the story itself, but the prospect that this movie will be 
released in more than 5000 cinemas across the world with the help of Hollywood’s 
global distribution network. That struck me and I was instantly intrigued by the idea 
that a Chinese story told by Chinese people gets global release, which is unprecedented 
and will be a true co-production, in every sense of the term. There is a saying in China  
借船出海, meaning taking advantage of others’ resources to achieve our own objective. 
The significance of The Great Wall is not the film per se, but that we can ride the tide 
of Hollywood big studio’s unrivalled global film distribution network to help Chinese 
films reach audience as wide as possible. (Zhang, 2016)131 
 
The epic flop of The Great Wall brought to an end of tenacious endeavours by the Chinese film 
industry to produce Chinese blockbusters tailored mainly for a global audience, and of the 
Hollywood studios to further exploit China’s explosive film market. Finding a Hollywood-
China co-production that works in China and internationally has become a driving interest for 
many studios, and Legendary has been particularly focused on trying to track down the 
breakout film. However, as Clark Xu of China Media Capital (hereafter CMC) shrewdly 
pointed out, that “nobody has cracked the code on creating stories that can work in both China 
and the West.”132 
 
The conscious choice to produce a Hollywoodized Chinese blockbuster aiming at global film 
market requires various narrative strategies. For example, war film is a perfect way of narrating 
national history, provoking nationalist sentiments and fostering a sense of national identity. 
Sino-Japanese war has served as the most important and convenient symbolic event through 
 
131 https://www.jiemian.com/article/1022940.html  
132 http://www.economist.com/news/business/21674821-chinas-booming-film-market-tantalising-hard-crack-
lost-shangywood 
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which nationalism and patriotism can be easily evoked among Chinese people and allowed to 
be expressed within limits. This national trauma has been represented in films repeatedly as it 
can not only easily evoke ordinary audience’s nationalist sentiment which to a certain extent 
assures its performance at the box office, but also can attract state support so readily that 
content is negotiable when interests of politics and commerce conflict. It is a subject with little 
political risk as long as it is narrated in line with official discourse.  
 
Another example of Zhang’s effort to “bringing the West and East together organically” 
(Zhang, 2011) is to find a foreigner to play the priest who originally in Yan Geling’s novel is 
a Chinese. Though Zhang implied once in an interview that the film censorship authorities had 
concern about this storyline, he however convinced them through a slow pace of negotiation. 
In my reading, the political consideration is still the top concern for authorities without doubt. 
However, like the invisible contract the party has established with underground filmmakers, as 
long as their films does not directly talk about social political taboos or make explicit reference 
to current social problems to the extent that party could not tolerate, they can express self-
identity the way they like (Pickowicz, 2006). The boundary of free expression is premised upon 
a certain distance between public and private life.  
 
From the outset, the production of all three films is in part driven by Chinese filmmaker’s 
global envision and authorities’ culture-oriented soft power ambition. To meet a unified global 
standard set by Hollywood blockbuster, Chinese dapian is featured by huge budget, star power, 
splendid spectacles, flamboyant marketing and global distribution, a highly marketable and 
easily comprehensible theme. This particular film category which Zhang has helped to build 
speaks volume for the changing dynamic both within and around the Chinese film industry at 
large. It may run the risk of simplifying a complex situation to argue that Chinese blockbuster 
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is a product of complicity among many different parties: the film director, the producer, the 
state, and transnational capital. However, it would also be an understatement to deny the 
intricate power dynamics between them, each with their respective agenda to push forward.  
 
The intention of singling out three films out of a large body of work is not give evaluation of 
or pass judgment on Zhang’s entire directing career spanning almost four decades. It would be 
extremely unfair to do so. Although many have suggested that Zhang Yimou has sold out 
completely to commercial global blockbusters with no real substance or connection with daily 
grind, in a paper he penned for The New York Times titled “What Hollywood looks like from 
China” in December 2017, he asked the question that Chinese audiences provide Hollywood 
with huge profits, but what does China’s film industry gain in return? This suggests that Zhang 
was aware of the possibility of losing “our unique values and aesthetics in the shadow of 
Hollywood blockbusters” (Zhang, 2017). 
 
7.3 Commercialized main melody film: “tribute movie”, Wolf Warrior 2 (2017) 
 
In this section, I examine how the changes in the nexus of politics and capital since 2002 have 
led to a reinvention of the Chinese main melody or propaganda film. Classic main melody films 
were mainly designed to put across views in tune with official policies in an easily digestible 
manner, with an almost total disregard for profit and viability on the commercial front. 
However, in the past decade or so, the Chinese film industry has witnessed a re-orientation in 
this particular genre in terms of the blending in of commercial elements to secure market profits, 
alongside the original propagandistic purpose. With the dual objectives of achieving political 
correctness and maximizing market effects, politics and capital form a complicit partnership. 
Films such as The Knot (2006), City of Death and Life (2008), Confucius (2010), and 
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Aftershock (2010) all fall into this category. Xu named this particular type the “politically 
customized commercial movie” (政治定制商业片), taking Tsui Hark’s The Taking of a Tiger 
Mountain (2014) 133 as an example (Personal interview with Xu, 14th August 2013). 
 
The most prominent exemplar is the trilogy of Founding of New China commissioned by the 
film regulators and produced by CFG to commemorate important historical events for China. 
Known as “tribute movie” (献礼片), the trilogy consists of The Founding of a Republic (2009), 
The Founding of a Party (2011),  both directed by Han Sanping and Huang Jianxin, and The 
Founding of an Army (2017) by Hong Kong director Andrew Lau. The Founding of a Republic 
is made to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the PRC. It tells the history of how sixty years ago 
Mao’s CCP overcame Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang, in the civil war 
to establish the PRC. To attract a younger, Internet-savvy generation, this film breaks the 
pattern of regular propaganda films with its star-studded cast, featuring nearly 200 of the best-
known stars in China. The film endeavours to obliterate all kinds of ambiguities, complications 
and contradictions surrounding history, but rather affirms a sense of “we” who have all suffered 
through China’s bitter and humiliating history and now are moving forward to build a stronger, 
unified, and ever-more-prosperous nation together. The Founding of a Party, also known as 
Beginning of the Great Revival, is to mark the 90th anniversary of the CCP, narrating the history 
of the formation of the CCP, beginning with the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and ending 
with the Party’s founding congress in 1921. The most recent addition to the trilogy is made for 
the 90th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army. Another movie that falls 
into the same category is 1911 (2011), also known as Xinhai Revolution and The 1911 
 
133 The story is based on a conflict between the People’s Liberation Army of China and a bandit gang that takes 
place in northwest China in the winter of 1946, a period in which civil war raged throughout the land. The most 
feared of all the bandits is Lord Hawk (Tony Leung), who commands an army of thousands from his fortress 
atop Tiger Mountain. 
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Revolution. This historical drama is a tribute to the 100th anniversary of the “Xinhai Revolution” 
(辛亥革命).134 Film scholar Dai Jinhua (2012) poignantly points out the depoliticized nature 
shared by all those movies, in the sense that the awareness of class divisions and class 
subjectivities which were at the core of traditional revolutionary narratives have been reduced 
to power struggles detached from a specific historical and ideological context.135  
 
Another prominent example is Wolf Warrior 2 (2017), the most successful propaganda 
blockbuster to date. This Rambo-style action adventure has become the all-time highest-
grossing film at the Chinese box office. Its phenomenal commercial success lies partly in 
incorporating Hollywood filmmaking conventions with China’s current nationalist ambitions, 
which is embodied in the film’s telling tagline “Anyone who offends China will be killed no 
matter how far the target is”. The film revolves around a covert rescue mission when rebels 
overrun a town in an unnamed African country. Leng Feng, a Chinese special forces soldier 
played by Wu Jing, is sent in to save Chinese businessmen and locals held by Western 
mercenaries. People’s Daily gave a fervent review of Wolf Warrior 2 for its portrait of a 
“superhero of Chinese style”, who showed “fearless heroism and responsibility” and “evoked 
passion for patriotism”. 136  It is worth noting that the authorities’ rave about this film is 
delivered in a depoliticized manner. The review attributes the film’s popularity among the 
audience to its “respect for the market” and “promoting positive energy”, instead of its blatant 
nationalist expression. Chinese superhero is praised for transcending the individual heroism 
embedded in western superhero narratives and seeking for love and justice for the humankind 
 
134 The Xinhai Revolution (辛亥革命), also known as the Chinese Revolution or the Revolution of 1911, was a 
revolution that overthrew China’s last imperial dynasty (the Qing dynasty) and established the Republic of 
China (ROC).  
135 https://www.guancha.cn/WangYan/2012_02_20_66257.shtml  
136 https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1574677454711092&wfr=spider&for=pc 
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as a unity. Overall, the film is seen as the perfect embodiment of “China’s cultural confidence 
and soft power”. 
 
Putting Wolf Warrior 2 in parallel with The Flowers of War yields interesting findings. Despite 
the vastly different background of the stories respectively set against, there is an evident shift 
in the saviour/victim construction. If we track further back to the era of Hero, the change is 
more striking. Following Zhao’s (2010) approach of interpreting Hero as a reflection on 
China’s place in the global political and economic order, the trajectory from Hero to Wolf 
Warrior 2 illustrates the shift not only in China’s position in a neoliberalizing global capitalist 
order, but also the way it is registered and articulated through cinematic expression. From being 
a newly invited member of the global capitalist political economic order in 2002, China has 
embraced and proactively participated in shaping the trajectory of neoliberal globalization 
across the globe. In a way, China’s nationalist ambition and soft power scheme is perfectly 
captured by Wolf Warrior 2, a film essentially talking about China being the protector and 
leader of the third world, warding off first world enemies.  
 
7.4 Where are the invisible? The Piano in A Factory (2010), A Touch of Sin (2013) 
 
Generally there has been a tectonic shift in terms of genre in the post-liberation period thanks 
to increasing commercialization. People came to realize a thriving domestic market relying 
more and more on a string of low to moderate budget films that can struck the right chord with 
the newcomers in China’s film audience–youngsters and inhabitants of smaller cities away 
from the biggest metropolises. In a recent study, regional trade publication Film Business Asia 
found that horror accounted for 12% of Chinese film productions last year, compared with 6% 
in 2003, and that romantic comedies had quadrupled from 2% to 8% over the same period. The 
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unexpected success of romantic comedy or so-called chick flick Love Is Not Blind (2011), 
Finding Mr. Right (2013) and comedy Lost in Thailand (2012) demonstrates the magic power 
of genre film. Even a poor production as Tiny Times (2013) also made a splash at last year’s 
box office which made the concept of fan movie the buzzword for a while. The writer-turned-
director Guo Jingming has a huge built-in audience which is largely comprised of teenage girls. 
The market delivers a much more diverse slate than before. Yet, the option for genre 
experimentation is still severely narrowed by censorship, technical limitations, and capital 
constraints, etc.   
 
What’s worth worrying about in this the situation is the extremely curtailed and biased 
cinematic representations of contemporary society. Social groups with little or no consumption 
power are quite simply rarely seen on the big screen. Chinese cinema as an important public 
space for representation of citizens as part of the nation is highly selective in its representation 
of the population. The award winning A Touch of Sin (2013) which was originally scheduled 
to release in Mainland China in late 2013 was put back on the shelf without any sign of seeing 
the light in the immediate future. Depicting violence by members of an underclass who are 
victims of cosmopolitan China’s new prosperity, this film appeared as a slap in the face for the 
government. At the time I was doing my fieldwork, rumours were that coverage or promotion 
of this film was banned in any official media. While director Jia Zhangke is still doing publicity 
for this film with his Weibo as it is currently screened overseas, the film does not cause any 
ripples in public discussion in Mainland China.   
 
In light of those groups who are under-represented or completely invisible in contemporary 
Chinese films, it is imperative that we question the exclusive nature of the Chinese dream. In 
this section I want to discuss the ways in which the Chinese Dream has been projected onto the 
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Chinese big screen. How does the changing socioeconomic and cultural forces shape the 
entertainment product is one of the central concerns for any political economic research on 
entertainment media. The dilemma is unbridgeable gap between textual analysis in relation to 
its context or the long-debated unreliability of text “reflecting” the context. It should be 
clarified upfront that the analysis of film texts in this thesis by no means taking the movies per 
se as the object of research. The intention is not trying to answer ontological, epistemological 
or aesthetic questions through reading of movies but rather to give a sense of the ways in which 
political economic and ideological issues are materialized through film in line with a particular 
set of logics.   
 
Kapur & Pendakur have argued that “the image as ideology can teach an important lesson about 
the workings of capital. It is, that just as capitalism unites the world, bringing it within its grasp, 
it also fragments and divides it, sharpening the inequalities and rendering the losers invisible” 
(2007: 57).  
 
Jia Zhangke, sometimes referred to as the “the poet of a global China” (Mäkinen, 2018), uses 
films to present a shadowy side of the Chinese society that is almost invisible on big screen. 
Jia’s attempt to articulate an alternative vision of Chinese reality and Chinese dream through 
the movie A Touch of Sin (2013) failed. When questioned about who would go to cinema to 
watch his movie when Jia was promoting this movie at BFI London, Jia responded defensively: 
 
The characters in my movie won’t be able to spend 50rmb on a movie ticket. In some 
sense, it’s not about them, or not just about them. I want those who frequently go to 
movies to understand one fact that, there is another world of reality existing out there, 
alongside with ours. People need to realize the world we are seeing on the screen is not 
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everything. It is my job to make people aware of other realities, realities that are 
overshadowed by China’s economic development, urbanization and globalization. 
These people [in my film] are not irrelevant, they are part of our reality. There are 
claims that my movies are only for intellectuals, this is obviously not my intention. But 
I think intellectuals need to and should watch my movies, despite what they think, they 
don’t truly understand the world I am portraying and the lives living within it. (Jia, BFI, 
8th May 2014) 
 
The same logic applies to the movie Piano in a Factory (2010), an elegy for the glory past of 
the working class in socialist China and its tragic demise of the present. The time when peasants 
and factory workers used to claim to be the subject of Chinese cinema has long gone, together 
with the departed communist revolutionary past. The working class has disappeared into the 
ash heap of history as rhetorical device, with no political identity to assert and certainly, 
minimal market value attached. The disposition of working class in the Chinese society is also 
manifested in their representation in Chinese cinema.  
 
Zhang (2004) expresses the concern that films that do not have commercial potential inevitably 
have to face the possibility of total oblivion. Zhao (2008a) is concerned about the possibility 
that commercialization will render the Chinese film industry “increasingly irrelevant to internal 
class and cultural politics” (2008a: 166). One film is a very good example to demonstrate the 
existing problem. In The Piano in a Factory (2010) directed by Zhang Meng, the issue of 
China’s working class is brought back into public discourse with seemingly odd but absolutely 
necessary timing. The film tells the story of a laid-off worker Chen Guilin, a father fighting for 
custody of his daughter against his ex-wife, who betrayed him and remarried a rich business 
man. The condition for custody is to give their daughter a piano. Without enough money to 
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buy a real one, Chen manages to gather his old co-workers together in the disused factory they 
used to work in to build a piano which is made of steel. Putting aside this film’s artistic 
accomplishment, it has received critical acclaim simply for giving a voice to a neglected social 
group—laid-off workers, those who are considered as the victims of China’s rapid economic 
development.  Unsurprisingly this film did not sell well on the film market in competition with 
big-budget Chinese films and Hollywood films. This example resonates with Zhao’s concern 
that it is increasingly difficult for marginalized voices to enter mainstream discourse, 
sometimes for political or ideological reasons. But what has been overlooked is the effect of 
commercialization in squeezing those seemingly unprofitable products that are attentive to 




For one thing, China’s neoliberalizing cinema is characterized by an ever more intertwined 
relationship between politics and commerce, to the extent that they are mutually feeding each 
other, making them almost undistinguishable sometimes. The belief that propaganda film only 
mirrors the ideological needs of the state is a myth requires deconstruction. It may speak the 
language of socialism on the screen, it plays by the rule of capitalism off the screen. The logic 
of market economy turns making propaganda film into a good business plan for investors who 
only follow the money. In a sense, the government outsources the production of propaganda 
films to private film companies, which ironically couldn’t care less about the ideological 
meaning of the movies. A large proportion of propaganda films are still supported by the local 
government, either financially or through other channels. Ideology has been stripped off its 
ideological overtone by throwing itself into the embrace of capital.  
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The government capitalize politics while the capital parasitize politics, is in and of itself an un-
political and political act at once, which paradoxically, constitutes the very essence of 
depoliticized politics. It becomes a combination of undead zombie and undressed emperor. A 
challenge, then, is how to liberate the bottled-up creative genius of Chinese film production 
not only from the state’s complex system of censorship, but also from a Hollywood-dominated, 
representationally stereotyped and unimaginative global film market in the neoliberal era. 
 
For another, the trajectory of Chinese blockbuster from Hero to Wolf Warrior 2 could be 
juxtaposed with the journey of China incorporating into the global capitalist system. China 
transforms from a small member eager to be reckoned with, the “other” waiting to be heard 
and empathized with, to a forceful presence as a mediator, saviour, and most importantly, a 
storyteller who is able to articulate its own reality and future.  
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I have investigated the restructuring of the Chinese film industry in the context 
of China’s attempted integration into a global neoliberal capitalism system since its WTO entry 
in 2002. Inspired by Chris Berry’s approach of employing “postsocialist cinema” in his study 
on Chinese cinema from 1979-1981, I designate the term “neoliberalizing cinema” to the post-
WTO Chinese film industry, which I consider as institutional and cinematic expressions of the 
process of neoliberalization that contemporary China is going through.  
 
Throughout the years from Hu Jintao’s administration to Xi Jinping’s, the CCP initiated and 
orchestrated institutionalised efforts to construct coherent political narratives in which 
fundamental ideological contradictions were masked and expressed in depoliticized forms in 
the service of sustaining the legitimacy of the regime. Real conflicts between classes were 
plastered over and instead addressed as culture-related and morality-centred problems that are 
inexorable components of China’s modernization process and can be resolved by reviving 
(supposedly) traditional Chinese culture as suggested by Xi’s speech, in which Chinese culture 
was regarded as the most valuable and unproblematic ontological and epistemological 
underpinning for China’s future development. In alignment with what Wang Hui calls the 
politics of depoliticization, the function of Chinese cinema was re-articulated and sutured into 
a broader nationalist project and soft power campaign through a raft of political discourses, 
such as “harmonious socialist society” and “Chinese dream”.  
 
In this thesis I aimed to answer three major research questions: (1) How does the Party-state 
redefine the function of the Chinese film industry and its relation to it in official discourses? 
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(2) What are the characteristics of the marketization and commercialization of the Chinese film 
industry since 2002 and how are they manifested on the textual level?  (3) How do film 
professionals navigate through the rapidly changing Chinese film industry and what are their 
coping strategies?  
 
To answer these above questions, I contextualized my research at the intersection of three lines 
of intellectual enquiry. First, I used the Chinese film industry as a prism for examining the 
interrelationship between marketization and commercialization processes and regime stability 
and legitimacy consolidation in post-WTO China. The notion of neoliberalizing Chinese 
cinema has served well as a lens through which the state-market relationship manifests its 
complexities and contradictions. Second, I zoomed in on the interplay between the party-state, 
domestic capital and transnational media capital and the role each stakeholder plays in 
facilitating the formation of the neoliberalizing Chinese cinema. The power dynamics between 
them have been examined in the context of neoliberal globalization, with particular attention 
paid to the participation of Chinese Internet corporations in shaping the political economic 
setting of the Chinese film industry. Third, I discussed and included film professionals as 
agents of neoliberalizing Chinese cinema, examining their daily struggles and coping strategies 
via the medium of interviews, through which I identified a certain level of industry reflexivity 
and highlighted the tensions of aesthetic, artistic freedom, creativity, cultural and ideological 
demands and the sustainability of funding models.  
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the political economic analysis of China’s media and 
communication sector from a critical perspective is a prolific research area. However, the 
cultural politics of entertainment media, in particular of the Chinese film industry, is seriously 
under researched. This project was undertaken with that gap in mind, and with a focus on the 
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tensions inherent in institutional transformations of the Chinese film industry from both 
institutional and critical political economic perspectives. However, I quickly realized the 
deficiency of this approach in the sense that it fell short of analytical power when dealing with 
questions related to official discourse, film culture, and a more nuanced reading of the context-
text dynamics. Thus I enlisted theoretical and conceptual assistance from media economics, 
cultural industries critiques, and a Foucauldian conception of discourse, to form an integrated 
approach that would help inform a more comprehensive and refined understanding of the 
Chinese film industry. 
 
Methodologically, I combined elite interviewing, critical discourse analysis and secondary data 
analysis. In total between 2013 and 2014 I interviewed 15 industry experts, or cultural 
intermediaries as I defined them in chapter 3. These cultural intermediaries exemplified far 
wider groups of expertise, and were from different sectors of the film industry, including 
policymaking, production, screenwriting, film criticism and film research, as well as self-
employed media practice. The wide range of positions they occupied in the film business 
allowed me to explore different aspects of the film industry. Elite interviews are accompanied 
by critical discourse analysis of key documents and in particular of Xi’s ideologically charged 
speech on Chinese art and literature, which provides a unique perspective on the state-cinema 
relationship. 
 
In the following sections, I revisit and summarise main findings and relate them back to the 
theoretical literature I drew on. In the end, I briefly wrap up key contributions of my research 
and present implications of this thesis for future research on the Chinese film industry. 
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8.2 Re-visiting the state-capital alliance 
 
The Party-state has always previously subordinated the cultural sector to its political interests 
and regarded cultural production as one of the main instruments for propagating and 
maintaining its ideology. This is particularly true for Chinese cinema. However, mounting 
artistic and cultural pressure has been placed on the liberatory potentials of an increasingly 
marketised and commercialised film industry based on the premise that economic liberation of 
media production could lead to political change.   
 
I argue against the widely accepted dichotomous understanding of the state-market relationship 
in China, and instead propose a critical theory of neoliberalization as the overarching 
theoretical framework to investigate the role of the Party-state in fostering industry 
restructuring of the Chinese film industry.  
 
Indeed, with productive and destructive consequences running in tandem, the 21st century has 
witnessed a commercial logic commanding the Chinese film industry in a way unprecedented 
in the history of Chinese cinema. Economic liberation has driven large scale institutional 
restructuring in the sectors of production, distribution and exhibition, and has also brought 
about changes in the state capital-private capital relationship. Yet this is by no means a linear 
narrative in the form of push and pull between the undisrupted progression of 
commercialization and the continuous retreat of politics from the cultural sphere. Underlying 
the ostensibly comprehensive liberalized economic policies lies an unswerving ideological 
bottom line. The state engineers economic reforms in the film industry in a manner that keeps 
any challenge to the official political ideology and cultural rhetoric of the day at bay. 
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In terms of its relationship with domestic capital, the state is transforming itself into a new 
actuality composed of multiple roles: supervisor, protector, collaborator and competitor. 
Exemplified by CFG, the state withdraws from actual production and focuses on the 
reinforcement of its powers in the arena of distribution, especially the distribution rights to 
imported foreign films. The state channels the majority of its resources into investing in major 
commercial films, be these domestic or Hollywood blockbusters, ready to reap the economic 
benefits with minimal capital risks.  
 
In this context the CFG is forming closer relationships with domestic capital in producing 
blockbusters that can turn great profits. Examples of investment in domestic blockbuster 
movies are John Woo’s two-part historical epic Red Cliff I (2008) & II (2009) as well as 
Stephen Chow’s sci-fi hit CJ7 (2008). Externally, in 2014 CFG joined Paramount’s Marco 
Polo” project as a minority financial investor, which had produced fantasy movies like 
Warcraft (2016) and Seventh Son (2014). 137  As I highlighted in foregoing chapters, Liu 
attributed CFG’s reduced interest in film production to the lack of motivation because “moving 
away from production to capital investment is a smart business strategy for CFG since 
production has never been its strength, especially after the massive scale of infrastructure 
changes ensued after intensive marketization  in the film sector” (personal interview, Beijing, 
17th Sep 2013).  
 
Tensions arise between CFG and domestic private media companies when they compete on the 
economic front in terms of seeking for partnership opportunities with transnational capital. The 
former holds the upper hand due to its monopolistic power in controlling import quota. It gives 
them an advantageous position in comparison to private corporations and affords them 
 
137 https://variety.com/2014/film/spotlight/china-film-group-1201243320/  
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enormous bargaining power when making co-production slate deals or investment deals with 
transnational media corporations. In this regard, BAT-backed film corporations, particularly 
Alibaba Pictures and Tencent Pictures, are in better positions to form alliances with 
transnational media capital owing to their deep pockets, which further consolidate their status 
in the film industry. Big Hollywood titles under Alibaba Pictures’ name include Mission: 
Impossible 5 (2015) & 6 (2018), Star Trek Beyond (2016). Tencent Pictures are behind the 
production of movies such as Kong: Skull Island (2017), Wonder Woman (2017), and Venom 
(2018).  
 
The CFG’s strategic choice of moving away from production does not mean that they have 
abandoned the production of traditional main melody propagandistic movies. The CFG either 
focuses on making big-budget propagandistic blockbusters like The Founding of a Republic 
(2009), or outsources propaganda productions to smaller private film companies, although 
without guaranteed compensation. Chen’s story is a great case in point (see chapter 4). And in 
this case, film-making practices operate in ways defying market logic.  
 
We can find discrepancies between ideological narratives articulated in official discourses and 
the actual materialization of those principles and how they are acted upon and appropriated 
amongst media elites and professionals.  
 
Since early the 1990s, the Chinese government has been actively pushing through its market 
reform agenda in its cultural and media sectors and this has already begun to bear fruit. The 
exponential growth of the Chinese film industry is therefore significantly tied to the 
government’s apparently encouraging and permissive cultural policies. Marketization has 
penetrated into every facet of the film industry as the Chinese government shows determination 
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in its push for economic reform in the cultural sector featuring key prescriptions of neoliberal 
media policy regimes: liberation, deregulation, and privatization. 
 
Riding on this wave of globalization and convergence, Chinese cinema is going through a 
period that is completely swept up in capitalist logic, albeit with the state still trying to keep it 
in-line with their ideological imperatives. 
  
The state is therefore holding on to its historical ideological legacy of treating cinema as an 
important instrument for socialist education in official discourses. However, political 
imperatives are overtly downplayed while economic aspects of the film industry are 
foregrounded, cultural dimensions are enhanced to a strategic level demonstrated by the state’s 
ambitions to Chinese soft power. Therefore, there remains a discrepancy within the state’s 
discourse pertaining to the cultural industries and cinema itself and between the discourse and 
the practices. 
 
Returning to the theoretical frameworks with which the opening chapters started, the Chinese 
cultural sector plays an important role in ensuring and maintaining regime stability not only by 
influencing economic development and communicating with the population, but also by 
offering opportunities for the regime to exploit the ideological potential of cultural products, 
either directly, by making direct normative appeals, or indirectly, by communicating a world 
view. Alongside this, the state manoeuvres both domestic and transnational capital to maintain 
its monopolistic role in the Chinese film industry through institutional mechanisms, such as 
CFG and China Movie Channel (CCTV6).  
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Scholars have done research on the dismantling effect of marketization and commercialization 
on state-owned studios in the new century. A central argument of some existing studies is that 
the Chinese government is trying to strengthen its economic power against the rapidly growing 
private sector by manoeuvring an emerging domestic film market that is carefully designed 
and strictly supervised by the state itself. This view is particularly welcomed by scholars 
specialising in political economic analysis of media and cultural production in a wide range of 
realms.  
 
With the old nationalized cinema system being dismantled by virtue of the state’s push for 
marketization and commercialization, the state is overtly retreating from the production sector, 
leaving it apparently almost completely to the hands of private capital. Meanwhile, to make 
sure the output of main melody propagandistic movies, the state offers economic incentives or 
rewards of other sorts to lure private companies to fill the gaps left by their own departure. This 
specific political demand is realized through officially endorsed exhibition outlets and 
platforms, such as China Movie Chanel (CCTV6) and overseas Chinese film festivals.  
 
This, then, creates a niche market driven by political imperatives instead of market demands, 
a market carefully monitored by the state and sustained through government outsourcing 
projects to private companies, mostly small film companies with government connections, or 
other kinds of political capital. However, the power imbalance prescribed between the state 
and private companies means there is no guaranteed compensation or economic return for the 
latter. The invisible market renders many end products (films) invisible to mass publics, with 
minimal economic value for producers. This kind of politically curtailed market behaviour is 
made possible by opportunistic capital with connection to government, which does not always 
yield satisfying results in return. Main melody movies remain another form of big-budget 
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commercial blockbuster that is well packaged with A-list stars, reasonably high production 
values, favourable release scheduling, high profile marketing campaign, but little criticality or 
innovation in other artistic matters and a stiflingly homogenising reference to the nation.   
 
8.3 Neoliberalizing Chinese cinema and depoliticizing film workers 
 
I reprise the concept of “cultural intermediary” to account for three empirical findings with 
regard to how film professionals perceive and cope with challenges arising from their day-to-
day filmmaking practices. The first finding is a response to a wider conversation about media 
professionals serving as agents of political changes in so-called authoritarian contexts. 
Professional identifications with filmmaking practices are historically formulated, and are 
manifested in shifting patterns of film culture enabled by technological development, political 
environment and economic conditions, etc.  
 
In recent years, there have been a handful of studies elucidating the political implications of 
Chinese film professionals’ work in the sense of whether their filmmaking activities help foster 
institutional changes or contribute to regime stability (Chu, 2012; Meyer-Clement, 2016). 
These studies share a commonality: that is, they regard politics as the principal dimension in 
the construction of professional identity for Chinese film workers. I appreciate their approach 
but argue for a slightly different one. My fieldwork as analyzed in this thesis leads to the 
conclusion that other elements like personal fulfilment, artistic pursuits, monetary motives are 
equally important aspects in constructing professional identity.  
 
The mental struggle of balancing individual artistic vision with political and commercial 
constraints is palpable for film practitioners on a daily basis, though to varying degree. One 
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way of coping with the challenge is to exercise agency in a highly de-politicized manner, 
channelling creative energy into filmmaking activities that are either considered politically 
safe, or in accordance with the official ideologies, in some cases pandering to the Party-state. 
The fact that Chinese film workers actively transform themselves into de-politicized subjects 
in their professional work, indicates that neoliberalism as a national hegemonic project remains 
at the industry’s core. However, this does not mean there is no room for negotiation within the 
space of cinematic representation.  
 
The second finding is that Hollywood is at one and the same time the role model to imitate, the 
arch-rival to compete with, and the ultimate enemy to ward off. These contradictory ideas are 
so deeply ingrained in the mind sets of film professionals and government officials that, to 
them, “globalization” by default equals Hollywoodisation.  
 
Thirdly, it is absolutely clear that elites in film production circles have no intention of fulfilling 
the Party’s avowed socialist objective of serving the people. Media elites in China interpret the 
discourse of “serving the people” very differently from the de facto meaning of the state’s 
ideology. The Chinese people are considered as consumers first and foremost, and with 
differential purchasing power, based on which they are categorized. Cinema becomes 
something that is more and more similar to other entertainment options, such as games, short 
online movies, and so on. 
 
Thus the tumultuous, unbridled and unruly forces of capital have turned the Chinese film 
industry into a disorderly and even anarchic site onto which the censorship mechanism has 
descended as only a secondary factor in the suppression of dissenting creativity. Films with 
social relevance and genre awareness are returning profits, but very rarely do these particularly 
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successful films shed light on subjects that touch upon the real nerves at the heart of 
contemporary Chinese society. 
 
8.4 Limitations and agenda for future research 
 
This thesis is by no means without limitations. For instance, the empirical information 
generated from elite interviews in the present research is by and large from Beijing. The 
findings are expected to be enriched or contested by future research which centres on cultural 
production in other tier one and tier two cities. Additionally, had time permitted, I would have 
liked to include and analyze further policy documents from the past three years, and to examine 
the ways in which predictions in my interviews have been proven or fallen by the wayside.  
 
Apart from the above methodological reflections, this research may also illuminate possible 
future theoretical and empirical studies focusing on one specific sector of the Chinese film 
industry, from production, to distribution, and exhibition, paying particular attention to how 
the dynamics between these sectors are disrupted and reconfigured by external forces such as 
the entry of technology conglomerates. Another possible direction for future research is to dive 
deeper into the field site to put the daily activities of film workers under microscope and to 
investigate the actual workings of the filmmaking process through participant observation. I 
believe that the empirical studies of the negotiations, contestations and struggles film workers 
have to experience in their creative cultural work on a daily basis are urgently needed. 
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Appendix 1: Informed Consent form (translated version) 
 
Study consent form: Political economy of the Chinese film industry 
 
Researcher: Xiaoxi Zhu, PhD student, LSE, Department of Media and Communications 
e-mail: X.Zhu6@lse.ac.uk 
Phone number: +86-17368167318 (China), +44-7549247815 (UK) 
 
I volunteer to participate in this interview. 
I have been informed about the nature and details of this study, and I agree to share my 
perspective on the subject. 
I am aware and consent to the usage of voice recording and subsequent transcription of the 
interview. Only the researcher, Xiaoxi Zhu, will have the access to these transcripts and my 
personal data will be protected.  
 
I know that the findings of this study may be reported in future publications or conference 
presentations. In such cases, I understand my real name will be altered, and I reserve the right 
not to be identified.  
 
 
I agree with the statement above. 
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Appendix 2: Demographic information of the respondents 
 
No Name  Affiliation  
1 Peng Kan (彭侃)  P&D Director, 
Legend Media Co. Ltd. 
2 Su Yi (苏毅) Wechat public account: Yue Mu (悦幕)  
3 Sun Hongyun (孙红云) Associate Professor, Beijing Film Academy 
4 Raymond Zhou (周黎明) China Daily Columnist, film critic  
5 Ben Ji Erwei (戢二卫) Managing Director/Producer, Reach Glory 
6 Zhou Tiedong (周铁东) President, China Film Promotion International (CFPI) 
7 Pan Yanyun (潘烟云) Production manager, 
UCE Group INC. Beijing 
8 Guo Xiaoping (郭晓平) Director of the Market Research Center, Bona Film 
Group 
9 Chen Honglin (陈鸿霖) Producer, Great Promise Media (Beijing) Co. Ltd. 
 
10 Zhang Wanmin (张万民) Governing Director-Genenral China, Asia 
Film&Television Federation 
11 Jin Fuxin (靳赋新) Vice President, China Film Stellar Theatre Chain 
12 Amy Liu (刘新颖) Vice President, EntGroup 
13 Stego Film Editor  
14 Xu Yunze (许云泽) Screenwriter, Film Workshop Co., Ltd. 
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15 Huang He (黄河) Vice President of Production and International Affairs, 
Desen International Media Co. Ltd. 
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Appendix 3: The list of participant observations  
 
Event  Participants  Time  Location  
Book launch for 号脉
电影 
Zhou Tiedong (Writer, 
President, CFPI) 
Zhou liming (Film critic, 
ChinaDaily) 






China devise a 




Zhou Tiedong (Chair) 
Luan Guozhi (Deputy 
chief, SAPPRFT) 
Stanley Rosen (Professor, 
USC) 
Patrick Frater (Asian 
Bureau Chief, Variety) 
Jiang Yanming 
(President&CEO, China 
Lion Film Distribution) 
Wang Fan (Film scholar) 
4th Sep 2013 
2:00pm 
Novotel Peace 
Hotel, Beijing  
Q&A with Feng 
Xiaogang 
Feng Xiaogang 21st Feb 2014 BFI, London 
Q&A with Jia 
Zhangke 
Jia Zhangke 8th May 2014 BFI, London 
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Appendix 4: Talks at the Forum on Literature and Art Work 
 
Xi Jinping’s talk at the Beijing Forum on Literature and Art138 
15th October, 2014 
 
Striking out at Vulgar Popular Culture 
Since reform and opening, our nation’s arts have ushered in a new springtime, with the creation 
of a great many of acclaimed works. At the same time, it cannot be denied that, from the 
perspective of artistic creation, we have quantity over quality and problems of plagiarism, 
imitation, stereotypes and repetition, assembly-line production, and fast-food consumption. 
Some works ridicule the sublime, warp the classics, subvert history, or defile the masses and 
heroic characters. In others good and evil cannot be distinguished, ugliness replaces beauty, 
and the dark side of society is over-emphasized. Still others blindly chase and cater to public 
tastes, vulgar interests, chase financial gain, and provoke the “ecstasy” of the senses. Others 
churn out baseless works of shoddy quality and make irrelevant comparisons, creating a kind 
of cultural “garbage,” while others pursue luxury, flaunt wealth and ostentation, and emphasize 
external appearance over content. There are also those obsessed with the so-called “art for art’s 
sake”, who remove themselves from the masses and reality. All of these should be a warning 
to us: the arts must not lose their direction within the trend of the market economy, they must 
not deviate on the question of whom they are for, otherwise art will have no vitality. 
 
On the Fickleness of Contemporary Culture 
In discussions with several people in the arts, I asked what was the most obvious problem in 
the arts. Without prior discussion, all brought up the same word: fickleness. Some feel that if 
 
138 http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-10/14/c_1116825558.htm 
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you cannot realize a pragmatic value in a work of art or make money out of it, it’s not worth it. 
Not only can this type of attitude mislead the creative process, it can also allow vulgar works 
to become very popular, letting the bad money drive out the good. As the history of human 
artistic endeavours makes clear, short-sightedness and creating shoddy works is not only a kind 
of injury to the arts, but also a kind of injury to the moral life of society. Entertaining the simple 
sense organs will not equate to a happy spirit. The arts must win the people’s approval, fancy 
but ineffectual work is not acceptable and egotistical self-promotion is not acceptable. 
 
The Market Value of the Arts is Secondary to Social Value 
Compared to social benefits, economic benefits are secondary. If a conflict arises between the 
two, economic benefit must be subservient to the social benefit, and market value must be 
subservient to social value. The arts cannot be a slave to the market, they must not be covered 
in filthy lucre. When it comes to outstanding works of art, it is best if they first achieve success 
in terms of ideology and art, and subsequently are welcomed by the market. The ideals of 
aesthetics and the independent value of art must be maintained, and while we cannot neglect 
and ignore indicators such as distribution, ratings, click-through rates, box office gross, and 
others, we also cannot prioritize these indicators and be led by the market. 
 
A Conservative and Patriotic View of Arts 
Contemporary arts must also take patriotism as a theme, leading the people to establish and 
maintain correct views of history, nationality, statehood, and culture while firmly building up 
the integrity and confidence of the Chinese people. 
 
Arts Must Not Chase After the Foreign 
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If we treat the foreign with reverence, treat the foreign as beautiful, only follow the foreign, 
take overseas prize-seeking as the highest goal, blindly following and unsuccessfully 
impersonating others, there is absolutely no future! In fact, foreigners have also come to us 
seeking inspiration and source materials, with Hollywood making Kung Fu Panda, Mulan, and 
other films using our cultural resources. 
 
On the Need to Sanitize Foreign Art Forms 
After reform and opening, our country widely studied and borrowed from the world’s arts. 
Nowadays, circumstances are still the same, and many art forms arise from overseas, such as 
hip-hop, breakdance, etc., but we should only adopt them if the masses approve of them, while 
also endowing them with healthy, progressive content. 
 
Foreign Films Stimulate the Domestic Industry 
Nowadays the world is an open world, and the arts must also compete in the global marketplace, 
and without competition there is no vitality. For example, in the realm of film, which is 
experiencing market competition, foreign films have not defeated our domestically produced 
films, but have stimulated our domestic film production to raise its quality and standards, to 
develop in the midst of market competition, and possess even greater competitive power. 
 
On the Need for Greater Control of New Art Forms 
When it comes to the production and distribution of traditional arts and culture, we have a set 
of relatively mature organizational systems and management measures in place, but for new 
art forms we still lack effective management methods and techniques. In this matter, we must 
catch up and work hard to come to a resolution. We must deepen reforms, improve policies, 
and establish robust systems in order to create quality products and develop talent. 
